Provisional text
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (Ninth Chamber)
22 October 2026 (*)
( Reference for a preliminary ruling – Internal market for electricity – Regulation (EU) 2022/1854 – Emergency intervention to address high energy prices – Article 6(1) – Cap on market revenues obtained by producers of electricity using certain energy sources – Article 8 – Earlier national measure – National contribution calculated on the total revenues of electricity producers, levied in order to finance a public entity responsible for ensuring financial stability and the security of the energy market – Measure not coming within the scope of Regulation (EU) 2022/1854 – Directive (EU) 2018/2001 – Promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources – Article 3(1), (3) and (4) – Regulation (EU) 2019/943 – Article 3(a), (b), (h) and (p) and Article 10(1), (4) and (5) – Directive (EU) 2019/944 – Common rules for the internal market for electricity – Article 5(1), (3) and (4) – Regulation (EU) 2021/1119 – European Climate Law – Articles 2 and 4 – Non-discrimination – Proportionality – Article 63 TFEU – Lack of sufficient information – Inadmissibility – Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union – No implementation of EU law – No jurisdiction on the part of the Court )
In Case C‑327/25,
REQUEST for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU from the Varhoven administrativen sad (Supreme Administrative Court, Bulgaria), made by decision of 13 May 2025, received at the Court on 14 May 2025, in the proceedings
‘VETS Svoge’ EOOD
v
Predsedatel na Upravitelnia savet na Fond ‘Sigurnost na elektroenergiynata sistema’,
THE COURT (Ninth Chamber),
composed of R. Frendo, President of the Chamber, I. Jarukaitis (Rapporteur), President of the Fourth Chamber, and M. Condinanzi, Judge,
Advocate General: A. Biondi,
Registrar: V. Di Bucci,
having regard to the written procedure,
after considering the observations submitted on behalf of:
– ‘VETS Svoge’ EOOD, by M. Raykov and L.G. Terzieva, advokati,
– the Predsedatel na Upravitelnia savet na Fond ‘Sigurnost na elektroenergiynata sistema’, by V. Marinova,
– the Council of the European Union, by I. Gurov and L. Vétillard, acting as Agents,
– the European Commission, by O. Beynet, T. Scharf and I. Zaloguin, acting as Agents,
having decided, after hearing the Advocate General, to proceed to judgment without an Opinion,
gives the following
Judgment
1 This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of (i) Article 8 of Council Regulation (EU) 2022/1854 of 6 October 2022 on an emergency intervention to address high energy prices (OJ 2022 L 261I, p. 1); (ii) Articles 2 and 4 of Regulation (EU) 2021/1119 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 2021 establishing the framework for achieving climate neutrality and amending Regulations (EC) No 401/2009 and (EU) 2018/1999 (‘European Climate Law’) (OJ 2021 L 243, p. 1), read in conjunction with Article 191(2) TFEU; (iii) Article 3(1), (3) and (4) of Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources (OJ 2018 L 328, p. 82); (iv) Article 3(a), (b), (h) and (p) and Article 10(1), (4) and (5) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on the internal market for electricity (OJ 2019 L 158, p. 54), read in conjunction with recitals 22 and 23 thereof, with Article 5(1), (3) and (4) of Directive (EU) 2019/944 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on common rules for the internal market for electricity and amending Directive 2012/27/EU (OJ 2019 L 158, p. 125), and with Article 8 of Regulation 2022/1854; (v) Article 63 TFEU, and (vi) Article 17 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’).
2 The request has been made in proceedings between ‘VETS Svoge’ EOOD (‘VETS Svoge’) and the Predsedatel na Upravitelnia savet na Fond ‘Sigurnost na elektroenergiynata sistema’ (Chair of the Management Board of the ‘Electricity System Security’ Fund, Bulgaria; ‘the administrative authority’) concerning the legality of an act establishing a public debt on the part of that company.
Legal context
European Union law
The Charter
3 Article 17 of the Charter, entitled ‘Right to property’, provides, in paragraph 1 thereof:
‘Everyone has the right to own, use, dispose of and bequeath his or her lawfully acquired possessions. No one may be deprived of his or her possessions, except in the public interest and in the cases and under the conditions provided for by law, subject to fair compensation being paid in good time for their loss. …’
4 Article 51 of the Charter, entitled ‘Field of application’, provides, in paragraph 1 thereof:
‘The provisions of this Charter are addressed … to the Member States only when they are implementing Union law. …’
FEU Treaty
5 Under Article 63(1) TFEU:
‘Within the framework of the provisions set out in this Chapter, all restrictions on the movement of capital between Member States and between Member States and third countries shall be prohibited.’
6 Article 191(2) TFUE is worded as follows:
‘Union policy on the environment shall aim at a high level of protection taking into account the diversity of situations in the various regions of the Union. It shall be based on the precautionary principle and on the principles that preventive action should be taken, that environmental damage should as a priority be rectified at source and that the polluter should pay.
In this context, harmonisation measures answering environmental protection requirements shall include, where appropriate, a safeguard clause allowing Member States to take provisional measures, for non-economic environmental reasons, subject to a procedure of inspection by the Union.’
Directive 2018/2001
7 Article 3 of Directive 2018/2001, entitled ‘Binding overall Union target for 2030’, provides, in paragraphs 1, 3 and 4 thereof:
‘1. Member States shall collectively ensure that the share of energy from renewable sources in the Union’s gross final consumption of energy in 2030 is at least 32%. The [European] Commission shall assess that target with a view to submitting a legislative proposal by 2023 to increase it where there are further substantial costs reductions in the production of renewable energy, where needed to meet the Union’s international commitments for decarbonisation, or where a significant decrease in energy consumption in the Union justifies such an increase.
…
3. Member States shall ensure that their national policies, … and their support schemes, are designed with due regard to the waste hierarchy … to aim to avoid undue distortive effects on the raw material markets. Member States shall grant no support for renewable energy produced from the incineration of waste if the separate collection obligations laid down in that Directive have not been complied with.
4. From 1 January 2021, the share of energy from renewable sources in each Member State’s gross final consumption of energy shall not be lower than the baseline share shown in the third column of the table in Part A of Annex I to this Directive. Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure compliance with that baseline share. If a Member State does not maintain its baseline share as measured over any one-year period, the first and second subparagraphs of Article 32(4) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 [of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on the Governance of the Energy Union and Climate Action, amending Regulations (EC) No 663/2009 and (EC) No 715/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council, Directives 94/22/EC, 98/70/EC, 2009/31/EC, 2009/73/EC, 2010/31/EU, 2012/27/EU and 2013/30/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, Council Directives 2009/119/EC and (EU) 2015/652 and repealing Regulation (EU) No 525/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ 2018 L 328, p. 1)] shall apply.’
Regulation 2019/943
8 Recitals 22 and 23 of Regulation 2019/943 state:
‘(22) Core market principles should set out that electricity prices are to be determined through demand and supply. Those prices should indicate when electricity is needed, thereby providing market-based incentives for investments into flexibility sources such as flexible generation, interconnection, demand response or energy storage.
(23) While decarbonisation of the electricity sector, with energy from renewable sources becoming a major part of the market, is one of the goals of the Energy Union, it is crucial that the market removes existing barriers to cross-border trade and encourages investments into supporting infrastructure, for example, more flexible generation, interconnection, demand response and energy storage. To support this shift to variable and distributed generation, and to ensure that energy market principles are the basis for the Union’s electricity markets of the future, a renewed focus on short-term markets and scarcity pricing is essential.’
9 Article 3 of that regulation, entitled ‘Principles regarding the operation of electricity markets’, provides:
‘Member States, regulatory authorities, transmission system operators, distribution system operators, market operators and delegated operators shall ensure that electricity markets are operated in accordance with the following principles:
(a) prices shall be formed on the basis of demand and supply;
(b) market rules shall encourage free price formation and shall avoid actions which prevent price formation on the basis of demand and supply;
…
(h) barriers to cross-border electricity flows between bidding zones or Member States and cross-border transactions on electricity markets and related services markets shall be progressively removed;
…
(p) market rules shall facilitate trade of products across the Union and regulatory changes shall take into account effects on both short-term and long-term forward and futures markets and products;
…’
10 Article 10 of that regulation, entitled ‘Technical bidding limits’, provides:
‘1. There shall be neither a maximum nor a minimum limit to the wholesale electricity price. This provision shall apply, inter alia, to bidding and clearing in all timeframes and shall include balancing energy and imbalance prices, without prejudice to the technical price limits which may be applied in the balancing timeframe and in the day-ahead and intraday timeframes in accordance with paragraph 2.
…
4. Regulatory authorities or, where a Member State has designated another competent authority for that purpose, such designated competent authorities, shall identify policies and measures applied within their territory that could contribute to indirectly restricting wholesale price formation, including limiting bids relating to the activation of balancing energy, capacity mechanisms, measures by the transmission system operators, measures intended to challenge market outcomes, or to prevent the abuse of dominant positions or inefficiently defined bidding zones.
5. Where a regulatory authority or designated competent authority has identified a policy or measure which could serve to restrict wholesale price formation it shall take all appropriate actions to eliminate or, if not possible, to mitigate the impact of that policy or measure on bidding behaviour. Member States shall provide a report to the Commission by 5 January 2020 detailing the measures and actions they have taken or intend to take.’
Directive 2019/944
11 Under Article 5 of Directive 2019/944, entitled ‘Market-based supply prices’:
‘1. Suppliers shall be free to determine the price at which they supply electricity to customers. Member States shall take appropriate actions to ensure effective competition between suppliers.
…
3. By way of derogation from paragraphs 1 and 2, Member States may apply public interventions in the price setting for the supply of electricity to energy poor or vulnerable household customers. Such public interventions shall be subject to the conditions set out in paragraphs 4 and 5.
4. Public interventions in the price setting for the supply of electricity shall:
(a) pursue a general economic interest and not go beyond what is necessary to achieve that general economic interest;
(b) be clearly defined, transparent, non-discriminatory and verifiable;
(c) guarantee equal access for Union electricity undertakings to customers;
(d) be limited in time and proportionate as regards their beneficiaries;
(e) not result in additional costs for market participants in a discriminatory way.
…’
Regulation 2021/1119
12 Article 2 of Regulation 2021/1119, entitled ‘Climate-neutrality objective’, provides:
‘1. Union-wide greenhouse gas emissions and removals regulated in Union law shall be balanced within the Union at the latest by 2050, thus reducing emissions to net zero by that date, and the Union shall aim to achieve negative emissions thereafter.
2. The relevant Union institutions and the Member States shall take the necessary measures at Union and national level, respectively, to enable the collective achievement of the climate-neutrality objective set out in paragraph 1, taking into account the importance of promoting both fairness and solidarity among Member States and cost-effectiveness in achieving this objective.’
13 Under Article 4 of that regulation, entitled ‘Intermediate Union climate targets’:
‘1. In order to reach the climate-neutrality objective set out in Article 2(1), the binding Union 2030 climate target shall be a domestic reduction of net greenhouse gas emissions (emissions after deduction of removals) by at least 55% compared to 1990 levels by 2030.
…
2. By 30 June 2021, the Commission shall review relevant Union legislation in order to enable the achievement of the target set out in paragraph 1 of this Article and the climate-neutrality objective set out in Article 2(1) and consider taking the necessary measures, including the adoption of legislative proposals, in accordance with the Treaties.
…
3. With a view to achieving the climate-neutrality objective set out in Article 2(1) of this Regulation, a Union-wide climate target for 2040 shall be set. …
…
5. When proposing the Union 2040 climate target in accordance with paragraph 3, the Commission shall consider the following:
…
(g) energy efficiency and the “energy efficiency first” principle, energy affordability and security of supply;
…
7. The provisions of this Article shall be kept under review in light of international developments and efforts undertaken …’
Regulation 2022/1854
14 Recitals 25, 40 and 41 of Regulation 2022/1854 stated:
‘(25) In a situation where consumers are exposed to extremely high prices which also harm the Union’s economy, it is necessary to limit, on a temporary basis, the extraordinary market revenues of producers with lower marginal costs by way of application of the cap on market revenues achieved through the sale of electricity within the Union.…
(40) Given that the generation mix and the cost-structure of power-generating facilities differ greatly among Member States, they should be allowed to maintain or introduce national crisis measures under specific conditions.
(41) In particular, Member States should retain the possibility to further limit the revenues of the producers to which the cap on market revenues applies and to set a specific cap on the market revenues obtained from the sale of electricity produced from hard coal, the price of which can be significantly lower than the price of marginal technologies in some Member States. In order to ensure legal certainty, Member States should also be allowed to maintain or introduce national crisis measures, which limit the market revenues of producers other than those subject to the Union-wide cap on market revenues.’
15 Article 1 of that regulation, entitled ‘Subject matter and scope’, provides:
‘This Regulation establishes an emergency intervention to mitigate the effects of high energy prices through exceptional, targeted and time limited measures. Those measures aim to reduce electricity consumption, to introduce a cap on market revenues that certain producers receive from the generation of electricity and redistribute to final electricity customers in a targeted manner …’
16 Article 6 of that regulation, entitled ‘Mandatory cap on market revenues’, provided, in paragraph 1 thereof:
‘Market revenues of producers obtained from the generation of electricity from the sources referred to in Article 7(1) shall be capped to a maximum of [EUR] 180 per [megawatt hour (MWh)] of electricity produced.’
17 Article 7 of Regulation 2022/1854, entitled ‘Application of the cap on market revenues to electricity producers’, stated, in paragraph 1 thereof, that the cap on market revenues provided for in Article 6 of that regulation was to apply to the market revenues obtained from the sale of electricity produced from the energy sources listed in that paragraph 1.
18 Article 8 of Regulation 2022/1854, entitled ‘National crisis measures’, provided:
‘1. Member States may:
(a) maintain or introduce measures that further limit the market revenues of producers generating electricity from the sources listed in Article 7(1), including the possibility to differentiate between technologies, as well as the market revenues of other market participants, including those active in electricity trading;
(b) set a higher cap on market revenues for producers generating electricity from the sources listed in Article 7(1), provided that their investments and operating costs exceed the maximum set in Article 6(1);
(c) maintain or introduce national measures to limit the market revenues of producers generating electricity from sources not referred to in Article 7(1);
(d) set a specific cap on the market revenues obtained from the sale of electricity produced from hard coal;
(e) subject the hydropower units not referred to in Article 7(1), point (d), to a cap on market revenues, or maintain or introduce such measures that further limit their market revenues, including the possibility to differentiate between technologies.
2. The measures referred to in paragraph 1 shall, in line with this Regulation:
(a) be proportionate and non-discriminatory;
(b) not jeopardise investment signals;
(c) ensure that the investments and operating costs are covered;
(d) not distort the functioning of electricity wholesale markets, and in particular, not affect the merit order and the price formation on the wholesale market;
(e) be compatible with Union law.’
19 In accordance with Article 22(2)(c) of that regulation, Articles 6 to 8 thereof applied from 1 December 2022 to 30 June 2023.
Bulgarian law
The Law on Energy
20 The Zakon za energetikata (Law on Energy) (DV No 107 of 9 December 2003), in the version applicable to the dispute in the main proceedings (‘the Law on Energy’), provides, in Article 36f thereof:
‘(1) The following shall pay a monthly contribution of 5% to the [Fond “Sigurnost na elektroenergiynata sistema” (“Electricity System Security” Fund, Bulgaria) (“the FSES”)]:
1. electricity producers, from the revenues, net of [value added tax (VAT)], obtained from the sale of electricity and, as regards producers receiving a premium under the Zakon za energiata ot vazobnovyaemi iztochnitsi [(Law on energy from renewable sources; ‘the Law on renewable energy’)], also from the revenues, net of [VAT], from that premium. …;
…
(2) The persons referred to in paragraph 1, with the exception of the producers referred to in Article 30(2) of the Law on renewable energy, shall, until the 20th of the current month:
…
2. pay into [the FSES] the relevant contribution under paragraph 1 for the previous month.
(3) The electricity producers referred to in Article 30(2) of [the Law on renewable energy] shall, by 31 March of each year:
…
2. pay into [the FSES] the relevant contributions under paragraph 1 for the preceding calendar year.
…
(5) For the purposes of taxation, the contributions paid to [the FSES] shall be regarded as current expenditure.’
The Regulation on the resources of the FSES
21 The Naredba za reda i nachina za nabiraneto, razhodvaneto, otchitaneto i kontrola na sredstvata na Fond ‘Sigurnost na elektroenergiynata sistema’ (Regulation on the methods and means of collection, expenditure, accounting and control of the resources of the FSES), in the version applicable to the dispute in the main proceedings (‘the Regulation on the resources of the FSES’), provides, in Article 5 thereof:
‘[The FSES] shall be funded by:
‘1. contributions amounting to 5% of the revenues, net of [VAT], of electricity producers from the electricity sold;
…’
22 Under Article 8 of that regulation:
‘(1) Revenues as referred to in Article 5(1) shall mean all sales revenues invoiced at regulated or freely negotiated prices of electricity produced by the person liable for payment, including:
1. revenues from the sale of active energy;
2. revenues from the supply of balancing energy under a contract …;
3. the net result of balancing under a contract …
(2) For the purpose of calculating the revenues under Article 5(1), the declared costs for balancing energy that has not been produced in the event of ‘downward’ regulation shall be deducted.
(3) Where the net result of the balancing under paragraph 1(3) is negative, its amount shall be deducted from the amount of the revenues for the purposes of the calculation of the revenues under Article 5(1).
…’
The 2022 Law applying provisions concerning the State budget
23 The Zakon za prilagane na razporedbi na Zakona za darzhavnia byudzhet na Republika Bulgaria za 2022 g., Zakona za byudzheta na darzhavnoto obshtestveno osiguryavane za 2022 g. i Zakona za byudzheta na Natsionalnata zdravnoosiguritelna kasa za 2022 g. (Law applying provisions of the Law on the State budget of the Republic of Bulgaria for 2022, the Law on the budget of the State social security system for 2022 and the Law on the budget of the National Health Insurance Fund for 2022) (DV No 104 of 30 December 2022), in the version applicable to the main proceedings (‘the 2022 Law applying provisions concerning the State budget’), states, in Paragraph 8 of its transitional and final provisions:
‘(1) Producers generating electricity with power-generating facilities with an installed capacity exceeding 1 [megawatt (MW)], whose market revenues are obtained from the sale of electricity produced from the sources referred to in Article 7(1) of [Regulation 2022/1854] …, shall pay into [the FSES] earmarked contributions representing the positive difference between, on the one hand, the market revenues, net of [VAT], and, on the other, the revenue cap set, calculated by applying the values for the relevant type of producer, for the supply period from 1 December 2022 to 30 June 2023, … The amount of the earmarked contribution shall be calculated for each transaction.
(2) The values used as the basis for calculating the revenue cap for the relevant type of producer referred to in subparagraph 1 shall be determined by a decision of the Ministerski savet [(Council of Ministers, Bulgaria)].
(3) Producers generating electricity with power-generating facilities with an installed capacity exceeding 1 MW which have a contract for compensation by way of premiums in force at 8 October 2022 and whose market revenues are obtained from the sale of electricity produced from the sources listed in Article 7(1) of [Regulation 2022/1854] shall pay into [the FSES] earmarked contributions from the market revenues, net of [VAT], from every transaction that was concluded at freely negotiated prices in the supply period from 1 December 2022 to 30 June 2023, with the exception of transactions concerning balancing energy. The amount of the earmarked contribution for each transaction shall be calculated as follows:
1. the positive difference between, on the one hand, the market revenues, net of [VAT], resulting from the relevant transaction concluded at freely negotiated prices (market price achieved) and, on the other, the revenue cap set, calculated on the basis of the estimated market price pursuant to the pricing decision of the Komisia za energiyno i vodno regulirane [(Energy and Water Regulatory Commission, Bulgaria)] setting the premium applicable to the relevant producer, in the case of producers for which the amount of that premium is not 0.00 [lev (BGN)] per MWh net of [VAT], and
2. 90% of the positive difference between, on the one hand, the market revenues, net of [VAT], resulting from the relevant transaction concluded at freely negotiated prices (market price achieved) and, on the other, the revenue cap set, calculated on the basis of the preferential price set by decision of the Energy and Water Regulatory Commission in accordance with the contract for compensation by way of premiums, in the case of producers for which the amount of the applicable premium is BGN 0.00 per MWh net of [VAT].
…
(11) The earmarked contributions under subparagraphs 1, 3, 4 and 5 shall be recognised as current expenditure for the purposes of the taxation of the producers, the traders of electricity and the public supplier.
…
(15) The earmarked contributions under subparagraphs 1, 3, 4 and 5 are public debts, and contributions not paid within the time limits shall be established and recovered in accordance with the Danachno-osiguritelen protsesualen kodeks (Code of Procedure for Tax and Social Security) …
…’
The 2023 Law on the State budget
24 Paragraph 3 of the transitional and final provisions of the Zakon za darzhavnia byudzhet na Republika Bulgaria za 2023 g. (Law on the budget of the Republic of Bulgaria for 2023), in the version applicable to the dispute in the main proceedings (‘the 2023 Law on the State budget’), provides:
‘(1) Electricity producers generating electricity with power-generating facilities with an installed capacity exceeding 1 MW whose market revenues are obtained from the sale of electricity produced from wind energy, solar energy (solar thermal and solar photovoltaic energy), geothermal energy, hydropower without reservoir, biomass fuel (solid or gaseous biomass fuels, excluding biomethane), waste, nuclear energy, lignite, crude petroleum products, and peat, and with coal-powered plants and hydropower units, shall pay into [the FSES] earmarked contributions corresponding to the positive difference between, on the one hand, the market revenues net of [VAT] and, on the other, the revenue cap set, calculated by applying the values for the relevant type of producer, for the supply period from 1 July 2023 to 31 December 2023 ... The amount of the earmarked contribution shall be calculated for each transaction.
(2) The values used as the basis for calculating the revenue cap for the relevant type of producer referred to in paragraph 1 shall be determined by a decision of the Council of Ministers.
(3) Producers generating electricity with power-generating facilities with an installed capacity exceeding 1 MW which have a contract for compensation by way of premiums in force at 8 October 2022 and whose market revenues are obtained from the sale of electricity produced from wind energy, solar energy (solar thermal and solar photovoltaic energy), geothermal energy, hydropower without reservoir, biomass fuel (solid or gaseous biomass fuels, excluding biomethane), waste, nuclear energy, lignite, crude petroleum products, and peat, and with coal-powered plants and hydropower units, shall pay into [the FSES] earmarked contributions from the market revenues, net of [VAT], from every transaction that was concluded at freely negotiated prices, for the supply period from 1 July 2023 to 31 December 2023, with the exception of transactions concerning balancing energy. The amount of the earmarked contribution for each transaction shall be calculated [using the same method as that provided for in Paragraph 8 of the transitional and final provisions of the 2022 Law applying provisions concerning the State budget].
…’
25 Paragraph 3(11) and (15) reproduces unchanged the provisions of Paragraph 8(11) and (15) of the transitional and final provisions of the 2022 Law applying provisions concerning the State budget.
The 2024 Law on the State budget
26 Paragraph 3 of the transitional and final provisions of the Zakon za darzhavnia byudzhet na Republika Bulgaria za 2024 g. (Law on the State budget of the Republic of Bulgaria for 2024), in the version applicable to the dispute in the main proceedings (‘the 2024 Law on the State budget’), reproduces the provisions of Paragraph 3 of the transitional and final provisions of the 2023 Law on the State budget as regards electricity supplied between 1 January and 31 December 2024.
The dispute in the main proceedings and the questions referred for a preliminary ruling
27 VETS Svoge is a company incorporated under Bulgarian law which owns five hydropower plants. It has the status of electricity producer and is included in the list of persons liable to pay the contributions referred to in Article 7 of the Regulation on the resources of FSES. Under Article 36f(1) of the Law on Energy, VETS Svoge is liable to pay a monthly contribution of 5% of the revenues obtained from the sale of its electricity (‘the 5% contribution’).
28 By a decision of the administrative authority of 8 April 2024, an administrative procedure for the adoption of an act establishing a public debt was initiated. According to the order for reference, VETS Svoge had, on that date, debts that were due and outstanding, relating to contributions under Article 36f(1) of the Law on Energy for January and February 2024, in the amount of BGN 86 828.39 (approximately EUR 44 395), representing 5% of the revenues calculated in accordance with Article 8 of the Regulation on the resources of the FSES.
29 By a letter of 14 April 2024, that company submitted its observations on that decision to initiate the procedure. It stated that it had paid those debts on time, annexing the corresponding payment orders.
30 By a letter of 17 April 2024, the administrative authority informed that company that it had erred in the calculation and payment of its contributions under Article 36f for December 2022 and for January, February, March, April, September and October 2023, given that it had, without any legal basis, deducted from the revenues on which the 5% contribution is calculated the earmarked contributions which it had paid under the transitional and final provisions of the 2022 Law applying provisions concerning the State budget and under the transitional and final provisions of the 2023 Law on the State budget.
31 Although VETS Svoge made certain payments in order to discharge the principal amount of the contributions due under Article 36f of the Law on Energy for 2023 and part of the contribution due for January 2024, the administrative authority took the view that VETS Svoge had not fully discharged its obligations to pay the 5% contributions and the related default interest. That authority subsequently adopted, on 22 April 2024, an act establishing a public debt, setting the total amount of VETS Svoge’s debts at BGN 55 671.89 (approximately EUR 28 465), that is to say, BGN 41 971.86 (approximately EUR 21 460) for the principal amount, corresponding to the 5% contributions from the revenues, net of VAT, obtained from the sale of electricity for the months of January and February 2024, and BGN 13 700.03 (approximately EUR 7 005) in respect of default interest due on the 5% contributions that were not paid within the time limits for the period from 1 August 2021 to 22 April 2024.
32 VETS Svoge brought an action before the Administrativen sad Sofia-grad (Administrative Court, Sofia City, Bulgaria), challenging the legality of that act.
33 By a judgment of 9 October 2024, that court dismissed that action. It found, inter alia, that, for March 2022 and January, February, March, April, September and October 2023, for each of its five power plants, that company, in the invoices which it had itself issued, had made deductions from its revenues obtained from the sale of electricity, with the result that it had paid a contribution under Article 36f of the Law on Energy that was lower than that due under that article.
34 That court held, in that regard, that, on the one hand, the contributions due under that article and, on the other, the earmarked contributions due under Paragraph 8 of the transitional and final provisions of the 2022 Law applying provisions concerning the State budget, adopted on the basis of Regulation 2022/1854, and those due under Paragraph 3 of the transitional and final provisions of the 2023 Law on the State budget and Paragraph 3 of the transitional and final provisions of the 2024 Law on the State budget, first of all, relate to different social relationships and are governed by different legislative acts, between which there is no correspondence, next, have different calculation, payment and determination mechanisms, and, lastly, have been adopted to compensate for expenditure of different kinds and amounts. The referring court added that, by adopting those two contributions, the Bulgarian legislature had pursued different objectives. It also noted that none of the transitional provisions had amended Article 36f of the Law on Energy or the method of calculating the 5% contribution provided for in that article.
35 That court therefore considered that the administrative authority was justified in finding that VETS Svoge had erred in the calculation and payment of the contributions due under Article 36f by deducting the earmarked contributions from the revenues on the basis of which those contributions under Article 36f are calculated.
36 VETS Svoge brought an appeal on a point of law before the Varhoven administrativen sad (Supreme Administrative Court, Bulgaria), which is the referring court. In support of that appeal, VETS Svoge submits that the findings of the court of first instance are contrary, first, to the Law on Energy, the 2022 Law applying provisions concerning the State budget, the 2023 and 2024 Laws on the State budget, the Regulation on the resources of the FSES and the fundamental principles and freedoms enshrined in the Konstitutsia na Republika Bulgaria (Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria), since they impose, according to it, an unjustified and disproportionate financial burden on electricity producers, and, second, to EU law.
37 In that context, the referring court states, first, that it is apparent, in particular, from Regulation 2022/1854 that the revenues of electricity producers which exceed the revenue cap set by that regulation are not regarded as revenues for the producers concerned, but constitute revenues for the benefit of the Member States, redirected to final consumers in order to limit the negative effects of price increases. It also notes that, according to that regulation, the introduction or maintenance by Member States of measures which further limit market revenues is possible only if the conditions set out in that regulation are satisfied. It follows, according to that court, that an additional measure may be regarded as proportionate only if it does not cause harm to producers and does not threaten competition.
38 Second, that court notes that, for the purpose of calculating the 5% contribution provided for in Article 36f of the Law on Energy, the revenues obtained from the sale of electricity consist of all the sales revenues invoiced at regulated or freely negotiated prices, and the only expenditure that may be deducted is that for supply shortages. Therefore, the measure referred to in Article 36f does not satisfy the conditions laid down by Regulation 2022/1854 because it is disproportionate, does not take account of the operating, production and investment costs of electricity producers and limits their activity. That regulation, as an instrument of EU law, takes precedence over national legislation and therefore precludes the existence of the contribution referred to in Article 36f of the Law on Energy, which amounts also to a revenue cap, at the same time as the mandatory revenue cap which the regulation establishes.
39 According to the referring court, furthermore, even if that mandatory revenue cap and the contribution provided for in Article 36f could exist at the same time, the view would have to be taken that the amount levied as earmarked contributions does not constitute revenue from the point of view of the relevant producer. Consequently, it is unlawful, in the context of the application of Article 36f of the Law on Energy, for the 5% contribution due under that provision to be calculated also on the amount of the earmarked contributions. Furthermore, that would lead to the same amount being taxed twice. In addition, that would be disproportionate and contrary to the objectives of Regulation 2022/1854, that is to say, to limit revenues that are actually realised rather than fictitious revenues.
40 In that regard, that court adds that, in accordance with Paragraph 8(11) of the transitional and final provisions of the 2022 Law applying provisions concerning the State budget, the earmarked contributions are recognised as current expenditure of the electricity producers. Treating them as revenues for the sole purpose of their taxation under Article 36f constitutes an arbitrary act of the State that is incompatible with the principles of solidarity and proportionality enshrined in EU law. Furthermore, even if such a measure were lawful under national law, it would be necessary, in accordance with the principle lex posterior derogat legi priori, to take account of the implicit repeal of Article 36f, since the concept of ‘revenues’ must be understood within the meaning of Paragraph 8 of the transitional and final provisions.
41 Third, the referring court states that the obligation to pay a 5% contribution on the amount of the earmarked contributions discourages the production of electricity from renewable sources and leads to a halt in investment and a forced limitation on the production of that type of electricity, taking into account the losses generated. In addition, that contribution is incompatible with the EU policy on environmental protection and the promotion of climate neutrality pursued by Regulation 2021/1119.
42 Fourth, according to the referring court, that contribution is incompatible with the free movement of capital because it subjects producers wishing to enter the Bulgarian electricity market or to continue their activity there to excessive taxation, which, moreover, restricts freedom of establishment and infringes Article 17 of the Charter.
43 In those circumstances the Varhoven administrativen sad (Supreme Administrative Court) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:
‘(1) Must Article 8 of [Regulation 2022/1854] be interpreted as meaning that a national measure such as the contribution of 5% of the revenues from the sale of electricity provided for in Article 36f of the [Law on Energy] can be maintained and a mandatory cap can simultaneously be imposed on electricity producers’ market revenues?
(2) If the answer to Question 1 is in the affirmative: Must Article 8 of [Regulation 2022/1854] be interpreted as permitting the contribution of 5% of revenues from the sale of electricity to be calculated and due on amounts exceeding the mandatory revenue cap, which the electricity producers must pass on to [the FSES] and which do not constitute [revenue] for them? Can it be assumed when interpreting [those provisions] that the contribution of 5% of revenues from the sale of electricity does not constitute discrimination, even though it results, for some electricity producers, in the same amounts being taxed twice?
(3) In light of the interpretation of
– [Article] 2(1) and (2) and [Article] 4 of [Regulation 2021/1119], read in conjunction with Article 191(2) TFEU, which govern the fundamental importance of the Member States’ transition to an energy system based on renewable sources,
– Article 3(1), (3) and (4) of [Directive 2018/2001], which governs the European Union’s binding target for energy from renewable sources to represent a certain share by 2030 and the Member States’ obligation to ensure that that share is achieved,
– [Article] 3(a), (b), (h) and (p) and [Article] 10(1), (4) and (5) of [Regulation 2019/943], read in conjunction with recitals 22 and 23 of that regulation and Article 5(1), (3) and (4) of [Directive 2019/944] and Article 8 of [Regulation 2022/1854], which govern the principles relating to price formation on the energy trading market:
Does EU law permit the Bulgarian State to levy and collect contributions from the producers of electricity from renewable sources, such as the contribution governed by Article 36f of the [Law on Energy] and calculated on the amounts exceeding the mandatory revenue cap, which the electricity producers must pass on to the [FSES] and which do not constitute [revenue] for them? Can such treatment be considered proportionate in light of the interpretation of those provisions, even though the electricity producers’ actual operating costs are not taken into account?
(4) Must Article 63 TFEU and Article 17 of [the Charter] be interpreted as precluding national legislation and national practice, such as that at issue in the present case, under which amounts which an electricity producer pays to the State (amounts exceeding the mandatory cap on electricity producers’ revenues) are subject to a further State receivable (of 5% pursuant to Article 36f of the [Law on Energy])?’
Consideration of the questions referred
The first question
44 By its first question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 8 of Regulation 2022/1854 must be interpreted as precluding legislation of a Member State under which electricity producers are liable to pay a monthly contribution amounting to 5% of their revenues obtained from the sale of electricity, which serves to finance a public entity whose purpose is to ensure the financial stability of the energy sector and the security of the electricity system of that Member State and which exists at the same time as the measure capping the revenues of electricity producers provided for by that regulation.
45 In that regard, it should be noted, as a preliminary point, that, according to the information in the order for reference, which it is for the referring court to verify, the dispute in the main proceedings concerns the monthly contribution provided for by Article 36f(1) of the Law on Energy, payable in respect of sales of electricity by VETS Svoge during the period from 1 August 2021 to 22 April 2024.
46 It must therefore be recalled, in the first place, that, according to Article 22(2)(c) of Regulation 2022/1854, Articles 6 to 8 of that regulation applied from 1 December 2022 to 30 June 2023. It follows that, in any event, Article 8 of that regulation cannot be interpreted as precluding national legislation such as that described in paragraph 44 above for a period during which that article did not apply (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 January 2026, Secab, C‑423/23, EU:C:2026:32, paragraph 38), that is to say, for the period prior to 1 December 2022 and for the period after 30 June 2023.
47 In the second place, as regards the period during which Articles 6 and 8 applied, it must be recalled that Article 6(1) of Regulation 2022/1854 provides that market revenues of producers obtained from the generation of electricity from the sources referred to in Article 7(1) of that regulation are to be capped to a maximum of 180 EUR per MWh of electricity produced. According to Article 7(1) of the regulation, those sources are wind energy, solar energy, geothermal energy, hydropower without reservoir, solid or gaseous biomass fuels, excluding biomethane, waste, nuclear energy, lignite, crude petroleum products and peat.
48 Article 8 of that regulation sets out, in paragraph 1 thereof, various other measures which the Member States may take. Those include, in essence, the maintenance or introduction of measures that further limit the market revenues of producers generating electricity from the sources listed in Article 7(1) thereof; the setting of a higher cap on market revenues for those producers, provided that their investment and operating costs exceed the maximum set in Article 6(1) of that regulation; the maintenance or introduction of national measures to limit market revenues of producers generating electricity from sources not referred to in Article 7(1); the setting of a specific cap on the market revenues obtained from the sale of electricity produced from hard coal; and the subjecting of hydropower units not referred to in Article 7(1)(d) to a cap on market revenues, or the maintenance or introduction of such measures that further limit their market revenues. Article 8(2) of that regulation lists, for its part, the conditions that the measures referred to in Article 8(1) must satisfy.
49 Furthermore, according to Article 1 of Regulation 2022/1854, that regulation establishes an emergency intervention to mitigate the effects of high energy prices through exceptional, targeted and time limited measures, which aim, inter alia, to introduce a cap on market revenues that certain producers receive from the generation of electricity and redistribute to final electricity customers in a targeted manner.
50 Thus, recital 25 of that regulation states that, in a situation where consumers are exposed to extremely high prices which also harm the European Union’s economy, it is necessary to limit, on a temporary basis, the extraordinary market revenues of producers with lower marginal costs by way of application of the cap on market revenues achieved through the sale of electricity within the European Union. Also to that effect, recital 41 of that regulation states that Member States should retain the possibility to further limit the revenues of the producers to which the cap on market revenues applies, given, according to recital 40 of that regulation, that the generation mix and the cost structure of power-generating facilities differ greatly among Member States.
51 It must be stated that a national contribution such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which is imposed on all electricity producers selling electricity in the territory of that Member State and which is intended to finance a public entity responsible for ensuring the financial stability of the energy sector and the security of the electricity system of that Member State, does not constitute the revenue cap provided for in Article 6(1) of Regulation 2022/1854. Second, that contribution also cannot form part of the measures which the Member States may take under Article 8(1) of that regulation. The purpose of such a contribution is clearly unrelated to the objective pursued by that regulation and its scope ratione personae does not correspond in any way to that of the measures envisaged by Article 8 of the regulation.
52 It follows that national legislation imposing a contribution such as that at issue in the main proceedings does not come within the scope of Regulation 2022/1854 and, in particular, of Articles 6 to 8 thereof.
53 Furthermore, the Court has previously held that nothing in that regulation indicates that it would apply to a measure capping revenues introduced by national legislation for a period prior to the entry into force of that regulation, and that, in the absence of EU legislation on the matter that is applicable ratione temporis, it cannot be considered that the Member States are deprived of the power to exercise their competences in that regard (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 December 2025, Electrabel and Others, C‑633/23, EU:C:2025:991, paragraph 58).
54 That latter finding must, a fortiori, also apply to national legislation providing for a contribution such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which, by its very nature, does not come within the scope of Regulation 2022/1854. In particular, nothing in that regulation indicates that, during the period of its application ratione temporis, the Member States are deprived of their power to impose compulsory levies intended to finance public entities entrusted with tasks in the public interest such as, in the present case, ensuring the financial stability of the energy sector and the security of the national electricity system.
55 In that regard, it is true that, according to settled case-law, the Member States must, when exercising their powers, respect EU law and, therefore, in particular, preserve the effectiveness of the provisions of that regulation (judgment of 18 December 2025, Electrabel and Others, C‑633/23, EU:C:2025:991, paragraph 40 and the case-law cited). However, in view of the features of a contribution such as that at issue in the main proceedings, in particular its purpose and scope, it cannot in any way undermine that effectiveness and, moreover, there is nothing to indicate that it would otherwise conflict with EU law.
56 In the light of the foregoing considerations, the answer to the first question is that Article 8 of Regulation 2022/1854 must be interpreted as not precluding legislation of a Member State under which electricity producers are liable to pay a monthly contribution amounting to 5% of their revenues obtained from the sale of electricity, which serves to finance a public entity whose purpose is to ensure the financial stability of the energy sector and the security of the electricity system of that Member State and which exists at the same time as the measure capping the revenues of electricity producers provided for by that regulation.
The second question
57 By its second question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 8 of Regulation 2022/1854, in particular the condition of non-discrimination set out in Article 8(2)(a), must be interpreted as precluding national legislation which provides that the monthly contribution for which electricity producers are liable under that legislation, which is used to finance a public entity whose purpose is to ensure the financial stability of the energy sector and the security of the electricity system of that Member State, is calculated and levied on the basis of all the revenues from electricity sales realised in the territory of that Member State by those producers.
58 In that regard, it is sufficient to recall, first, that, as has been pointed out in paragraph 46 above, Article 8 cannot be interpreted as precluding such national legislation for a period during which that article did not apply. Second, as stated in paragraph 52 above, such national legislation does not come within the scope of that regulation. It follows from that that Article 8 cannot preclude a contribution such as that described in the preceding paragraph from being calculated and levied on the basis of all the revenues from electricity sales realised in the territory of that Member State by those producers.
59 The answer to the second question is therefore that Article 8 of Regulation 2022/1854, in particular the condition of non-discrimination set out in Article 8(2)(a), must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation which provides that the monthly contribution for which electricity producers are liable under that legislation, which is used to finance a public entity whose purpose is to ensure the financial stability of the energy sector and the security of the electricity system of that Member State, is calculated and levied on the basis of all the revenues from electricity sales realised in the territory of that Member State by those producers.
The third question
60 By its third question, the referring court seeks, in essence, an interpretation of, first, Article 2(1) and (2) and Article 4 of Regulation 2021/1119, read in conjunction with Article 191(2) TFEU, second, Article 3(1), (3) and (4) of Directive 2018/2001 and, third, Article 3(a), (b), (h) and (p) and Article 10(1), (4) and (5) of Regulation 2019/943, read in conjunction with recitals 22 and 23 thereof, with Article 5(1), (3) and (4) of Directive 2019/944, and with Article 8 of Regulation 2022/1854.
61 In that regard, it must be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, in the context of the cooperation between the Court and the national courts provided for in Article 267 TFEU, it is solely for the national court before which the dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the particular circumstances of the case both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court. Consequently, where the questions submitted concern the interpretation or the validity of a rule of EU law, the Court is in principle bound to give a ruling (see judgments of 21 April 1988, Pardini, 338/85, EU:C:1988:194, paragraph 8; of 24 July 2023, Lin, C‑107/23 PPU, EU:C:2023:606, paragraph 61; and of 11 June 2026, OTP banka, C‑81/24, EU:C:2026:470, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited).
62 Questions on the interpretation of EU law referred by a national court in the factual and legislative context which that court is responsible for defining and the accuracy of which is not a matter for the Court to determine enjoy a presumption of relevance. Accordingly, the Court may refuse to rule on a request for a preliminary ruling made by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (judgments of 16 December 2008, Cartesio, C‑210/06, EU:C:2008:723, paragraph 67 and the case-law cited, and of 11 June 2026, OTP banka, C‑81/24, EU:C:2026:470, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited).
63 That said, it is clear from Article 94 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice and from settled case-law that, in order to provide an interpretation of EU law which is of use to the national court, the request for a preliminary ruling must, first, contain a summary of the subject matter of the dispute and the relevant findings of fact as determined by the referring court or tribunal, or, at least, an account of the facts on which the questions are based. It must, second, set out the tenor of any national provisions applicable in the case in the main proceedings, and, where appropriate, the relevant national case-law. Lastly, the referring court or tribunal must state the reasons which prompted it to inquire about the interpretation or validity of certain provisions of EU law, and the relationship between those provisions and the national legislation applicable to the main proceedings (see order of the President of the Court of 12 June 2014, Municipiul Piatra Neamț, C‑13/14, EU:C:2014:2000, paragraph 10 and the case-law cited, and judgment of 4 June 2026, Darashev, C‑312/24, EU:C:2026:449, paragraph 56).
64 In the present case, it is true that the referring court has set out the tenor of the national provisions applicable to the dispute in the main proceedings and the subject matter of that dispute. In addition, it has stated, with regard to the third question, that the 5% contribution discourages the production of electricity from renewable sources, leads to a halt in investment and a forced limitation on the production of that type of electricity, and is incompatible with the EU policy on environmental protection and the promotion of climate neutrality.
65 Nevertheless, apart from those general assertions, and as has also been submitted by the administrative authority, that court has not in any way set out the reasons why it is uncertain as regards the interpretation of the provisions of EU law referred to in that question or the relationship between those provisions and the national legislation applicable to the dispute in the main proceedings.
66 In that regard, it is apparent from the order for reference that that dispute concerns the methods of calculating a contribution introduced by the Bulgarian legislature, intended to finance a public entity whose purpose is to ensure the financial stability of the energy sector and the security of the electricity system of that Member State. That court has not in any way explained the relationship between, on the one hand, the national legislation relating to that contribution and the detailed rules for its calculation and, on the other, the provisions whose interpretation it seeks by its third question. Although the referring court points, in a generic manner, to Regulation 2021/1119, none of the other acts or provisions set out in its third question are referred to in the order for reference.
67 In those circumstances, the Court does not have before it the information necessary to give a useful answer to the third question. That question is therefore inadmissible, in accordance with the case-law referred to in paragraphs 62 and 63 above.
The fourth question
68 By its fourth question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 63 TFEU and Article 17 of the Charter must be interpreted as precluding legislation of a Member State pursuant to which electricity producers selling electricity in the territory of that Member State are liable to pay a monthly 5% contribution intended to finance a public entity whose purpose is to ensure the financial stability of the energy sector and the security of the electricity system of that Member State, calculated on the basis of all their revenues obtained from those sales.
69 In that regard, it must be noted, first, that, apart from a general assertion that such a contribution restricts the free movement of capital, the referring court has in no way explained the reasons why it is uncertain as regards the interpretation of Article 63 TFEU or the relationship between that provision and the dispute in the main proceedings. Accordingly, in so far as that fourth question relates to that provision, it is inadmissible, in accordance with the case-law set out in paragraphs 62 and 63 above.
70 Second, inasmuch as the referring court seeks an interpretation of Article 17 of the Charter, it must be recalled that the scope of the Charter is defined in Article 51(1) thereof, according to which, so far as action by the Member States is concerned, the provisions of the Charter are addressed to those States only when they are implementing EU law.
71 The fundamental rights guaranteed in the legal order of the European Union are applicable in all situations governed by EU law, but not outside such situations (judgments of 26 February 2013, Åkerberg Fransson, C‑617/10, EU:C:2013:105, paragraph 19, and of 29 July 2024, protectus, C‑185/23, EU:C:2024:657, paragraph 41).
72 By contrast, where a legal situation does not come within the scope of EU law, the Court does not have jurisdiction to rule on it and any provisions of the Charter relied upon cannot, of themselves, form the basis for such jurisdiction (see judgments of 26 February 2013, Åkerberg Fransson, C‑617/10, EU:C:2013:105, paragraph 22, and of 21 May 2026, 24.hu, C‑843/24, EU:C:2026:426, paragraph 28).
73 The concept of ‘implementation of Union law’, within the meaning of Article 51(1) of the Charter, presupposes a degree of connection between an act of EU law and the national measure at issue above and beyond the matters covered being closely related or one of those matters having an indirect impact on the other (judgment of 29 July 2024, protectus, C‑185/23, EU:C:2024:657, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited).
74 Accordingly, in order to determine whether a national measure involves ‘implementing Union law’ within the meaning of Article 51(1) of the Charter, it is necessary to determine, inter alia, whether that national legislation is intended to implement a provision of EU law; the nature of the legislation at issue and whether it pursues objectives other than those covered by EU law, even if it is capable of indirectly affecting EU law; and also whether there are specific rules of EU law on the matter or rules which are capable of affecting it (judgment of 29 July 2024, protectus, C‑185/23, EU:C:2024:657, paragraph 43 and the case-law cited).
75 In the present case, first, it is clear from the analysis of the first question that the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings does not come within the scope of Regulation 2022/1854. Second, the order for reference does not show that there is a degree of connection between that legislation and another act of EU law. Accordingly, it cannot be stated that the purpose of that legislation is to implement EU law, within the meaning of Article 51(1) of the Charter.
76 Consequently, the Court does not have jurisdiction to answer the fourth question in so far as it concerns the interpretation of Article 17 of the Charter.
Costs
77 Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the referring court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs of those parties, are not recoverable.
On those grounds, the Court (Ninth Chamber) hereby rules:
1. Article 8 of Council Regulation (EU) 2022/1854 of 6 October 2022 on an emergency intervention to address high energy prices
must be interpreted as not precluding legislation of a Member State under which electricity producers are liable to pay a monthly contribution amounting to 5% of their revenues obtained from the sale of electricity, which serves to finance a public entity whose purpose is to ensure the financial stability of the energy sector and the security of the electricity system of that Member State and which exists at the same time as the measure capping the revenues of electricity producers provided for by that regulation.
2. Article 8 of Regulation 2022/1854, in particular the condition of non-discrimination set out in Article 8(2)(a),
must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation which provides that the monthly contribution for which electricity producers are liable under that legislation, which is used to finance a public entity whose purpose is to ensure the financial stability of the energy sector and the security of the electricity system of that Member State, is calculated and levied on the basis of all the revenues from electricity sales realised in the territory of that Member State by those producers.
[Signatures]
* Language of the case: Bulgarian.