Article 3
This Decision is addressed to: Visa International Service Association European Union Region 99 High Street Kensington London W8 5TE.
Done at Brussels, 24 July 2002.
For the Commission
Mario Monti
Member of the Commission
(1) OJ 13, 21.2.1962, p. 204.
(2) OJ L 148, 15.6.1999, p. 5.
(3) OJ L 354, 30.12.1998, p. 18.
(4) OJ C 286, 22.11.2002.
(5) In its letter of 23 March 1994 Visa International requested the Commission to extend its existing notification to Article 53(1) and (3) EEA.
(6) OJ L 293, 10.11.2001, p. 24.
(7) The Visa membership provisions are under examination in the context of case COMP/37.860 and are not the subject of the present decision, which is adopted without prejudice to the outcome of the Commission's examination of that case.
(8) As approved by the Visa EU Board on 27 June 2001, and subsequently modified and extended, the final Visa Proposal being described in section 3.2.3 below.
(9) With the exception of the new distinct intra-regional interchange rate for mail order and telephone payments (see section 3.2.3.4 below), which will be implemented by April 2003.
(10) According to Visa these Member States are Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden. The Visa Rules also contain provisions relating to cash disbursement reimbursement fees, to be paid by the ATM acquirer to the card issuer. These fees are not the subject of the complaint by EuroCommerce, nor of the present decision.
(11) Parts of this text have been edited to ensure that confidential information is not disclosed; those parts are enclosed in square brackets and marked with an asterisk.
(12) Visa defines the interchange reimbursement fee as "a fee reimbursed by an acquirer to an issuer in the clearing and settlement of an interchange transaction" (Visa EU Regional Operating Regulations, [...]*).
(13) Commercial cards (that is, cards issued to business users for their business expenses only) were excluded from the initial proposal for modifications because, according to Visa, they constitute a relatively new product with specific characteristics which may only be issued to individuals to enable them to pay for business expenditures. Following the comments made by the complainant and third parties (see section 6 below) [...]*. However, as said above (recital 9) the present decision does not cover the current [...]* MIF for commercial cards. Where in this decision reference is made to the Visa proposal for a modified MIF scheme, this relates exclusively to the proposal made with regard to Visa EU intra-regional POS transactions with consumer cards.
(14) Debit cards are also known as direct debit cards or immediate debit cards.
(15) The reduction in the weighted average MIF for credit and deferred debit transactions is to be achieved in the following stages: 2002, [0,81 % to 0,93 %]*; 2003 [0,78 % to 0,90 %]*; 2004, [0,77 % to 0,89 %]*; 2005 [0,74 % to 0,86 %]*; 2006 [0,70 % to 0,82 %]*; 2007, 0,7 %.
(16) This corresponds, for deferred debit cards, to the cost of any time difference between payment to the acquirer and debiting of funds from the cardholder's current account. For credit cards, it corresponds only to the cost of any time difference between payment to the acquirer and the time when either payment must be made by the cardholder, or the balance of the credit card bill rolled over into the extended credit facility, to which a rate of interest is applied (that is, it does not include any costs arising from the granting of extended credit to cardholders). For debit cards, it represents only the processing time necessary to debit the transaction to the cardholder account; for deferred debit and credit cards it represents also the extra interest-free period before which payment must be made or extended credit used.
(17) Visa does not use the terminology "payment guarantee". In the present decision, this term is used to describe the promise of the issuing bank to honour payments to the acquiring bank, even those which turn out to be, inter alia, fraudulent or for which the cardholder ultimately defaults, on condition that the merchant undertakes all the security checks necessary to enable the issuing bank to promise payment. As concerns default losses, only losses occurring during the free-funding period are to be included in the MIF cost study.
(18) Visa has informed the Commission of the subcategories of costs which will be included within the three main categories. This information is considered as business secrets by Visa.
(19) These categories are [...]* and [...]*.
(20) From EuroCommerce's complaint, it is clear that it is not advocating the "prohibition of the MIF" in the sense of the removal of any default arrangement on the terms of exchange of debt between the issuing bank and the acquiring bank (which would leave issuing banks free to impose unilaterally any interchange discount rate they wish), but rather, EuroCommerce wishes the Commission to impose on Visa "the exchange of paper at par", which would amount to leaving the MIF in place but reducing its level to zero, as in the Canadian Interac system.
(21) Case COMP/36.518. See recital 2, recital 7, and recital 27 to 28.
(22) The Commission's observations on these comments from the complainant can be found in recital 39 below, insofar as they are not dealt with in part II of the present decision (see in particular sections 7.4.3 and 8.1.3). EuroCommerce made two further points which are not dealt with in the present decision, since they fall outside its scope. These are firstly that the Visa MIF for commercial cards (not covered by the Visa proposal described in the Article 6 letter) was not exemptible, and secondly that the intra-regional MIF of Visa should be considered in conjunction with the MIFs for domestic Visa payments applicable in the Member States (these are not part of Visa International's notification).
(23) Ninety-five of the replies in the latter category had identical text, and many others displayed a high degree of similarity in their drafting.
(24) Many replies also commented that since no modifications to the MIF for Visa commercial cards had been offered since the issuing of the supplementary Statement of Objections of 29 September 2001, there was no reason for the Commission to change its position in this regard, and envisage an exemption. As the MIF for commercial cards is not covered by the present decision, there is no need to consider that point.
(25) Rather, it is the complainant EuroCommerce who advocates that the Commission regulate the level of the MIF, by imposing that it be set at zero. See footnote 19.
(26) Decision of 30.6.1993 under Merger Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 in Case IV/M.350 WestLB/Thomas Cook which says in recital 9 that "... it would seem that travellers' cheques to a certain degree are in competition with other methods of payment, such as e.g. credit cards and eurocheques." Commission decision of 10.12.1984 in Case IV/30.717 - Uniform Eurocheques (OJ L 35 of 7.2.1985, p. 43) which says in recital 41 that a person travelling to a foreign country generally has a choice between several means of payment, such as cash, travellers' cheques, postal payment orders, credit cards, ATM cards and eurocheques.
(27) Nabanco Bancard Corporation v. Visa USA [596 F. Supp.1231 (S.D. Fla. 1980) affid 770 F 2d 592 (11th Circ. 1986)] and South Trust Corporation v. Plus System [71.219 (N.D. Ala. 1995)]. However, in its litigation with Discover in the United States of America in the early 1990s, Visa submitted that the market was credit cards only [SCFC Inc v Visa USA, 36 F3d, 958, 966 10th Circuit, 1994].
(28) OJ L 293, 10.11.2001, p. 24.
(29) In a four party payment card systems such as Visa, both merchants (in their capacity as clients of the acquiring services) and cardholders (in their capacity as clients of the issuing services) are to be considered as consumers.
(30) It is to be noted in this regard that the Commission decisions referred to by Visa (see footnote 25), apart from the fact that they do not take into account the latest developments in the payment sector, relate to substitutability of other means of payment to cheques and not the other way around. Moreover, the Commission in both decisions left the exact definition of the relevant market open.
(31) The substitutability of debit cards, on the one hand, and deferred debit and credit cards, on the other, may vary in a domestic and a cross-border context, as deferred debit and credit cards have certain features which are particularly beneficial in a cross-border context. See recital 89 below.
(32) As described in the Commission decision of 9 August 2001, mentioned in recital 2 above, sections 3.2.3 and 3.2.4.
(33) OJ C 3, 6.1.2001, p. 2.
(34) See in this sense also the Dutch banks acceptance giro decision of 8 September 1999 (OJ L 271, 21.10.1999, p. 28), stating that, for the proper functioning of the payment system at stake joint agreements on technical specifications and procedural aspects of transactions processing are necessary. Also, an a priori agreement on the level of charges (that is, whether to charge or not and, in the affirmative, how much) was held to be necessary, but not necessarily in the form of an MIF (recital 46).
(35) See in this context the Commission decision in the case "Rheims II" (OJ L 275 of 26.10.1999), also with respect to the dissuasive effect which a default fallback agreement has on the conclusion of bilateral agreements among the parties.
(36) See in this sense Commission decisions ABB (OJ L 7, 9.1.1987, p. 27), ABI (OJ L 43, 13.2.1978, p. 51), NVB (OJ L 253, 30.8.1989, p. 1) and NVB II (OJ L 271, 21.10.1999, p. 28). Compare also the Commission's "Notice on the application of the EC Competition rules to cross-border credit transfers" (13.9.1995, SEC(95) 1403 final) which says: "a multilateral interchange fee agreement is a restriction of competition falling under Article 85(1) now 81(1) because it substantially restricts the freedom of banks individually to decide their own pricing policies."
(37) See in this sense also Visa's own economic experts in the USA proceedings, David Evans and Richard Schmalensee, acknowledging that "interchange fee place a floor under the price that merchants pay their acquirers for processing card transactions" ... "the only significant price the system sets is the interchange fee" ... "since the acquirer has to pay the issuer an interchange fee for each transaction, that fee sets a floor under the merchant discounts" (in their book "Paying with plastic", pp. 113 and 155).
(38) The argument that consumers are encouraged to become cardholders by reason of the scope of the system, and that there are advantages to the system of encouraging consumers to become cardholders, would seem to be true only in respect of geographic markets where the take up of cards has not reached saturation point. This may be the case only for certain Member States and for international transactions.
(39) See for example Article 3 of Regulation (EEC) No 4056/86 in the transport sector, providing for an exemption for price agreements between liner conferences under certain conditions and obligations. See also Article 4 of Regulation (EEC) No 1617/93, providing for a group exemption for price agreements between airlines with regard to IATA interlineable fares (OJ L 155 of 26.6.1993, p. 18).
(40) This "lock in" effect is illustrated by the extreme paucity of examples of merchants who have decided to cease to accept Visa cards, having once accepted them.
(41) See recital 80.
(42) See the complaint of 22 May 1997, p. 5, "the charge that banks impose on merchants, the merchant fee, does not correspond to the price of the service that he receives, or only for a very small part of that amount. The service rendered to the merchant consists of the processing of the operation". Letter of 22 January 1998, p. 3 "the only service that a card transaction generates is the processing of that transaction".
(43) See also point 9 of judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Communities in Case C-18/92 Bally, ECR [1993], p. I-2871).
(44) Visa also argues that the free funding benefits merchants by representing a "contracting out" of merchant consumer credit programmes. However, this argument seems weak, in light of the fact that many merchants who accept Visa cards nevertheless offer consumer credit, and other merchants who accept Visa cards have never desired to operate a consumer credit programme.
(45) It should be re-emphasised in this context that the present exemption only applies to the Visa intra-regional MIF as applied to cross-border transactions. An analysis of the exemptability of the inclusion of the free funding period in a MIF for domestic card payments might conceivably reach a different conclusion.
(46) This conclusion is not necessarily valid in a domestic context, where the number of banks may well be far fewer and the efficiency gains of a multilateral arrangement vis-à-vis bilateral agreements may not outweigh the disadvantage of the creation of a restriction of competition.
