Judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber, Extended Composition) of 4 November 2026. – GI v European Commission.

1

By his action brought under Article 270 TFEU, the applicant, GI, seeks, first, in essence, the annulment of his appraisal report for 2022, in the version as rendered definitive by the decision of the appeal assessor of 24 October 2023 (‘the appraisal report at issue’) and, secondly, compensation in respect of the harm he claims to have suffered.

2

At the time of the facts at issue, the applicant was an official in Grade AD 8, who had taken up duties with the European Commission on 1 September 2004.

3

During the period from 1 January 2011 to 15 October 2023, the applicant worked for one Directorate-General. In particular, from 16 September 2015 to 31 January 2023, the applicant worked within the same unit.

4

In 2021, A became the applicant’s head of unit.

5

On 22 March 2022, the applicant received his appraisal report for 2021 (‘the 2021 appraisal report’) which concluded that his general performance was unsatisfactory.

6

On 7 September 2022, following the appeal brought by the applicant against the 2021 appraisal report, the appeal assessor confirmed that report.

7

In October 2022, a support plan was put in place in order to help the applicant improve his performance (‘the support plan’). That support plan, which was applied until at least 31 December 2022, was followed by three meetings and three progress reports.

8

On 15 October 2022, A was promoted to Director and B became the applicant’s head of unit.

9

On 7 February 2023, in the context of the 2022 appraisal exercise, the applicant submitted his self-assessment.

10

On 6 March 2023, after the appraisal dialogue with the applicant on 9 February 2023, B signed, in respect of the 2022 appraisal exercise, the applicant's appraisal report as reporting officer. In that report, to which A also contributed in respect of the period from 1 January to 15 October 2022, it was concluded that the applicant’s performance had been unsatisfactory during the appraisal period.

11

On 28 April 2023, A, in his capacity as countersigning officer, confirmed the appraisal report concerning the applicant.

12

On 5 May 2023, the applicant refused to accept the appraisal report concerning him and lodged an appeal against his appraisal.

13

On 25 September 2023, the Director-General of the ‘Human Resources and Security’ Directorate-General gave her opinion on the appraisal report concerning the applicant and recommended that the conclusions of the reporting officer be followed.

14

On 10 October 2023, a dialogue between the applicant and the appeal assessor took place in the presence of a staff representative.

15

On 24 October 2023, the appeal assessor confirmed the appraisal report at issue.

16

On 24 January 2024, the applicant lodged a complaint pursuant to Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union (‘the Staff Regulations’) against the appraisal report at issue.

17

On 30 August 2024, the appointing authority rejected the applicant’s complaint (‘the decision rejecting the complaint’).

18

In his application, the applicant claims that the General Court should:

19

In his reply, the applicant also claims that the Court should:

20

The Commission contends that the Court should:

21

By his second head of claim submitted in the application, the applicant requests the General Court to order the Commission to classify him retroactively, as of 1 January 2023, at the step higher than that which he will hold at the date of delivery of the judgment in the present case and to pay the resulting difference in remuneration.

22

In addition, by his second, third and sixth heads of claim (see paragraph 19 above) submitted in the reply, the applicant requests, likewise, the General Court to issue several directions to the Commission.

23

It is settled case-law that, regarding judicial review, the Court does not have jurisdiction to issue directions to the administration (see judgment of 2 February 2022, LU v EIB, T‑536/20, not published, EU:T:2022:40, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited).

24

Consequently, the claims of the applicant to which those heads of claim relate must be dismissed on grounds of lack of jurisdiction.

25

As regards the admissibility of the other heads of claim submitted in the reply, it must be borne in mind that, under Article 76 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the applicant is obliged to define the subject matter of the proceedings and to set out the form of order he or she is seeking in the application initiating proceedings. Although Article 84(2) of those rules authorises, in certain circumstances, new pleas in law to be introduced in the course of proceedings, that provision cannot in any circumstances be interpreted as authorising the applicant to bring new claims before the General Court and thereby to modify the subject matter of the proceedings (see judgment of 3 June 2026, UF v Parliament, T‑1137/23, not published, EU:T:2026:367, paragraph 58 and the case-law cited).

26

The heads of claim set out in paragraph 19 above are new, since they were expressed for the first time in the reply. Consequently, without prejudice to those heads of claim dismissed in paragraph 24 above, due to the General Court’s lack of jurisdiction, those new heads of claim must be dismissed as inadmissible.

27

By his first head of claim submitted in the application, the applicant seeks the annulment, first, of the decision rejecting the complaint and, secondly, of the appraisal report at issue.

28

It is settled case-law that a claim for annulment formally directed against the decision rejecting a complaint has the effect of bringing before the Court the act against which the complaint was submitted, where that claim, as such, lacks any independent content (see judgment of 13 July 2018, Curto v Parliament, T‑275/17, EU:T:2018:479, paragraph 63 and the case-law cited).

29

In the present case, the decision rejecting the complaint merely confirms the appraisal report at issue and explains its reasoning by responding to the applicant’s criticism in that regard.

30

Consequently, the claim for annulment directed against the decision rejecting the complaint has no independent content. The claims for annulment must therefore be regarded as being directed solely against the appraisal report at issue, the legality of which must however be examined by taking into account the statement of reasons contained in the decision rejecting the complaint.

31

In support of his claim for annulment of the appraisal report at issue, the applicant raises four pleas in law, alleging, as to the first, manifest errors of assessment, as to the second, failure to state adequate reasons, as to the third, infringement of Article 5 of Commission Decision C(2019) 6855 of 4 October 2019 on procedures for dealing with professional incompetence (‘the 2019 internal provisions’) and, as to the fourth, as corrected in the reply, infringement of Article 4 of Commission Decision C(2013) 8985 final of 16 December 2013 laying down general provisions for implementing Article 43 of the Staff Regulations and implementing the first paragraph of Article 44 of the Staff Regulations (‘the GIP’).

32

It is appropriate to examine, in the first place, the second plea in law, alleging failure to state adequate reasons.

33

The applicant claims that adequate reasons were not stated for the appraisal report at issue. First, many vague criticisms in it are impossible to understand. Secondly, it contains almost no examples of the applicant’s alleged insufficiencies.

34

The Commission disputes the applicant’s arguments.

35

In that regard, it must be recalled that appraisal reports are not decisions within the meaning of Article 25 of the Staff Regulations, but are governed by the specific provisions laid down in Article 43 thereof (see judgment of 17 July 2024, LW v Commission, T‑232/23, not published, EU:T:2024:482, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited).

36

Article 43 of the Staff Regulations provides that the ability, efficiency and conduct in the service of each official are to be the subject of an annual report as provided for by the appointing authority of each institution and that that report shall state whether or not the performance level of the official has been satisfactory. That article gives no indication as to a possible duty to substantiate, by factual elements or by evidence, all the comments included in the appraisal report (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 July 2022, TL v Commission, T‑677/21, not published, EU:T:2022:456, paragraph 25).

37

As regards the GIP, Article 2(3) of those provisions provides that each appraisal report is to contain a conclusion on whether the jobholder’s performance has been satisfactory and that, if the performance is held to be unsatisfactory, that conclusion is to be based on factual elements.

38

It follows from the case-law that the administration is obliged to state in a sufficient and detailed manner the reasons on which any appraisal report is based in order to give the person concerned an opportunity to make observations on those reasons, compliance with those requirements being all the more important where the appraisal shows a deterioration compared with the previous report (judgment of 18 October 2023, Gómez Calavia v Court of Justice of the European Union, T‑336/22, not published, EU:T:2023:652, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited).

39

However, reporting officers, who have a wide discretion when appraising the work of persons upon whom they must report, are not obliged to include in that report all the relevant factual and legal information supporting their appraisal. In that regard, it is sufficient in principle for the appraisal report to set out the salient points of the official’s performance in terms, in particular, of his or her efficiency, ability and conduct in the service, and to appraise them. Provided that the appraisal is clearly individualised and not impersonal, a reporting officer is not obliged to give details of the grounds for his or her assessment by providing specific examples to substantiate his or her value judgments (see judgment of 5 February 2025, US v Commission, T‑18/24, not published, EU:T:2025:132, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited).

40

Nor is the reporting officer, in principle, required to provide an explicit and specific statement of reasons for each of his or her assessments (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 September 2019, FV v Council, T‑27/18 RENV, not published, EU:T:2019:621, paragraph 75).

41

In the present case, the appraisal report at issue contains the assessment of the reporting officer – namely B – in respect of the entire appraisal period and a contribution from A for the period from 1 January to 15 October 2022.

42

In the first place, so far as concerns the assessment of the reporting officer in respect of the entire appraisal period, that assessment may be summarised as follows.

43

As regards the ability, efficiency and conduct of the applicant, after recalling the tasks which he performed within his unit and drawing attention to the positive aspects of his performance, the reporting officer noted the difficulties he encountered. Thus, she found, inter alia, in essence, that, in the cases where his superiors had been consulted, regular aid had been given to him in order to identify the subjects pertaining to his directorate-general’s remit, that he had been regularly reminded of several rules (for example, those concerning information sharing), that his answers to the letters sent to his directorate-general had required monitoring by his hierarchy, that his written and oral skills were at an inadequate level, that, referring to mock presentations delivered by the applicant, the quality of the latter did not correspond to his grade, that he had had to be reminded of internal rules regarding the taking of leave, that, in the management of the assignments given to him, his work required regular supervision and support by his peers, who had had to take on part of his workload to meet deadlines and to bring a project to a successful completion (for example, for the organisation of a virtual stand or the preparation of a toolkit) and also that he had not proactively sought to integrate into the team.

44

As regards the applicant’s language skills, the reporting office observed that his written and oral skills in English were insufficient.

45

Lastly, as regards the level of responsibilities exercised by the applicant, the reporting officer stated that they had remained unchanged in 2022. She also stated that he had been requested to work on a new project but that, since he had not followed the instructions given, the team leader had taken over that project.

46

In the second place, so far as concerns A’s contribution in respect of the period from 1 January to 15 October 2022, that assessment may be summarised as follows.

47

As regards the applicant’s efficiency, A identified the tasks carried out by him in an acceptable manner – namely repetitive tasks – and those the performance of which was unsatisfactory. Concerning the latter, which were of a general nature, A noted that their performance required detailed monitoring. Thus, the applicant regularly committed errors when he was to determine whether citizens’ requests pertained to his directorate-general’s remit. A also stated that, despite his years of experience, the applicant needed guidance in order to find the necessary information and on how to update it. In addition, even though a request to this effect had been made to him by his hierarchy, the applicant had not made any concrete proposal in order to optimise certain aspects of the visits to the Commission’s Visitors’ Centre. A also observed that the applicant had encountered difficulties in dealing with citizens’ questions and referred, on that issue, to the 2021 appraisal report.

48

As regards the applicant’s ability, A observed that, although he had been encouraged to do so by his hierarchy, the applicant had not contributed to the work of the team by proposing new ideas. In addition, A noted the lack of clarity of the applicant’s written communication style, which added to the workflow of his colleagues and often required the applicant to explain or clarify his messages.

49

As regards the applicant’s conduct in the service, after referring to the courtesy shown by the applicant, A noted that the applicant had not sought to integrate into his team and cooperated little with the other members and within that team. A also observed that holiday management and the need to ensure back-ups had been problematic.

50

As regards the applicant’s language skills, A again drew attention to the applicant’s unsatisfactory level of English, both written and oral.

51

Lastly, as regards the level of responsibilities exercised by the applicant, A stated that he had not changed the level of his responsibilities in the course of the year.

52

It is in the light of the foregoing that it is necessary to examine whether the applicant is justified in claiming that the appraisal report at issue is vitiated by a failure to state adequate reasons.

53

In the first place, it must be observed that the applicant’s general performance was found to be unsatisfactory both in the appraisal report at issue and in the 2021 appraisal report. The same is true of the applicant’s efficiency, his ability and his conduct, which were held to be unsatisfactory both in 2021 and in 2022. The Court therefore does not note any deterioration in the appraisal in respect of 2022 as compared with 2021, which would have required the administration to comply more fully with the obligation to state reasons.

54

In the second place, so far as concerns the applicant’s argument that some of the criticisms made in the appraisal report at issue are impossible to understand, that argument is based on the allegedly vague explanations contained in that report. That argument concerns A’s contribution as regards the applicant’s efficiency. Specifically, the applicant claims that A’s comment that ‘requests of [a] more general nature which should be handled by him as per his role and grade require detailed monitoring by his immediate management, with the need to improve content and style’ is very vague inasmuch as it is impossible to understand what tasks were concerned and what needed to be improved.

55

In that regard, it must be noted that the applicant’s argument is based on a partial reading of A’s comments. First, it is apparent from those comments that the management of ‘requests of [a] more general nature’ must be understood in terms of its opposition with the management of repetitive processes, which were handled by the applicant in an acceptable manner. Secondly, A did not merely express a negative opinion on the handling by the applicant of ‘requests of [a] more general nature’ without providing further details. He continued by stating, in particular, that the applicant had regularly committed errors in the identification of requests which pertained or did not pertain to the remit of his directorate-general and that he had to be helped in order to find the necessary information and to update it. A also noted that, in 2022, there were still significant issues as regards how citizens’ questions were dealt with, referring on that point to issues already identified in the 2021 appraisal report.

56

Accordingly, it was possible for the applicant to identify the ‘requests of [a] more general nature’ which A’s comments concerned, in respect of which his performance was held to be unsatisfactory.

57

It also follows from the foregoing that the applicant cannot take issue with A for failing to specify the issues as regards his manner of dealing with citizens’ questions. As observed in paragraph 55 above, A referred to the 2021 appraisal report. The applicant was acquainted with that report. He could therefore readily identify what the issues were in respect of his handling of citizens’ questions, as noted in 2021 and which persisted until 2022, namely his inability to adapt the Commission’s standard reply format to the questions asked by citizens and the extra workload that that entailed for his colleagues. Since A’s statement of reasons was adopted in a context known to the applicant, A was not required to identify with more precision, within the same appraisal report at issue, the issues linked with the applicant’s handling of citizens’ questions, nor even, having regard to the persistently unsatisfactory nature of that handling, to state whether the applicant had nevertheless made progress since 2021 (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 22 April 2021, Council v PKK, C‑46/19 P, EU:C:2021:316, paragraph 48 and the case-law cited).

58

Moreover, the findings made in paragraphs 56 and 57 above are confirmed by the appeal brought against the appraisal report at issue, in which, after quoting A’s comments, the applicant indicated, inter alia, that he was open to improving his approach to ensure that his directorate-general was handling appropriate requests with the best possible content and style.

59

In the third place, so far as concerns the argument that the appraisal report at issue contained almost no examples of the insufficiencies identified, it must be observed that, by that argument, the applicant claims that some criticisms made in that report are not exemplified in any way while others are insufficiently exemplified.

60

As regards the argument that some of the comments made in the appraisal report at issue are not in any way exemplified, the following must be observed.

61

First, the applicant wrongly claims that the reporting officer’s comment that his work required regular supervision by his peers is not supported by any facts. After making that comment, the reporting officer referred to the organisation of a virtual stand at an event and to the preparation of a toolkit for visitors and groups wishing to find out more about an EU policy.

62

Second, it is true, on the other hand, that the reporting officer’s criticism concerning the organisation of the applicant’s leave is not accompanied by any specific example. However, that criticism was adopted in a context known to the person concerned (see the case-law cited in paragraph 57 above), from which he could deduce the facts on which it was based. It is apparent from the decision rejecting the complaint that, on 15 November 2022, emails were exchanged with the applicant to clarify the arrangements regarding the taking of leave within his unit. While the content of those emails is not repeated in that decision, the existence of that email exchange and, more fundamentally, of the need to remind the applicant of the rule on leave are attested to by the progress reports drawn up in connection with the support plan. Besides, the applicant in the reply acknowledges receiving instructions from his hierarchy concerning the planning of leave.

63

Third, as regards A’s contribution concerning the applicant’s ability, first, A cannot be criticised for failing to substantiate his assessment that the applicant did not contribute to the work of the team with ideas. A relevant example is included in A’s contribution concerning the applicant’s efficiency, namely the failure of the applicant to make any proposal to optimise certain aspects of visits to the Commission’s Vistors’ Centre.

64

Secondly, A’s comment that the written communication style of the applicant was not easily understandable was adopted in a context known to the applicant (see the case-law cited in paragraph 57 above). It is apparent from the decision rejecting the complaint that, in emails dated 10 March and 16 September 2022, the existence of which is not disputed, the applicant had been requested to pay more attention to the grammar and spelling in a draft reply, and to revise in detail another draft reply, respectively.

65

Fourth, as regards A’s other comments in respect of which the applicant also claims that no specific example was provided – namely that concerning his conduct in the service and, in the assessment concerning his efficiency, that relating to his lack of autonomy – it is sufficient to observe that, in any event, it was not necessary to substantiate those comments.

66

In fact, it is apparent from the case-law set out in paragraph 39 above that, provided that the appraisal is clearly individualised and not impersonal, a reporting officer is not obliged to give details of the grounds for his or her assessment by providing examples to substantiate his or her value judgements. Taking account of the summary of the appraisal report at issue made in paragraphs 41 to 51 above and the assessments made in paragraphs 53 to 64 above, the conditions laid down by that case-law are satisfied. First, the statement of reasons for the appraisal report is sufficient and detailed. Secondly, the assessment is clearly individualised and not impersonal. Specifically, the statement of reasons clearly highlights the salient features of the performance of the applicant assessed, and gives a sufficiently detailed overall view of that performance. In addition, the statement of reasons enables it to be understood why the reporting officer had been led to find that the applicant’s performance, his efficiency, his ability and his conduct in the service were unsatisfactory. Lastly, the statement of reasons is based on specific evidence, illustrated by a number of precise factual examples.

67

Accordingly, a fortiori, the applicant’s argument alleging that an insufficient number of examples were given to illustrate some of the reporting officer’s comments even though those comments, in some cases, stress the regular nature of the insufficiency noted, likewise cannot succeed.

68

Consequently, the second plea must be rejected as unfounded.

69

In support of his first plea in law, the applicant submits, in essence, that the Commission committed manifest errors of assessment by holding that his performance was unsatisfactory.

70

The Commission disputes the applicant’s arguments.

71

According to the case-law, appraisal reports contain assessments which can give rise to judicial review only in order to ensure that the procedure is conducted in a regular manner, the facts are materially correct, and there is no manifest error of assessment or misuse of powers by persons who are called upon to draw up those documents. In other words, the reporting officers have the widest discretion when judging the work of people whom they are responsible for appraising and it is not for the Court to review the merits of that assessment, containing complex value judgments which, by their nature, are not susceptible of objective verification, except in the event of manifest error (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 March 2018, HJ v EMA, T‑579/16, not published, EU:T:2018:168, paragraph 160 and the case-law cited).

72

Moreover, in order to establish that the administration committed a manifest error in assessing the facts such as to justify the annulment of an appraisal report, the evidence, which it is for the applicant to adduce, must be sufficient to make the findings of the administration implausible (see judgment of 23 September 2020, VE v ESMA, T‑77/18 and T‑567/18, not published, EU:T:2020:420, paragraph 91 and the case-law cited). In other words, the plea alleging a manifest error must be rejected if, despite the evidence adduced by the applicant, the disputed assessment may still be accepted as justified and consistent. Thus, an error may be classified as manifest only where it is easily recognisable and can be readily detected, in the light of the criteria to which the legislature intended the administration’s exercise of its discretion to be subject (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 March 2018, HJ v EMA, T‑579/16, not published, EU:T:2018:168, paragraph 95).

73

It is in light of those principles that it is necessary to examine the arguments put forward by the applicant in support of his first plea.

74

As a preliminary point, first, it must be observed that some of the arguments put forward concern the effectiveness of the support plan, so that they will be examined under the third plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 5 of the 2019 internal provisions. Secondly, the arguments concerning the statement of reasons for the appraisal report at issue have already been rejected in connection with the examination of the second plea, alleging a failure to state adequate reasons, and consequently are not addressed under the present plea.

75

That being so, in the first place, the applicant disputes the assessment of his performance by the reporting officer.

76

In that regard, first, it is admittedly apparent from the appraisal report at issue that the applicant adhered to the support plan and complied with it by reporting, every month, on his work and the steps provided for by that plan that he had accomplished. However, contrary to what the applicant seems to argue, by finding that he complied with the support plan, the reporting officer did not accept that his performance had improved. Thus, the argument that, in essence, the acceptance by the reporting officer of progress made by the applicant runs counter to the overall negative assessment in the appraisal report at issue is based on an erroneous premiss and cannot be upheld.

77

Second, the applicant incorrectly claims that he is criticised, in the appraisal report at issue, for his vigilance in checking with his superiors whether the questions addressed to the Europe Direct contact centre fell within his directorate-general’s remit. While the reporting officer referred to the applicant’s vigilance in the handling of those questions, she nevertheless did not express any negative comment in that regard. On the other hand, the reporting officer drew attention in that context to the difficulties encountered by the applicant in identifying which questions fell within the remit of his directorate-general. On that matter, the applicant’s claim that he had doubts only in respect of 4 requests out of the 1963 which he allegedly handled in 2022 is in no way substantiated, and therefore it cannot succeed.

78

Third, even though the applicant claims that no issue had been taken with his written and oral communication in English for 17 years, first, criticisms in that regard had already been made in the 2021 appraisal report. Secondly, having regard to the specific examples in the decision rejecting the complaint, referred to in paragraph 64 above, that factor does not render wholly implausible the reporting officer’s negative assessment of the applicant’s communication style. In the same way, the applicant’s mere participation in a training on clear writing in English in 2022 does not guarantee that his effort gave rise to positive results and therefore, likewise does not render implausible that assessment.

79

Fourth, in so far as the applicant submits that he cannot be criticised for amending, for efficiency reasons, the PowerPoint presentations available on the internet, it is sufficient to observe that the reporting officer does not make any negative comments as regards that practice, but nuances the applicant’s statement, made in his self-assessment, that he prepared a significant number of PowerPoint presentations.

80

Fifth, the same is true of the finding made by the reporting officer that the applicant did not work on the Commission Work Programme or the Annual Activity Report for 2022 and contributed only by the transmission of quantitative, factual information. That finding likewise does not constitute a negative comment but also seeks to nuance the applicant’s self-assessment in which he seems to state that he worked on those documents.

81

Sixth, while it is true that the appraisal report at issue shows that the applicant complied with some of the internal disciplinary rules, he nevertheless cannot maintain that he complied with all those rules inasmuch as the reporting officer, without contradicting herself in any way, notes that the applicant had to be regularly reminded of the rules on leave. The Commission cannot be criticised regarding that point for failing to demonstrate that the applicant was the only staff member to be so reminded. First, Article 5 of the GIP provides expressly that the individual qualitative appraisal must not include a comparison with the performance of other jobholders. In addition, the fact that colleagues of the applicant also infringed the internal rules on leave does not render the applicant’s conduct less blameworthy.

82

Lastly, seventh, the elements put forward by the applicant do not enable the plausibility of the examples referred to by the reporting officer, which illustrate to a sufficient standard the need to supervise the applicant in the handling of the tasks entrusted to him and for regular support on the part of his colleagues, to be called into question.

83

Thus, first, as regards the applicant’s shortcomings in preparing a ‘toolkit’ for visitors and groups, while the applicant disputes having been entrusted with that task, the email of 15 December 2022 sent to him, referred to in the decision rejecting the complaint, nevertheless attests to the contrary. It is apparent from that email that there was a plan to make tools available in order to ensure the consistency of the information shared with visitors and that, in that context, the applicant had inter alia been asked to gather ideas in order to improve the presentations to groups of visitors and to facilitate coordination within the directorate-general.

84

Secondly, as regards the applicant’s shortcomings during the organisation of a virtual stand at an event, the fact that the reporting officer purportedly was not present at that event cannot render her assessment implausible. As the coordinator of that event, she could directly assess the applicant’s involvement during the preparations for it and stay informed of his conduct during that event. Moreover, there is no requirement to refer to documents drawn up by third parties to substantiate an assessment. The appointing authority therefore cannot be criticised for referring, in the decision rejecting the complaint, to an email from the reporting officer recounting the applicant’s conduct during that event to confirm her assessment. Lastly, the interview given by the applicant to the media during that event, available on YouTube, is not in itself sufficient to demonstrate that he was adequately involved in the organisation of the stand.

85

As regards the applicant’s argument that there was nothing blameworthy in the fact that other colleagues were involved in the organisation of the virtual stand or in the fact that he had the support of his colleagues, that argument cannot succeed. First, by noting that other colleagues were involved in the organisation of the virtual stand, the reporting officer intended to nuance the comments of the applicant, who, in his self-assessment, had indicated that he had had a driving role in the success of that stand, yet without expressing any criticism in that regard. Next, the applicant is criticised not so much for the fact that his colleagues had had to support him, as for the regular nature of that support and the consequences that it had for his colleagues, who were thus led to take on part of his workload.

86

Lastly, as it has already been stated in paragraph 81 above, the reporting officer cannot be criticised for failing to have demonstrated that the applicant was subject to greater supervision than his colleagues. First, Article 5 of the GIP prohibits such a comparative assessment. Next, the fact that the applicant’s colleagues were also supervised does not render the applicant’s performance less unsatisfactory.

87

In the second place, the applicant challenges A’s contribution to the appraisal report at issue in respect of the period from 1 January to 15 October 2022, in particular so far as that contribution concerns his efficiency and his ability. For the following reasons, the applicant’s criticism in that connection cannot succeed either.

88

In that regard, first, so far as concerns the applicant’s efficiency, while, by his contribution, A does not take issue with the applicant for his vigilance in terms of identifying requests falling within the remit of his directorate-general, he observes on the other hand that, despite that vigilance, the applicant regularly committed errors in that task. On that matter, as it has already been observed in paragraph 77 above, the applicant’s claim that he had doubts only in respect of 4 requests out of the 1963 which he allegedly handled in 2022 is in no way substantiated, and therefore it cannot succeed.

89

Nor does the applicant adduce evidence capable of rendering implausible A’s claim that, even though he had been so requested, the applicant had not thought about ways to optimise the visits in terms of communication and the collection of feedback from the participants. Thus, while the applicant argues that he created a list of speakers willing to take part in the visits and received no response from his hierarchy in that regard, he has produced neither the list nor any other evidence to support his assertion.

90

Second, as regards the applicant’s ability and, specifically, A’s negative comments on the applicant’s communication style, the applicant again claims that his communication style was not criticised until 2021, namely for 17 years. That complaint must be rejected on the same grounds as those set out in paragraph 78 above.

91

Lastly, in the third place, the applicant seems to be maintaining that the positive aspects which are apparent from the appraisal report at issue – namely his adhesion to the support plan, his vigilance in the exercise of his duties, his aim to act efficiently in amending PowerPoint presentations which were already available, his compliance with certain internal disciplinary rules, his participation (on a voluntary basis) in a committee and also his acceptable management of repetitive and purportedly important processes – are incompatible with the assessment’s conclusion that his performance was unsatisfactory. However, it must be stated that, having regard to the negative comments expressed in that report (see paragraphs 41 to 51 above), those aspects alone cannot lead the Court to conclude that there was a manifest error of assessment imputable to the reporting officer or to A.

92

Consequently, having regard to all the foregoing reasoning, the first plea must be dismissed as unfounded.

93

The applicant claims that his hierarchy failed to implement the support plan correctly, which influenced his appraisal in respect of 2022. He takes issue, inter alia, with the period he was allowed to put that plan into practice, the plan’s contents and the fact that that plan was not continued in 2023. The applicant claims that, by failing to implement the support plan correctly, his hierarchy also infringed its duty of care.

94

The Commission disputes the applicant’s arguments.

95

Article 5 of the 2019 internal provisions, which implements the duty of care (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 1 October 2025, EP v Parliament, T‑370/24, not published, EU:T:2025:934, paragraph 40), states:

‘1.   When an annual report drawn up under Article 43 of the Staff Regulations which has become final contains for the first time a conclusion stating that performance has not been satisfactory, the reporting officer shall, after a preliminary interview with the official, draw up a draft support plan in writing within one month of the annual report becoming final. … The draft support plan shall be notified to the official who shall have five working days in which to submit any comments. No later than 15 working days after the end of this period, the reporting officer shall draw up the support plan, which shall take effect as soon as it has been notified to the official.

2.   For the purposes of this Decision, the “support plan” is a tool for managing efficiency, ability and conduct in the service, the purpose of which is to improve the performance of an official. This support plan shall be set up following an annual report indicating an unsatisfactory performance, drawn up in accordance with Article 43 of the Staff Regulations and having become final in accordance with the provisions implementing Article 43 of the Staff Regulations. The support plan shall establish:

If appropriate, these objectives may include preparation for mobility to another post. The support plan also provides for meetings between the reporting officer and the official in question to measure progress on the objectives set.

…

5.   The support plan shall end upon notification to the official of the annual report drawn up pursuant to Article 43 of the Staff Regulations and which has become final, indicating a satisfactory performance level.

6.   If a support plan has been drawn up for the reference period or a part of it, when drawing up the next annual report or a contribution thereto, the reporting officer shall give an assessment of the official’s efforts to attain the objectives set out in the support plan. This assessment must be substantiated by factual elements if it concludes that the performance level is unsatisfactory.’

96

In the first place, the General Court notes at the outset the ineffectiveness of the argument as to the alleged failure to continue the support plan in 2023. Even if it were established, the fact that that plan was not continued in 2023 concerns the professional performance of the applicant in 2023. It therefore has no effect on the lawfulness of the appraisal report at issue, which concerns the professional performance of the applicant in 2022.

97

In the second place, it follows from Article 5 of the 2019 internal provisions that the institution which establishes a support plan is required to give the official concerned the necessary time to demonstrate a progression in his or her performance and thus to guarantee that that plan is effective (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 November 2024, VO v Commission, T‑160/23, not published, EU:T:2024:791, paragraph 65).

98

In the present case, it is apparent from the file that the applicant had approximately two and a half months to implement the support plan before the end of 2022. The applicant’s arguments do not prove that that period was insufficient to enable him to make use of that plan.

99

First, the applicant does not claim that the draft support plan and the support plan were notified to him outside the time limits fixed by Article 5(1) of the 2019 internal provisions (see paragraph 95 above). Furthermore, it is apparent from the documents in the file that those time limits were observed.

100

Secondly, the period which expired between the start of the implementation of the support plan and the end of the appraisal period – approximately two and a half months – was of a sufficient length to guarantee that that plan was effective in the context of the 2022 appraisal exercise. Having regard to the nature of the applicant’s shortcomings, such a period allowed the latter the opportunity to improve his performance with a view to that appraisal exercise.

101

In the third place, contrary to what is claimed by the applicant, the fact that his performance was held to be unsatisfactory in the appraisal report at issue despite the implementation of the support plan cannot, in itself, imply that that plan was inadequate and thus that it did not comply with Article 5 of the 2019 internal provisions.

102

In the fourth place, nor can the argument that the support plan led to an additional unnecessary workload for the applicant, inasmuch as he had to draw up weekly reports on, it is alleged, numerous issues, which were not the subject of feedback on the part of his hierarchy, prove that that plan was ineffective.

103

First of all, the applicant has not proved that the documents which he had to draw up each week – namely a report on his activities for the past week and a plan for his activities the following week – were such as to impose an unreasonable burden on him. Next, those documents were intended to provide his hierarchy with a continuous overview of his activities and therefore did not require any reaction on its part. Lastly, his hierarchy monitored the implementation of the support plan. It is common ground between the parties that it sent three monthly progress reports to the applicant, namely on 20 October, 15 November and 13 December 2022. The progress reports of 20 October and 15 November 2022 indeed refer expressly to the weekly reports drawn up by the applicant. In addition, it is apparent from those progress reports that at least two meetings to monitor progress were organised, at which the applicant was present.

104

In the fifth place, the argument that the support plan did not include any of the elements required by Article 5(2) of the 2019 internal provisions (see paragraph 95 above) has no factual basis.

105

In that regard, first, specific professional objectives in terms of efficiency, ability and conduct were established in the support plan. Thus, by way of example, the applicant was requested to contribute to three communication projects carried out by the team concerned, to perform quality control of his performance and his replies to citizens’ questions on EU policies, to improve his knowledge of IT tools, to improve his written and oral skills in English and also to be available during working hours.

106

Second, both the timeline and the means available to the applicant for the purpose of meeting the specific professional objectives were established in the support plan. The applicant had until December 2022 to reach those objectives. As regards the tools to do so, periodic follow-ups and trainings, inter alia, were offered to the applicant.

107

Third, success criteria were provided for in the support plan, such as the management and quality of replies to citizens, within the deadlines, the efficient and independent use of IT tools, the observance of procedures and presence in the office. In the absence of any argument to the contrary, there is nothing to suggest that those success criteria were not clear and measurable, within the meaning of Article 5(2)(c) of the 2019 internal provisions. It follows from that finding that the applicant’s arguments based on the premiss that the support plan did not contain clear and measurable success criteria – namely the arguments concerning the arbitrary nature of that plan and the breach of the rights to good administration and to fair working conditions – must, as a result, be rejected.

108

Finally, fourth, the role of the support person was set out in the support plan. Thus, it was envisaged that the mission of that person was to provide counselling to the applicant, to organise informal meetings and to review possible difficulties and opportunities. Furthermore, if requested by the applicant, the support person was to provide career guidance on mobility.

109

In the sixth and last place, as regards the argument that the appraisal report at issue does not include any assessment of the applicant’s efforts to attain the objectives set out in the support plan and was not substantiated by factual elements, the following must be noted.

110

In accordance with Article 5(6) of the 2019 internal provisions (see paragraph 95 above), since the support plan covered part of 2022, the reporting officer, in the drawing up of the appraisal report at issue, had to give her assessment of the applicant’s efforts to attain the objectives set out in that plan. In addition, inasmuch as that assessment concluded that the applicant’s performance was unsatisfactory, it had to be substantiated by factual elements.

111

In the present case, the appraisal report at issue expressly or impliedly covers all the objectives established in the support plan.

112

First, the reporting officer expressly noted that some of the objectives referred to in the support plan had not been met. For example, she found that the objective concerning improvement of the applicant’s communication style had not been attained.

113

Secondly, without expressly referring to the other objectives in the support plan, the reporting officer concluded that the aspects of his performance closely linked to those objectives were not satisfactory, thus necessarily finding that the effort made by the applicant to attain those objectives was insufficient. Thus, for example, whereas one of the objectives of the support plan sought that the applicant contribute to the various actions of the outreach team, the reporting officer noted shortcomings of the applicant in that regard, in respect of the organisation of a virtual stand or the preparation of a toolkit. The same is true of the objective of the support plan seeking that the applicant ensure high quality replies to citizens’ questions, the reporting officer having observed that his replies required detailed monitoring and correction by his hierarchy.

114

As regards the argument that the appraisal report at issue is not substantiated by factual elements although it contains negative assessments, it is sufficient to observe that that argument has already been rejected in connection with the examination of the second plea.

115

It is clear from the foregoing reasoning that the third plea must be rejected as unfounded.

116

Having regard to the corrections made by the applicant in the reply, his arguments must be understood as meaning that there is an infringement of Article 4 of the GIP inasmuch as A was both his reporting officer for the period from 1 January to 15 October 2022, and the countersigning officer of the appraisal report at issue. Also in the reply, the applicant claims in addition that no decision delegating countersigning authority to A was adopted.

117

The Commission submits that the applicant’s arguments are inadmissible, given that they were not raised in the complaint, and that they are, in any event, unfounded.

118

It should be recalled that it follows from Article 91(2) of the Staff Regulations that, in principle, an appeal to the EU Courts by an official is admissible only if that official has previously submitted a complaint to the appointing authority in accordance with Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations.

119

However, the lodging of a complaint does not seem to be a necessary prerequisite for the bringing of an action directed against an appraisal report, which expresses the freely drawn-up opinion of the reporting officers and not the assessment of the appointing authority (see, to that effect, judgments of 3 July 1980, Grassi v Council, 6/79 and 97/79, EU:C:1980:178, paragraph 15, and of 4 July 2024, EUIPO v KD, C‑5/23 P, EU:C:2024:575, paragraph 19 and the case-law cited).

120

Nevertheless, where the person concerned, with regard to an appraisal report, instead of bringing an action directly before the EU judicature, relies on the provisions of the Staff Regulations to submit an administrative complaint to the appointing authority, the admissibility of the action brought subsequently will depend on the compliance by the person concerned with all the procedural constraints attaching to the recourse to a prior complaint (judgment of 16 July 1992, Della Pietra v Commission, T‑1/91, EU:T:1992:91, paragraph 24; see also, to that effect and by analogy, judgments of 7 May 1986, Rihoux and Others v Commission, 52/85, EU:C:1986:199, paragraph 11, and of 3 December 2015, Cuallado Martorell v Commission, T‑506/12 P, EU:T:2015:931, paragraph 62).

121

Among those procedural constraints is the principle according to which Article 91 of the Staff Regulations is designed to permit and encourage the amicable settlement of differences which have arisen between officials and the administration. In order to comply with that requirement, it is essential that the administration should be in a position to know with sufficient certainty the complaints of the person concerned against the contested decision (judgment of 16 July 1992, Della Pietra v Commission, T‑1/91, EU:T:1992:91, paragraph 24; see also, by analogy, judgment of 7 May 1986, Rihoux and Others v Commission, 52/85, EU:C:1986:199, paragraph 12).

122

Consequently, after the expiry of the time limit for bringing an application directly before the Court, an official who has preferred to make a prior complaint first may not seek from the Court a form of order having a subject matter different from the remedy sought in the complaint or put forward heads of claim based on matters other than those relied on in the complaint. The submissions and arguments made to the EU judicature in support of those heads of claim need not necessarily appear in the complaint, but must be closely linked to it (judgment of 16 July 1992, Della Pietra v Commission, T‑1/91, EU:T:1992:91, paragraph 24; see also, by analogy, judgment of 7 May 1986, Rihoux and Others v Commission, 52/85, EU:C:1986:199, paragraph 13).

123

It should also be noted that, since the pre-litigation procedure is informal in character and those concerned act, in general, without the assistance of a lawyer at that stage, the administration must not interpret complaints restrictively but must, on the contrary, examine them with an open mind. It is not the purpose of Article 91 of the Staff Regulations to bind strictly and absolutely the contentious stage of the proceedings, if any, provided that the claims submitted at that stage change neither the legal basis nor the subject matter of the complaint (judgment of 25 October 2013, Commission v Moschonaki, T‑476/11 P, EU:T:2013:557, paragraph 76).

124

Lastly, pleas involving matters of public policy may, as an exception to the rule of correspondence between the complaint and the action, be raised for the first time before the EU judicature (see, to that effect, judgment of 8 September 2021, AH v Eurofound, T‑630/19, not published, EU:T:2021:538, paragraphs 41 and 45), and may be done so at any stage of the proceedings (see judgment of 11 July 2019, Pshonka v Council, T‑285/18, not published, EU:T:2019:512, paragraph 55 and the case-law cited).

125

In the first place, on the assumption that the applicant intends to criticise the failure to delegate countersigning authority to A, it is sufficient to observe that that argument, raised for the first time before the Court, at the stage of the reply, cannot be upheld as to its substance, irrespective of its admissibility.

126

In that regard, so far as concerns the actors in the appraisal procedure where the appraisal report concludes that the performance of the official under appraisal was unsatisfactory, having regard to the provisions applicable in the present case, as a first step, Article 3(1) of the GIP provides for the intervention of the reporting officer. That reporting officer is to be the direct hierarchical superior of the official under appraisal and, in the present case, the head of unit of the official under appraisal on 1 December of the reporting period.

127

As a second step, Article 4(1) of the GIP provides for the intervention of a countersigning officer where the performance of the official under appraisal is found to be unsatisfactory. Under the second paragraph of that provision, read in conjunction with the first subparagraph of Article 3(2) of the GIP, the countersigning officer’s duties are exercised by the direct hierarchical superior of the reporting officer at the time of the superior’s first intervention in the appraisal procedure.

128

As a third step, in the event of a reasoned refusal to accept the appraisal report by the official under appraisal, Article 4(3) of the GIP provides for the intervention of an appeal assessor. The appeal assessor is to be the Director-General carrying out that duty at the time of his or her first intervention in the appraisal procedure. Under the second subparagraph of Article 7(3) of the GIP, the appeal assessor is to consult the Directorate-General responsible for human resources before taking his or her decision. That directorate-general may in turn consult the Reports Committee.

129

Lastly, Article 2(ii) of Annex I to the GIP, which governs certain special cases, provides that if, during the reporting period but not less than four months after the period covered by the previous report or the previous contribution included in the report, an official leaves a post by virtue of which he or she would have been called upon to carry out the duties of reporting officer with respect to a jobholder, he or she must draw up a contribution on the jobholder’s performance. That contribution is incorporated in the appraisal report.

130

Therefore, as is apparent from paragraph 127 above, A derived his competence as countersigning officer from Article 4(2) of the GIP, since he was, at the relevant date, the direct hierarchical superior of B, who performed the duties of reporting officer, which is moreover not disputed by the applicant.

131

In the second place, so far as concerns the argument alleging an infringement of Article 4(1) of the GIP on account of the dual role of A, namely that of the author of a contribution in the appraisal report at issue in respect of the period from 1 January to 15 October 2022 and that of countersigning officer of the appraisal report at issue, that argument was also put forward for the first time before the General Court.

132

Having regard to the case-law recalled in paragraphs 119 to 124, it must be observed, first, that the complaint contains no claim alleging an infringement of Article 4 of the GIP, even though the applicant already knew of the alleged facts at the stage of the complaint. Nor is the dual role of A criticised.

133

Consequently, the argument alleging a breach of Article 4(1) of the GIP on account of the dual role played by A is not closely linked to any of the heads of claim relied on in the complaint, in breach of the rule of correspondence.

134

Second, the argument alleging a breach of Article 4 of the GIP on account of the dual role of A in the appraisal procedure, which could raise the issue of observance of the requirement of objective impartiality, cannot be considered to concern a matter of public policy.

135

In those circumstances, it must be concluded that the fourth plea, in so far as it is based on an infringement of Article 4 of the GIP, is inadmissible on the grounds of a failure to comply with the rule of correspondence.

136

Accordingly, the fourth plea must be rejected as in part unfounded and in part inadmissible.

137

In support of his claims for compensation, as set out in the application, the applicant maintains that he has suffered material and non-material damage. In essence, first, the invalid appraisals to which he was subject had an impact on his career development and, secondly, they caused him distress and damaged his reputation.

138

The Commission disputes that line of argument.

139

It must be borne in mind in this respect that, according to settled case-law, claims for compensation for material or non-material damage must be dismissed where they are closely associated with claims for annulment which have themselves been dismissed as inadmissible or unfounded (see judgment of 5 July 2023, SE v Commission, T‑223/21, EU:T:2023:375, paragraph 185 and the case-law cited; see also, to that effect, judgment of 6 March 2001, Connolly v Commission, C‑274/99 P, EU:C:2001:127, paragraph 129).

140

In the present case, the claim for compensation is closely associated with the claim for annulment of the appraisal report at issue. The material and non-material harm in respect of which the applicant is seeking compensation stem from the irregularities which allegedly vitiate that report.

141

However, since the claim for annulment of the appraisal report at issue has been dismissed, the claims for compensation set out in the application must also be dismissed.

142

It is apparent from all the foregoing that the action must be dismissed in its entirety.

143

Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.

144

In the present case, since the applicant has been unsuccessful, he must be ordered to bear his own costs and to pay those incurred by the Commission, in accordance with the form of order sought by the Commission.

On those grounds,

THE GENERAL COURT (Third Chamber, sitting with five Judges)

hereby: