Judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) of 29 October 2025. – FU v European Parliament.

1

By her action under Article 270 TFEU, the applicant, FU, seeks the annulment of the decision of 30 November 2023 of the European Parliament, by which the European Parliament rejected, on the ground that it was out of time, her accident report of 27 November 2023 (‘the contested decision’).

2

On 20 August 2023, during a sailing trip in Greece, the applicant, an official of the Parliament, felt a pain in her right knee following a jump in the air.

3

On 21 August 2023, the applicant went to a doctor in Greece, who advised her, inter alia, to wait for the swelling in the knee to reduce, before undergoing a magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scan.

4

On 12 September 2023, while continuing to suffer knee pain once she had returned from her trip, the applicant had a consultation with her general practitioner, who asked her to undergo medical examinations, carried out by another doctor.

5

On 12 October 2023, the applicant underwent an MRI scan.

6

On 19 October 2023, on the basis of the results of the MRI, an orthopaedic specialist recommended that the applicant consult a surgeon to obtain a second opinion and consider, if necessary, surgery.

7

On 24 October 2023, a surgeon confirmed the need for surgery.

8

On 15 November 2023, another medical specialist also advised surgery.

9

On 27 November 2023, the applicant reported her accident to the Parliament (‘the accident report’). In the accident report, the applicant’s general practitioner stated that, on the day of the medical examination, it was not possible to judge the seriousness of the injury.

10

On 30 November 2023, by the contested decision, the appointing authority informed the applicant of the rejection of her accident report, which the appointing authority considered to be out of time.

11

On 27 February 2024, the applicant lodged a complaint against the contested decision, which was rejected by decision of the Parliament of 12 July 2024, notified to the applicant the same day.

12

The applicant claims that the Court should:

13

The Parliament, supported by the Council of the European Union, contends that the Court should:

14

The European Commission contends that the Court should dismiss the action.

15

In support of her action, the applicant raises three pleas in law, alleging, first, infringement of the obligation to state reasons and of Article 15(2) of the Common rules on the insurance of officials of the European Communities against the risk of accident and of occupational disease (‘the Common Rules’) and a manifest error of assessment, secondly, breach of the principles of equal treatment and proportionality and, thirdly, in the alternative, a plea of illegality in respect of Article 15(2) of the Common Rules.

16

Without formally raising a plea of inadmissibility, the Parliament puts forward two grounds for challenging the admissibility of the action.

17

The Parliament contends that the applicant failed to structure her application around clearly identified pleas in law and neither followed the order indicated at the beginning of her application, nor grouped her arguments under a heading corresponding to the heading of those pleas in law. In addition, the applicant also drew conclusions on the basis of reasons which were not developed to the requisite legal standard, such as the infringement of Articles 4 and 7 of the Common Rules, the infringement of the duty to have regard for the welfare of officials and the right to good administration, and the failure to have regard to the obligation to state reasons.

18

The applicant disputes that line of argument.

19

In that regard, it must be recalled that Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court provides that the application must contain ‘the pleas in law and arguments relied on and a summary of those pleas in law’. Thus, according to settled case-law, the Courts of the European Union are not required to respond to the arguments of a party which are not sufficiently clear and precise, in that they have not been expanded upon or accompanied by a specific line of argument intended to support them (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 December 2024, FFPE Council section v Council, T‑179/23, EU:T:2024:897, paragraph 128 and the case-law cited).

20

In the present case, although the applicant states that she raises the three pleas in law referred to in paragraph 15 above, it is true that the application does not set out the pleas in turn and that they are not submitted under different headings. However, the presentation of the arguments in the body of the application makes it possible to identify, in a sufficiently comprehensible manner, the three pleas in law set out and the arguments put forward in support of them.

21

Furthermore, as regards the arguments relating to the alleged infringement of Articles 4 and 7 of the Common Rules, the applicant submits that accident reports which are out of time do not constitute an exclusion from cover or an exclusion of benefits provided for in those articles. In that regard, it should be stated that, although the line of argument is not supported by specific considerations, it nevertheless appears to relate to the alleged misinterpretation of Article 15(2) of the Common Rules relied on in the context of the first plea in law, alleging infringement of that article and a manifest error of assessment.

22

The same is true of the alleged infringement of the duty to have regard for the welfare of officials and the right to good administration. In that regard, the applicant submits that a restrictive interpretation of Article 15(2) of the Common Rules is contrary to the right to good administration, which required the administration to ensure the equitable treatment of any person, and to the administration’s duty to have regard for the welfare of its staff, which obliged the administration to carry out a thorough examination of all the circumstances of the case.

23

Finally, as regards the infringement of the obligation to state reasons, the applicant submits that the appointing authority failed to have regard to its obligation to state reasons by defining neither the concept of ‘lawful reason’ nor the criteria applicable to the present case. In that regard, the line of argument is closely linked to that relating to the concept of ‘lawful reason’ laid down in Article 15(2) of the Common Rules developed in the context of the first plea in law, with the result that it must be considered to be linked to it.

24

Consequently, the first ground of inadmissibility must be rejected.

25

The Parliament contends that the applicant failed to comply with the rule of correspondence between the complaint and the application. In her complaint, the applicant did not raise any argument concerning the alleged breach of the principles of equal treatment and proportionality, the alleged infringement of Articles 4 and 7 of the Common Rules and the alleged infringement of the obligation to state reasons and the plea of illegality in respect of Article 15(2) of the Common Rules.

26

The applicant disputes that line of argument.

27

In that regard, it must be remembered that the rule of correspondence between the complaint and the application requires that, for a plea before the Courts of the European Union to be admissible, it must have already been raised in the pre-litigation procedure, enabling the administration to know the criticisms made by the person concerned in respect of the contested decision. Thus, in civil service actions, the form of order sought before the Courts of the European Union can contain only heads of claim based on the same matters as those forming the basis of the heads of claim put forward in the complaint, although those heads of claim may be developed before the Courts of the European Union by pleas and arguments which, whilst not necessarily appearing in the complaint, are closely linked to it. In addition, it should also be noted, first, that, since the pre-litigation procedure is informal in character and those concerned are generally acting without the assistance of a lawyer at that stage, the administration must not interpret complaints restrictively but must, on the contrary, examine them with an open mind and, secondly, that it is not the purpose of Article 91 of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union (‘the Staff Regulations’) to bind strictly and absolutely any contentious stage of the proceedings (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 November 2024, WS v EUIPO, T‑221/23, not published, EU:T:2024:820, paragraphs 47 to 49 and the case-law cited).

28

As stated in paragraphs 21 to 23 above, the arguments relating to the infringement of Articles 4 and 7 of the Common Rules, the duty to have regard for the welfare of officials and the right to good administration and the alleged infringement of the obligation to state reasons are put forward by the applicant in support of the first plea in law. That plea in law is based on the same matters as those forming the basis of the heads of claim put forward in the complaint. As regards the alleged breach of the principles of equal treatment and proportionality, the dispute relates to the same matters as those forming the basis of the heads of claim put forward in the complaint. Accordingly, it cannot be held that those arguments constitute new pleas in law in the light of the complaint.

29

As regards the plea of illegality put forward in the third plea in law, under the case-law, as a rule, the broad logic of the incidental legal remedy justifies a plea of illegality being declared admissible where it is raised for the first time before the Courts of the European Union, by derogation from the rule of correspondence between the application and the complaint (judgment of 16 December 2020, RN v Commission, T‑442/17 RENV, EU:T:2020:618, paragraph 60).

30

Therefore, the fact that the plea of illegality in respect of Article 15(2) of the Common Rules was raised for the first time at the application stage does not mean that the plea is inadmissible.

31

In the light of the foregoing considerations, the ground of inadmissibility alleging failure to comply with the rule of correspondence must be rejected.

32

First, the applicant submits that the starting point for the time period within which the accident report must be submitted should be determined by reference to the time when the insured party becomes aware that he or she has been the victim of an accident. However, the applicant became aware of the extent of her injury gradually on account of the minor nature of the accident and the delayed onset of symptoms. The delay in reporting her accident was therefore unintentional. The time taken to report the accident was reasonable in the light of the lack of knowledge of her physical impairment until 15 November 2023.

33

Secondly, the applicant claims that the delay in submitting the accident report is also justified by the fact that it was not possible for her to consult a doctor capable of making the required findings. In accordance with Article 15(1) of the Common Rules and the actual wording of the accident report form, the accident report must be accompanied by a medical certificate specifying the nature of the injuries and the probable consequences of the accident.

34

The Parliament, supported by the Council and the Commission, disputes that line of argument.

35

The Common Rules were adopted by the EU institutions on the basis of Article 73(1) of the Staff Regulations.

36

Article 2(1) of the Common Rules defines the concept of an ‘accident’ as ‘any sudden occurrence adversely affecting the insured party’s bodily or mental health, the cause or one of the causes of which is external to the victim’s organism’.

37

In addition, paragraph 1 of Article 15 of the Common Rules, entitled ‘Accident report’, provides that ‘insured parties who sustain an accident, or those entitled under them, shall report the accident to the administration of the institution to which the insured party belongs’. Paragraph 2 of the same article provides as follows:

‘The report shall be submitted not later than 10 working days following the date on which the accident occurs. However, in cases of force majeure or for any other lawful reason, and provided the insured party provides proof of the accident and establishes a causal link between the accident and the physical or mental impairment, this period may be extended.’

38

It is apparent from Article 15(2) of the Common Rules that it is the date on which the accident occurred which causes the period of 10 working days to begin to run within which the report must be submitted, and not the date on which the insured party becomes aware of his or her accident. Furthermore, Article 15(2) of the Common Rules provides that the insured party may extend the period of 10 days to submit his or her accident report in cases of force majeure or for any other lawful reason, and provided that the insured party provides proof of the accident and establishes a causal link between that accident and the physical or mental impairment.

39

The concept of ‘lawful reason’ in respect of an accident report that is out of time is not defined by the Common Rules or by the case-law. That concept should be applied strictly for two reasons: first, because it constitutes an exception to a well-established obligation to submit an accident report within a period of 10 working days and, secondly, because it is a concept relating to provisions of EU law which confer entitlement to financial benefits (see, to that effect, judgment of 7 June 2023, OP v Parliament, T‑143/22, EU:T:2023:313, paragraph 99 and the case-law cited). According to the case-law concerning a request for the transfer of acquired pension rights, for the purpose of justifying a failure to observe the period prescribed in a situation which cannot be regarded as force majeure, the official must demonstrate that he or she was faced with an exceptional situation arising from causes which cannot be attributed to him or her. The conditions for justifying such a situation are less stringent than those required to justify force majeure and it is for the person at issue to prove the existence or occurrence of external events preventing him or her from complying with an obligation, whereas, to justify the existence of force majeure, that person must demonstrate not only the occurrence of abnormal events beyond his or her control, but also that he or she has acted diligently in order to guard against the consequences of those events (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 October 2024, CF v Commission (T‑51/24, not published, EU:T:2024:686, paragraph 77).

40

In that regard, the concept of ‘lawful reason’ must be interpreted as meaning that the insured party must demonstrate that he or she was faced with an exceptional situation arising from causes which are not attributable to him or her and which relate to his or her inability to submit an accident report within 10 working days following the date on which the accident occurs.

41

In the first place, as regards the argument of the applicant alleging a failure to state reasons, the applicant submits that the contested decision does not define the concept of ‘lawful reason’ and the applicable criteria. However, it is apparent from that decision that the accident report was rejected on the ground that it was out of time and that the period for reporting an accident refers to the day of the accident, and not to the day on which the insured party felt a worsening of her state of health or to the day on which a full diagnosis was obtained. It is also stated in that decision that the applicant became aware of the accident on the same day and that she did not provide any evidence of force majeure or any lawful reason preventing her from submitting the accident report within the prescribed period. Accordingly, the contested decision contains a clear and unequivocal explanation of the reasons in respect of which the pleas in law raised by the applicant do not constitute a lawful reason justifying the delay in submitting the accident report, which enabled the applicant to know the reasons for that decision and the Court to review the legality of that decision. It follows that the Parliament did not infringe its obligation to state reasons laid down in the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU and in Article 41(2)(c) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 November 2017, Icap and Others v Commission, T‑180/15, EU:T:2017:795, paragraph 287 and the case-law cited).

42

In the second place, in the light of paragraph 40 above, the applicant is wrong to consider that the mere production of evidence of the accident is sufficient to justify the delay in reporting the accident. It also follows that, in the absence of justification of force majeure or another lawful reason, the submission of an accident report out of time leads to the refusal to cover the accident. Nevertheless, as the Parliament, the Council and the Commission state, even if the insured party cannot benefit from supplementary accident insurance cover in the absence of proof of force majeure or any other lawful reason, the insured party is still eligible for reimbursement of her medical expenses by the Joint Sickness Insurance Scheme.

43

In the present case, as to whether the delay in reporting the accident could be justified by lawful reasons, it should be noted that the applicant, in her accident report, described the symptoms, namely a swollen knee and difficulty in walking, which she was able to determine on the day following the day of the accident. She explained that the doctor she consulted at the medical centre on that day advised her to undergo an MRI on her return from the trip. The applicant states that the pain persisted on her return. In those circumstances, she could not have been unaware before the expiry of the period of 10 working days following the date on which the accident occurred that she had suffered an accident for the purposes of Article 2(1) of the Common Rules. She cannot therefore claim to have belatedly become aware of the seriousness of her injuries for the purpose of demonstrating that the delay in reporting her accident was justified by a lawful reason.

44

Furthermore, it is true that it is apparent from the accident report form that the accident report must be accompanied by a medical certificate issued by a doctor. However, there is no requirement that a full diagnosis be made in order to be able to report an accident. Article 15(1) of the Common Rules provides only for a medical certificate ‘specifying the nature of the injuries and the probable consequences of the accident’. It is apparent from the accident report that the applicant went to a medical centre within the period of 10 days prescribed in Article 15(1) of the Common Rules and she does not demonstrate that the doctor she consulted refused to provide her with a medical certificate.

45

In the light of the foregoing considerations, the applicant has not proved the existence of force majeure or a lawful reason which prevented her from complying with the period of 10 working days prescribed in Article 15(2) of the Common Rules. In considering that she did not put forward a lawful reason justifying the delay in submitting her accident report, the Parliament neither made an error of assessment nor misapplied Article 15 of the Common Rules. In that regard, the contested decision is not vitiated by an error.

46

That finding cannot be called into question by the additional arguments put forward by the applicant.

47

The applicant submits that accident reports which are out of time do not constitute an exclusion from cover or an exclusion of benefits provided for in Articles 4 and 7 of the Common Rules. In that regard, it should be noted that Articles 4 and 7 of the Common Rules lay down the substantive conditions for the acceptance of an accident which are independent of the period laid down in Article 15(2) of the Common Rules.

48

In addition, according to the applicant, the interpretation of Article 15(2) of the Common Rules in the contested decision is contrary to the right to good administration, which requires the administration to ensure the equitable treatment of any person, and to the administration’s duty to have regard for the welfare of its staff, which obliges the administration to carry out a thorough examination of all the circumstances of the case. As is apparent from paragraph 41 above, the appointing authority carried out a thorough examination of the circumstances of the present case and, without any further explanation put forward by the applicant, it has not been established that the interpretation of Article 15(2) of the Common Rules was contrary to the principle of good administration and the duty to have regard for the welfare of officials.

49

It follows from all the foregoing considerations that the first plea in law must be rejected.

50

By her second plea in law, the applicant submits that there was a breach of the principles of equal treatment and of proportionality.

51

The Parliament, supported by the Council, contends that the second plea in law is inadmissible.

52

In that regard, in support of the present plea, the applicant merely claims, first, that the Parliament arbitrarily applied the criterion of ‘lawful reason’ laid down in Article 15(2) of the Common Rules and, secondly, that the rejection of her accident report is in breach of the principle of proportionality, since the failure to observe the period prescribed is not the result of negligence, without further explanation.

53

Accordingly, in so far as the applicant does not develop her line of argument, the second plea in law must be rejected as inadmissible in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 19 above.

54

In the alternative, the applicant raises a plea of illegality in respect of Article 15(2) of the Common Rules. The applicant claims that if that article were to be interpreted as strictly imposing a period of 10 working days to submit an accident report, that provision would have to be declared unlawful in the light of the unjustifiable and disproportionate interference with the right under the Staff Regulations to cover against the risk of accidents, referred to in Article 73 of the Staff Regulations. The wording of that provision precludes a restrictive interpretation as regards the grounds which may be taken into account to examine whether the failure to observe the period prescribed in respect of the accident report is justified. The clause, as interpreted by the appointing authority, amounts to an unfair term giving rise to an imbalance between the respective rights of insured parties and of the insurer and infringes the right to social security enshrined in Article 73 of the Staff Regulations.

55

The Parliament, supported by the Council and the Commission, disputes that line of argument.

56

The plea of illegality raised by the applicant concerns the inapplicability of Article 15(2) of the Common Rules on account of the inconsistency of that article with Article 73 of the Staff Regulations, in so far as it provides that the accident report must be submitted within a period of 10 working days following the date on which the accident occurs.

57

In that regard, first of all, it is clear from Article 73(1) of the Staff Regulations that an official is insured against the risk of accidents ‘in rules drawn up by common agreement of the appointing authorities of the institutions’. That article has served as the legal basis for the adoption of the Common Rules and the laying down of the conditions for reimbursement of expenses incurred therefore falls within the competence conferred on the institutions by Article 73 of the Staff Regulations.

58

Next, there are exceptions to the period prescribed in Article 15(2) of the Common Rules, namely force majeure and the existence of lawful reasons.

59

In addition, as the Parliament, the Commission and the Council submit, the establishment of a temporal condition in respect of the submission of an accident report constitutes a necessary measure for the purpose of preventing the abuse of rights and fraud. Such a condition is intended to enable the institutions to verify, with sufficient certainty, the genuineness of the reported accident and whether there is a causal link between that accident and the injuries.

60

Finally, in so far as the insured parties can attach a certificate of the initial medical assessment to their accident report, which may subsequently be supplemented, a period of 10 days is not unreasonable.

61

Therefore, the period prescribed in Article 15(2) of the Common Rules, and within which, except in respect of force majeure or a lawful reason, an accident must be reported for the purpose of receiving reimbursement of the expenses incurred cannot be contrary to Article 73(1) of the Staff Regulations.

62

Consequently, the plea of illegality must be rejected as unfounded, with the result that the action must be dismissed in its entirety.

63

Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, she must be ordered to bear her own costs and to pay those incurred by the Parliament, in accordance with the form of order sought by the latter.

64

Under Article 138(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the Member States and institutions which have intervened in the proceedings are to bear their own costs. The Council and the Commission must therefore bear their own costs.

On those grounds,

THE GENERAL COURT (Fourth Chamber)

hereby: