Article 2
This Decision is addressed to:
Airtours plc Parkway One
Parkway Business Centre
300 Princess Road
Manchester M14 7QU United Kingdom.
Done at Brussels, 22 September 1999.
For the Commission
Mario Monti
Member of the Commission
(1) OJ L 395, 30.12.1989, p. 1; corrected version in OJ L 257, 21.9.1990, p. 13.
(2) OJ L 180, 9.7.1997, p. 1.
(3) OJ C 105, 13.4.2000.
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(5) Parts of this text have been edited to ensure that confidential information is not disclosed; those parts are enclosed in square brackets and marked with an asterisk.
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(7) Parts of this text have been edited to ensure that confidential information is not disclosed; those parts are enclosed in square brackets and marked with an asterisk.
(8) For example, Commission Decision in Case IV/M.1502 - Kuoni/First Choice (OJ C 139 19.5.1999, p. 3), and Commission Decision in Case IV/M.1341 - Westdeutsche Landesbank/Carlson/Thomas Cook (OJ C 102 13.4.1999, p. 9).
(9) Kuoni/First Choice case, cited in footnote 4.
(10) Reply to Commission's Statement of Objections, paragraphs 2.20 to 2.31.
(11) The British Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC) took a similar view, for similar reasons, in its investigation of the sector, ("Foreign Package Holidays"), December 1997, Cmnd 3813, p. 12, paragraph 2.21, ("1997 Report").
(12) Notification, pp. 19 and 23 to 25.
(13) Paragraph 2.22.
(14) Notification, in particular paragraphs 6.52 to 6.60.
(15) The MMC, in its 1997 report, table 3.3, indicates that in 1996, Spain and Greece together accounted for 5,5 million package holidays from the United Kingdom out of a total for Europe (including Turkey) of 9,5 million - or nearly 60 %, with Spain alone accounting for 45 %. This proportion has probably decreased sine then but Spain remains the most popular package holiday destination.
(16) Notification, Section 6, and sources quoted there; flights to Eastern Mediterranean destinations or the Canary Islands may take up to around four hours.
(17) Notification, table 6.9, source AC Nielsen. Short-haul figures are set out in table 1 of this Decision.
(18) Notification, paragraph 6.64.
(19) Notification, paragraph 6.58.
(20) Source: "Hot!" - Airtours' in-flight magazine, winter 1998/1999.
(21) Reply to Statement of Objections, p. 22, paragraph 2.43(iii).
(22) For example, the popular Lonely Planet travel guide makes the following comment in regard to Orlando, Florida: "July and August are very hot and humid with highs around 90 °F (33 °C), 95 % humidity and frequent downpours."
(23) Annex 1(a) to reply of 29 June 1999 to Commission enquiry.
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(26) Parts of this text have been edited to ensure that confidential information is not disclosed; those parts are enclosed in square brackets and marked with an asterisk.
(27) This reflects the view expressed by long-haul operator Kuoni on this point at the oral hearing.
(28) Table 2.6, p. 21.
(29) Annex 2 to reply of 29 June 1999 to the Commission's enquiry.
(30) BA Holidays "world offers" poster, produced by Airtours at the oral hearing, and showing prices available in July 1999 for travel in September or October 1999.
(31) Reply to Statement of Objections, p. 2, paragraph 1.8.
(32) Tables 2.4 and 2.5 and paragraphs 2.37 to 2.39.
(33) The MMC, in its 1997 report, cited in footnote 7, excluded direct sales operations and telephone sales from its market definition when considering competition between travel agents (paragraphs 2.24 and 4.29).
(34) As, for instance, described by the MMC in its 1997 report, paragraphs 2.69 to 2.83.
(35) The figures are for 1998. Source: British National Travel Survey (BNTS), paragraph 6.149 of the notification.
(36) It should also be considered in this connection that while some small operators in specialist-interest niches may make extensive use of direct sales, those that offer typical mass market holidays in competition with the major integrated operators are more dependent on distribution through travel agents.
(37) Commission estimate, based on Form CO and MMC 1997 report.
(38) Nearly 90 % according to survey data reproduced by the parties in table 6.17 of the notification.
(39) Notification, tables 6.17 and 6.19.
(40) 1998, source: BNTS, reproduced in table 6.17 of the notification.
(41) Source: press article enclosed by Airtours in its reply of 29 June 1999 to the Commission enquiry.
(42) Transparency and documentation accompanying Airtours' presention at the oral hearing, "low-cost airlines - who flies where", p. 18.
(43) Letter to Airtours from seat brokers Hunt & Palmer, Apendix 5 to the reply to the Statement of Objections, and quoted at paragraph 3.48 of the reply.
(44) According to one major tour operator, in the great majority of cases, the only direct flilght available to a "summer sun destination", estecially from regional airports, will be a charter flight or, for the more popular destinations, one from a "leisure" airline such as BA's recently created "Go".
(45) BA offers some whole-plane charters at weekends from British regional airports, using aircraft not required for scheduled services at those times. This is, however, understood to be a small-scale operation, and BA has indicated that it has no plans to expand it substantially.
(46) Information on relative prices supplied by Airtours at the oral hearing (paper by Professor Neven, p. 10 and table 5) in support of its view that prices for selected scheduled and charter flights were comparable, also indicates that the operator in question charged (or was charged) a supplement for the scheduled flight in each of the five instances examined
(47) For example, the Commission Decisions in the following cases: Havas Voyages/American Express (IV/M.564) (OJ C 117, 12.5.1995, p. 8); Thomas Cook Group/LTU/West LB (IV/M.229), (OJ C 199, 6.8.1992); West LB/Thomas Cook (IV/M.350) (OJ C 216, 11.8.1993); Wagons-Lits/Carlson (IV/M.867) (OJ C 202, 2.7.1997, p. 4); Westdeutsche Landesbank/Carlson/Thomas Cook (IV/M.1341), cited in footnote 4.
(48) Commission Decision 97/26/EC, Case IV/M.619 - Gencor/Lonrho (OJ L 11, 14.1.1997, p. 30); judgment of the Court of First Instance of 25 March 1999 in Case T-102/96, Gencor v Commission, not yet published.
(49) For example, as in paragraph 5.2, first indent, on p. 56 of their reply to the Commission's Statement of Objections: "the allegedly collectively dominant firms must be able to reach tacit agreement to raise prices".
(50) See paragraph 70 ff.
(51) For example, paragraph 5.2, third indent.
(52) "Collective dominance" and "oligopolistic dominance" are used as syonyms in this Decision.
(53) Notification, paragraph 6.23.
(54) Parts of this text have been edited to ensure that confidential information is not disclosed; those parts are enclosed in square brackets and marked with an asterisk.
(55) Parts of this text have been edited to ensure that confidential information is not disclosed; those parts are enclosed in square brackets and marked with an asterisk.
(56) Parts of this text have been edited to ensure that confidential information is not disclosed; those parts are enclosed in square brackets and marked with an asterisk.
(57) "Competition in the UK foreign package holiday market: An economic analysis", paper by Professor Neven prepared for Airtours and presented at the Hearing, p. 3, last paragraph.
(58) As defined by the MMC in its 1997 report, this covers a variety of specific practices - such as only offering a competitor's product to a customer if an equivalent "own" product is unavailable - see paragraphs 1.9 and 7.59.
(59) 1997 report, paragraphs 2.84 to 2.97.
(60) Figures for the parties are at paragraph 6.158 of the notification.
(61) Based on actual passenger carrying figures from major operators and on total market size figures from BNTS and corroborated by Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) data.
(62) The MMC 1997 report (paragraph 3.20) gives the total for 1997 as about 1000, although there has probably been some decline since then.
(63) See p. 33, paragraph 3.27.
(64) Seat brokers help to match supply and demand by selling to tour operators and others any spare capacity which airlines wish to dispose of as surplus to their own requirements.
(65) Co-op Travel, with a 9 % market share in distribution, is not integrated, but it is less significant in the South of England than in the rest of the United Kingdom.
(66) Paragraph 2.164. However, the MMC did not, in the circumstances prevailing at the time, find this practice to have been against the public interest.
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(68) [...].
(69) On page 32 of their reply to the Statement of Objections, the parties quote Libra Holidays as an example of an independent tour operator which has expanded capacity. The Commission notes that Libra Holidays is a specialist operator. It is also noted that Libra Holidays, even with the capacity expansion, will continue to be a very small operator. However, more importantly, the Commission has not said that no new small independent tour operating companies will be established in the future. The Commission has only said that the group of independent tour operators has been and will be increasingly marginalised.
(70) Source: Nielsen via Airtours.
(71) Package holidays.
(72) Reply to the Statement of Objections, pp. 31 and 32.
(73) The characteristics listed are substantially those employed in previous Commission Decisions in Merger Regulation cases where oligopoly ("collective dominance") was an issue; see Gencor/Lonrho, cited in footnote 41, and Commission Decision 1999/152/EC in Case IV/M. 1016, Price Waterhouse/Coopers & Lybrand (OJ L 50, 26.2.1999, p. 27).
(74) Notification, p. 30, paragraph 6.40.
(75) Notification, p. 30, paragraphs 6.40 and 6.41.
(76) Reply to the Statement of Objections, paragraphs 2.10 to 2.19.
(77) Presentation of Professor Neven and Alan Overd, Lexecon at the hearing.
(78) This is not inconsistent with statements in the yearly report on competition policy (for example, the yearly report, 1996). See also Commission Decision 92/553/EEC in Case IV/M.190 - Nestlé/Perrier (OJ L 356, 5.12.1992, p. 1).
(79) MMC 1997 report, table 3.1. The same table shows that the proportion of these which were package holidays has remained relatively constant in recent years at around 55 %.
(80) Reply to the Statement of Objections, p. 7, paragraph 2.5.
(81) Reply to the Statement of Objections, p. 7, paragraph 2.6.
(82) Changing tastes are discussed in the section on product homogeneity, paragraph 88 ff., and the impact of low-cost airlines is discussed in the section on supply of airline seats, paragraph 34 ff.
(83) Exogenous shocks could take place in the platinum market (Gencor/Lonrho case, cited in footnote 41) for example through strikes, or in the bottled-water market, for example due to contamination of the water (Nestlé/Perrier case, cited in footnote 68). However, in neither of these markets were exogenous shocks considered to make the markets less conducive to oligopolistic dominance.
(84) Indeed, if exogenous shocks became a normal feature of the market, then it is to be expected that they would be treated as endogenous variables in forecasting demand, i.e. they would be explicitly taken into account. This would reduce the disruptive impact of the shocks on capacity planning. Moreover, such events are related to some countries or destinations and will not necessarily affect the overall demand and supply as holidaymakers seek other destinations and redistribute flying capacity and seek additional accommodation at other destinations.
(85) Reply to the Statement of Objections, p. 67, paragraph 5.52.
(86) Reply to the Statement of Objections, p. 69, paragraph 5.53.
(87) Paper by Professor Neven, p. 4, third line, cited in footnote 47.
(88) Notification, paragraphs 6.49 to 6.51, 6.137 to 6.139 and 6.166.
(89) Paragraphs 4.39, 4.53 to 4.55.
(90) A comparison of the figures for all tour operating in table 4.2 of the MMC 1997 report and the equivalent ones in table 6.4 of the notification suggests that the share of the four largest tour operators has increased from around 54 % to over 60 % in the two years from 1996 to 1998. Since most of the acquisitions involved have been in the short-haul sector, the increase in concentration there is likely to have been even more marked.
(91) Notification, p. 32, paragraph 6.49.
(92) Reply to the Statement of Objections, overview section, point 3.
(93) The largest independent retailer is Co-op Travel, with a share of 9 %.
(94) In theory, consumers could partly offset the effects of directional selling etc. by shopping around between agencies and other sales points. But is appears they do this only to a limited extent. The MMC 1997 report (paragraph 5.118) found that only about half of consumers buying a package holiday visited more than one travel agent before doing so.
(95) In a tight market, a tour operator confronted with a request for a lower price would simply refuse, because the tour operator would know that in all likelihood it will be possible to sell the holiday anyway.
(96) At the hearing, the economic consultant of the parties, Lexecon, argued that market shares are volatile. As evidence of that, the graph from the notification, p. 34, paragraph 6.51 was reproduced at the hearing. It should be noted that this graph includes acquisitions. If acquisitions are excluded, then there is very little movement in market shares. Therefore, there is no evidence that the underlying market shares are volatile. On the contrary, they have been relatively stable.
(97) Parts of this text have been edited to ensure that confidential information is not disclosed; those parts are enclosed in square brackets and marked with an asterisk.
(98) Parts of this text have been edited to ensure that confidential information is not disclosed; those parts are enclosed in square brackets and marked with an asterisk.
(99) Wall Street Journal Europe, 23 April 1999.
(100) Thomas Cook is jointly controlled by Westdeutsche Landesbank and Preussag.
(101) The calculation is based on the market-share data of the Commission and not AC Nielsen data.
(102) The creation of a substantial independent retail operation by a new entrant (or substantial expansion of existing independent agencies) is not considered likely for some time to come. Suitable retail sites are not cheap, and town planning and other restrictions may apply to their development. Internet and digital television selling operations undoubtedly have great potential, but it appears to be for the longer term; one major operator has suggested that it would take 5 to 10 years to build a substantial retail business in the United Kingdom through these emerging technologies. See the sections on the fringe, recitals 75 ff., and on barriers to entry, recitals 113 ff.
(103) Slides from presentation of Lexecon and Professor Neven; paper of Professor Neven, cited in footnote 47.
(104) Slides from presentation of Lexecon and Professor Neven.
(105) Airtours also argued that the fringe are effective competitors constraining the large integrated operators. For the reasons discussed earlier, the Commission does not consider that the fringe constrains the large operators.
(106) In the Gencor/Lonrho case, cited in footnote 41, the Commission did not argue that a specific punishment mechanism was necessary nor did the Court of First Instance in its judgment put any emphasis on this point.
(107) At the hearing the parties argued that in previous cartel cases such as the Cement case (see Commission Decision 94/815/EC in Cases IV/33.126 and 33.322 (OJ L 343, 30.12.1994, p. 1)) the suppliers had kept large over-capacities and had retailiated against cheating by oversupplying the market by up to 40 %. According to the parties there is no evidence that this would be the case in this market. In the view of the Commission it is not appropriate to draw a comparison with this type of cartel case. In any case, it should be noted that a 40 % oversupply is not necessary for effective retaliation in the British market for short-haul foreign package holidays.
(108) Notification, paragraph 6.128.
(109) Parts of this text have been edited to ensure that confidential information is not disclosed; those parts are enclosed in square brackets and marked with an asterisk.
(110) Parts of this text have been edited to ensure that confidential information is not disclosed; those parts are enclosed in square brackets and marked with an asterisk.
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(129) Parts of this text have been edited to ensure that confidential information is not disclosed; those parts are enclosed in square brackets and marked with an asterisk.
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(132) [...](133)(133) Parts of this text have been edited to ensure that confidential information is not disclosed; those parts are enclosed in square brackets and marked with an asterisk.
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(135) OJ L 61, 2.3.1998, p. 1.
