Judgment of the General Court (Tenth Chamber) of 29 April 2026. – Isabel Sánchez v European Commission.

1

By her action pursuant to Article 270 TFEU, the applicant, Ms Isabel Sánchez, seeks, first, in essence, annulment of the decision of 15 May 2023 of the selection board for open competition EPSO/AD/391/21, by which that board decided, after review, not to include her name on the reserve list and, second, compensation for the damage that she allegedly suffered.

2

On 10 May 2021, the applicant applied to participate in open competition EPSO/AD/391/21, based on qualifications and tests, for the recruitment of administrators (AD 7). The purpose of the competition in question was to draw up a reserve list from which the EU institutions, mainly the Directorate-General for Structural Reform Support and the Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs of the European Commission, could recruit officials. The notice of competition was published by the European Personnel Selection Office (EPSO) in the Official Journal of the European Union on 8 April 2021 (OJ 2021 C 120 A, p. 1) (‘the notice of competition’). An amendment of Section 5 of the notice of competition, relating to the ‘assessment centre’, was published in the Official Journal of the European Union on 8 March 2022 (OJ 2022 C 111 A, p. 11).

3

The notice of competition provided for a three-phase procedure. In the first phase, the files of all the candidates had to be examined to verify compliance with the eligibility conditions on the basis of the information provided in the online application form, and the candidates were required to sit ‘multiple-choice question’ tests. The second phase related to the qualification-based selection (the ‘Talent Screener’ phase), on the basis of the qualifications indicated in the application form. In the third phase, the candidates who had obtained the best results in the preceding phase were invited to sit the assessment centre tests. According to the amended notice of competition, that phase consisted of four tests: a general competency-based interview, a situational competency-based interview, a written test in the field concerned and a field-related interview. The names of the candidates who obtained the highest overall marks following that third phase would be included on the competition reserve lists.

4

On 1 April 2022, the applicant was informed by the selection board that she had obtained sufficient points in the Talent Screener test to be invited to participate in the tests organised by the assessment centre.

5

By decision of 19 December 2022, the applicant was informed that, 122 points having been awarded on completion of those tests, her name had not been included on the reserve list because she was not among the candidates who had obtained the highest marks in the tests organised at the assessment centre, that is to say, at least 123 points (‘the original non-inclusion decision’).

6

On 20 December 2022, the applicant requested an uncorrected copy of her written test, which was sent to her on 5 January 2023.

7

On 22 December 2022, the applicant requested a review of the assessment of her performance in the written test and in the field-related interview.

8

By decision of 15 May 2023, taken after the review, the selection board confirmed the original non-inclusion decision in so far as concerned the score obtained in the assessment centre tests.

9

On 30 May 2023, the applicant sent EPSO a series of questions relating to the review. On 31 May 2023, EPSO replied that it could only confirm the selection board’s response to the request for review.

10

On 14 August 2023, the applicant lodged an administrative complaint under Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union (‘the Staff Regulations’).

11

By decision of 24 January 2024, the appointing authority rejected the complaint lodged by the applicant (‘the decision rejecting the complaint’).

12

On 3 July 2023, the applicant made a request for access under Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (OJ 2001 L 145, p. 43) in relation in particular to the field-related interview, the normalisation of marks (‘normalisation’) and the meetings between EPSO and the selection board (‘the initial request for access to documents’).

13

The same day, the applicant submitted a request for access to the personal data processed by EPSO or the selection board in connection with the field-related interview.

14

On 17 August 2023, EPSO informed the applicant that, of the seven documents identified as falling within the scope of her initial request for access to documents, she was granted full access to three documents, including a document entitled ‘Third marking rules – Markers effect – Normalisation’, and partial access to a fourth. She was refused access to the three other documents, pursuant to Article 4(3) of Regulation No 1049/2001, on protection of the institution’s decision-making process.

15

By letter of 31 August 2023, on the basis of Article 7(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001, the applicant made a confirmatory application for access to the documents identified by EPSO in relation to her initial request for access to documents, asking it to reconsider its position (‘the confirmatory application for access to documents’).

16

On 16 October 2023, EPSO replied to the request for access to personal data of 3 July 2023, stating that those data had either already been provided to the applicant or were protected by the secrecy of the proceedings of the selection board pursuant to Article 6 of Annex III to the Staff Regulations.

17

On 14 February 2024, the applicant lodged a complaint against EPSO with the European Ombudsman concerning the procedure in relation to open competition EPSO/AD/391/21, based on qualifications and tests, in particular in so far as concerned the field-related interview and the marking methodology.

18

By letter of 18 March 2024, the Commission replied to the confirmatory application for access to documents, stating that one of the documents identified by EPSO did not fall within the scope of the request, but granting full access to an additional document relating to normalisation, entitled ‘guidelines on normalisation’. It confirmed the initial decision in respect of the other documents.

19

On 29 November 2024, the Ombudsman closed the enquiry relating to the complaint lodged by the applicant, finding, in essence, that the documents that had not been disclosed to her concerned the proceedings and deliberations of the selection board.

20

The applicant claims that the Court should:

21

The Commission claims that the Court should:

22

By her first head of claim, the applicant seeks annulment of the original non-inclusion decision.

23

It should be recalled that, where a candidate in a competition, in accordance with a rule laid down by the notice of competition, seeks review of a decision taken by the selection board, the decision taken by the latter, after the review of the candidate’s situation, replaces its original decision and therefore constitutes the act adversely affecting the person concerned (see judgment of 5 September 2018, Villeneuve v Commission, T‑671/16, EU:T:2018:519, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited).

24

Accordingly, the selection board’s decision of 15 May 2023 rejecting the applicant’s request for review replaced the original non-inclusion decision.

25

By her second head of claim, the applicant, in so far as necessary, seeks annulment of the decision rejecting the complaint.

26

In that regard, it should be recalled that, according to settled case-law applicable to EU civil service law, the action before the court, even if formally directed against the rejection of the complaint, has the effect of bringing before the court the act adversely affecting the applicant against which the complaint was submitted, except where the rejection of the complaint differs in scope from the act against which that complaint was made (see judgment of 9 June 2021, Calhau Correia de Paiva v Commission, T‑202/17, EU:T:2021:323, paragraph 34 (not published) and the case-law cited).

27

In addition, the fact that the authority authorised to decide on the applicant’s complaint has been led, in response to the complaint, to supplement or amend the grounds for the review decision cannot justify the rejection of that complaint being regarded as an autonomous act adversely affecting the applicant, the statement of grounds for that rejection being deemed to be incorporated in the contested decision against which that complaint was directed (see judgment of 9 June 2021, Calhau Correia de Paiva v Commission, T‑202/17, EU:T:2021:323, paragraph 35 (not published) and the case-law cited).

28

In the present case, the decision rejecting the complaint merely confirms the review decision.

29

It must therefore be found that the claim for annulment is directed only against the selection board’s decision of 15 May 2023 rejecting the applicant’s request for review (‘the contested decision’).

30

In support of her action, the applicant relies on five pleas in law alleging: first, that the marking procedure was not published in the notice of competition; second, failure to observe the separation of the respective functions of the selection board and of EPSO; third, failure by the selection board to draw up a reserve list with all the candidates who met the requirements laid down by the notice of competition; fourth, breach of the obligation to state reasons, the principle of good administration and the rights of the defence; and, fifth, breach of the principle of equal treatment during the field-related interview.

31

It should be noted that, although the parties determine the subject matter of the dispute, which cannot be modified by the EU Courts, the latter must interpret the pleas in law by reference to their substance rather than their classification and thus characterise the pleas in law and the arguments in the application (see judgment of 18 October 2023, BZ v ECB, T‑162/21, not published, EU:T:2023:647, paragraph 98 and the case-law cited).

32

In those circumstances, in the interests of the proper administration of justice, the Court finds that the applicant raises, in essence, seven pleas in law alleging: first, failure to publish the normalisation method in the notice of competition or failure to predetermine that method and to disclose it in advance; second, that EPSO’s intervention in connection with normalisation was unlawful; third, infringement of Article 5 of Annex III to the Staff Regulations; fourth, breach of the obligation to state reasons; fifth, breach of the rights of the defence; sixth, breach of the principle of good administration; and, seventh, breach of the principle of equal treatment during the field-related interview.

33

In the present case, the applicant submits, in essence, that the normalisation, as a marking method, should have been published in the notice of competition or, at the very least, should have been determined and disclosed by the selection board before the beginning of the tests. Making it public in that way would comply with the requirements laid down by Article 1(1)(e) of Annex III to the Staff Regulations. However, the rules governing the normalisation were established only some four months after the deliberations concerning the applicant’s results in the assessment centre tests.

34

Furthermore, in response to a request, made by the Court to the parties in the form of a measure of organisation of procedure, to submit their observations regarding the possible consequences of the judgment of 17 December 2025, CB v Commission (T‑37/24, not published, EU:T:2025:1119), the applicant stated, inter alia, that she inferred from paragraph 58 of that judgment that the failure to predetermine the marking criteria prevented verification of whether the candidates had been assessed on the basis of objective and uniform criteria known in advance; that it was apparent from paragraph 71 of that judgment that the failure to produce a document demonstrating that the selection board had adopted recommendations resulting from the statistical analysis of the marking and of the normalisation prevented verification of whether that normalisation had been applied consistently and objectively; and that it had to be concluded from paragraph 75 of that judgment that, in the absence of evidence of a meeting of the selection board in its full composition, it was not possible to verify compliance with the procedural guarantees.

35

According to the Commission, that plea in law, by which the applicant expressly disputes that the competition notice complied with Article 1(1)(e) of Annex III to the Staff Regulations, constitutes a plea of illegality that should be found to be inadmissible. In any event, the Commission disputes the applicant’s arguments.

36

As a preliminary point, it should be noted that the EU agencies and institutions have a wide discretion with regard to the procedure for organising a competition and that, in that connection, review by the EU Courts must be limited to the extent necessary to ensure equal treatment of candidates and objectivity in the choice made between them (judgment of 13 January 2021, ZR v EUIPO, T‑610/18, not published, EU:T:2021:5, paragraph 36).

37

It should also be borne in mind that the proceedings of a selection board involve as a rule at least two separate stages, the first being an examination of the applications in order to select the candidates admitted to the competition and the second being an examination of the abilities of the candidates for the posts to be filled in order to draw up a list of suitable candidates (judgment of 22 September 2021, JR v Commission, T‑435/20, EU:T:2021:608, paragraph 52).

38

The second stage of the proceedings of the selection board is primarily comparative and, accordingly, covered by the secrecy inherent in those proceedings, which is provided for in Article 6 of Annex III to the Staff Regulations, as interpreted by the Court of Justice (see, to that effect, judgment of 4 July 1996, Parliament v Innamorati, C‑254/95 P, EU:C:1996:276, paragraph 28 and the case-law cited).

39

Normalisation, which relates to the second stage of the proceedings of the selection board, is intended to neutralise the relative subjectivity of the different markers in giving marks, some of whom are objectively more severe than others. Normalisation may be appropriate, depending on the circumstances of each recruitment procedure. The method in question fosters implementation of the principle of equal treatment since, first, it is applied uniformly to all the candidates who have been assessed independently by at least two separate markers. Second, it enables the candidates to be examined comparatively on the basis of comparable data, in the present case the marks normalised on the basis of all the candidates in the competition, in order to ensure that the assessment is uniform (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 2 March 2016, Loescher v Council, F‑84/15, EU:F:2016:29, paragraphs 67 and 68 and the case-law cited).

40

It is in the light of those considerations that it is appropriate to examine the applicant’s arguments that recourse to normalisation should have been made public in the notice of competition or, at the very least, should have been determined and disclosed before the beginning of the tests.

41

In the first place, as regards the applicant’s argument that Article 1(1)(e) of Annex III to the Staff Regulations requires that the notice of competition provide for recourse to normalisation, it is apparent from that article that a notice of competition must, where the competition is on the basis of tests, state what kind they will be and how they will be marked. According to settled case-law, the terms of the competition notice constitute both the legal framework and the basis for assessment for the selection board. Furthermore, the essential function of a notice of competition is to give those interested the most accurate information possible about the conditions of eligibility for the post in question, so as to enable them to judge whether they should apply for it (see judgment of 15 September 2016, Italy v Commission, T‑353/14 and T‑17/15, EU:T:2016:495, paragraph 65 and the case-law cited).

42

It is therefore clear that Article 1(1)(e) of Annex III to the Staff Regulations provides neither that possible recourse to normalisation should be made public nor that it should be disclosed before the tests.

43

It is also clear from the case-law, and, moreover, is not disputed by the applicant, that normalisation is a method intended to neutralise the relative subjectivity of the different markers in giving marks, some of whom are objectively more severe than others, and in that way to ensure that the assessment is uniform (see paragraph 39 above). Contrary to what the applicant is, in essence, claiming, the application of such a method is not covered by the concept of ‘how [the tests] are marked’, which concerns the awarding of points in the various tests or competencies to be assessed.

44

It follows that it is not mandatory for recourse to normalisation to be referred to in a notice of competition.

45

In the second place, as regards the applicant’s arguments that the failure to predetermine recourse to normalisation and to disclose it to the candidates is contrary to the requirement to ensure that candidates are assessed on the basis of objective criteria known in advance, the following should be noted.

46

According to the case-law, the obligation to recruit officials of the highest standard of ability, efficiency and integrity, imposed on the institutions by Article 27 of the Staff Regulations, means that the appointing authority and the selection boards must each ensure, when exercising their powers, that competitions take place in such a way that the principles of equal treatment of candidates, consistent marking and objectivity of the assessment are observed (see judgment of 13 January 2021, ZR v EUIPO, T‑610/18, not published, EU:T:2021:5, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited).

47

It has thus been held that the wide discretion enjoyed by a selection board in determining the procedures for and detailed content of the tests to be undergone by candidates must be counterbalanced by scrupulous observance of the rules governing the organisation of those tests. The selection board must therefore ensure that the principle of equal treatment is complied with strictly in relation to the candidates in the course of those tests and that the choice made between the persons concerned is objective (see judgment of 6 July 2022, VI v Commission, T‑20/21, not published, EU:T:2022:427, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited).

48

In order to ensure equal treatment of candidates, consistency in marking and objectivity of assessment, the selection board is required to ensure that the assessment criteria are applied consistently to all candidates (see judgment of 14 December 2022, SY v Commission, T‑312/21, EU:T:2022:814, paragraph 72 and the case-law cited).

49

As a result of the broad discretion enjoyed by the selection board in conducting its proceedings, it is open to it, where the competition notice does not lay down criteria for marking, to fix such criteria or, where the notice lays down such criteria but does not mention their respective weighting, to determine that weighting (see judgment of 22 September 2021, JR v Commission, T‑435/20, EU:T:2021:608, paragraph 80 and the case-law cited).

50

First, it should be noted that the applicant is not disputing that recourse to normalisation is intended to implement the principle of equal treatment at the second stage of the proceedings of the selection board, relating to examination of the abilities of the candidates vis-à-vis the post to be filled.

51

In that regard, it should be noted that the decision to have recourse to normalisation can be adopted only following the tests, when the marks given by the markers are known to the members of the selection board and the discrepancies between the marks given by the different markers are found to be too great. Accordingly, as the applicant conceded at the hearing, it is impossible to know at the outset whether normalisation will be necessary, meaning that the decision to have recourse to normalisation cannot be adopted by the selection board before the tests are marked.

52

Therefore, in view of the broad discretion, referred to in paragraph 49 above, enjoyed by the selection board in conducting its proceedings, even if the possibility of normalisation is not referred to in the notice of competition, it is open to the selection board to have recourse to normalisation and to determine the procedure for doing so.

53

In that regard, it should be noted that the applicant has not substantiated her argument that the failure to predetermine recourse to normalisation and to disclose it in advance breaches the principle of equal treatment of candidates.

54

Unlike the ‘kind’ of tests involved and ‘how they are marked’, which relate to the tests themselves and therefore to objective factors that must be specified in the notice of competition (see paragraph 41 above), normalisation is intended to neutralise subjectivity in the context of the comparative assessments by the selection board, which are themselves covered by the secrecy surrounding the proceedings of selection boards (see paragraphs 38 and 39 above). Moreover, as the applicant conceded at the hearing, the fact of knowing, before the tests, that the selection board would use normalisation would not in practice have changed her preparation for the competition.

55

Second, as regards the applicant’s reference to paragraph 58 of the judgment of 17 December 2025, CB v Commission (T‑37/24, not published, EU:T:2025:1119), which should be read in conjunction with paragraph 59 of that judgment, it is stated in those paragraphs that, in a context in which the composition of the selection board was unstable and there was no continuity in the person chairing it, in the absence of a marking scheme or, at the very least, of precise indications in respect of the assessment criteria, it was not possible to guarantee that those criteria were applied consistently to all candidates.

56

However, in the present case, the applicant has neither established nor even claimed any such lack of stability in the composition of the selection board and of continuity in the person chairing it such as to vitiate the proceedings of that board. The reference to paragraph 58 of the judgment of 17 December 2025, CB v Commission (T‑37/24, not published, EU:T:2025:1119), is therefore, in any event, irrelevant.

57

It follows that the applicant has not demonstrated that the fact that the normalisation was not predetermined and disclosed to the candidates infringed the principles of equal treatment of candidates, of consistent marking and of objectivity of assessment.

58

Third, it is necessary to reject the applicant’s argument that the rules governing normalisation were established, in the present case, only some four months after the deliberations of the selection board.

59

First, it is apparent from the case file that the selection board adopted recommendations relating to normalisation by means of minutes dated 11 October 2022. Second, it is clear from the Commission’s reply to the measure of organisation of procedure and from its statements at the hearing that, according to a practice that was well established by the date of the competition, EPSO would give the selection board, for information only, a statistical overview of the marks that had been given by the markers, setting out the effect that normalisation would have on those marks. The document entitled ‘Third marking rules – Markers effect – Normalisation’, provided to the applicant by EPSO on 17 August 2023 (see paragraph 14 above), was drawn up by that office in 2023 in order to summarise that practice. It follows from those clarifications, which the applicant has not questioned, that the information on normalisation, summarised in that document, related to a common practice existing much earlier than the notice of competition.

60

In that regard, the applicant’s reference to paragraph 71 of the judgment of 17 December 2025, CB v Commission (T‑37/24, not published, EU:T:2025:1119), concerning a failure by the Commission to produce a document capable of demonstrating the adoption of recommendations relating to a normalisation procedure, is irrelevant, since it should be borne in mind that, in the present case, the selection board adopted such recommendations by minutes dated 11 October 2022.

61

In the third place, in her reply to the measure of organisation of procedure, the applicant submits that, in the present case, there is no document proving that all the members of the selection board were present to adopt the results of the normalisation procedure, even though, according to paragraph 75 of the judgment of 17 December 2025, CB v Commission (T‑37/24, not published, EU:T:2025:1119), it is for the Commission to provide evidence that the selection board met in its full composition to adopt the final decisions.

62

In accordance with Article 84(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, no new plea in law may be introduced in the course of proceedings unless it is based on matters of law or fact which have come to light in the course of the procedure. Furthermore, pleas which constitute merely an amplification of a plea made previously, whether directly or by implication, in the original application, and which are closely connected therewith, must be declared admissible (see judgment of 5 October 2020, HeidelbergCement and Schwenk Zement v Commission, T‑380/17, EU:T:2020:471, paragraph 87 (not published) and the case-law cited).

63

In that regard, first, it should be noted that paragraph 75 of the judgment of 17 December 2025, CB v Commission (T‑37/24, not published, EU:T:2025:1119), follows in the line of the settled case-law cited in paragraph 73 of that judgment, according to which, having regard to the fact that the drawing up of a reserve list is a comparative exercise, it is essential that the selection board sits in its full composition for the final deliberation meeting. That case-law, which is also recalled in the context of a lack of stability in the composition of the selection board, is therefore well established.

64

Second, it should be noted that the applicant’s argument criticising the lack of evidence of a final meeting of the selection board in its full composition, raised for the first time in her reply to the measure of organisation of procedure adopted following the hearing, cannot be found to be an amplification of a plea made previously in the application. That argument is therefore inadmissible.

65

Accordingly, it is apparent from all the foregoing considerations that the recruitment procedure is not vitiated by any procedural irregularity resulting from recourse being had to normalisation without that recourse having been made public in the notice of competition or decided on and disclosed before the beginning of the tests.

66

Therefore, without any need to rule on the plea of inadmissibility raised by the Commission in relation to a plea alleging illegality, the first plea in law must be rejected as in part inadmissible and in part unfounded.

67

The applicant claims that EPSO’s intervention in the marking of the tests, by modifying scores after the selection board had completed the assessment of candidates, is contrary to the rules set out in the notice of competition, which does not mention any such intervention, and to Article 1(1)(e) and Article 7(2) of Annex III to the Staff Regulations. EPSO exceeded its essentially organisational role by providing assistance in relation to the application of normalisation in the absence of clear rules determined in advance. Moreover, the normalisation criteria are not based on the merits of the candidates, contrary to the requirements of Article 27 of the Staff Regulations, but rather on the merits of the assessors, on whom EPSO bases its adjustments. In addition, the selection board’s decision to depart from the objective marking criteria set out in the notice of competition, following EPSO’s intervention, infringes Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’).

68

The Commission submits that the applicant, in infringement of Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure, has not stated clearly the reasons why she considers that provision to have been infringed due to the fact that EPSO’s role in the normalisation process was not set out in the notice of competition. That plea in law should therefore be rejected as inadmissible. In any event, the Commission disputes the applicant’s arguments.

69

First, as regards the applicant’s argument concerning the fact that EPSO’s intervention at the normalisation stage was not provided for in the notice of competition, it is sufficient to note that, as indicated under the first plea in law, it is not mandatory for potential recourse to normalisation to be referred to in the notice of competition, with the effect that the selection board’s recourse to normalisation does not mean that it departed from the criteria set out in the notice of competition.

70

Similarly, since it is common ground that EPSO intervened only at the normalisation stage, the applicant cannot correctly argue that its intervention should have been provided for in the notice of competition.

71

Second, as regards the applicant’s argument that EPSO’s intervention at the normalisation stage does not comply with Article 1(1)(e) and Article 7(2) of Annex III to the Staff Regulations, it should be noted that, although, under Article 1(1)(e), for competitions on the basis of tests, the notice of competition must state what kind of tests they will be and how they will be marked, it is Article 7(1) to (3) of Annex III to the Staff Regulations that defines EPSO’s tasks.

72

In application of Article 7(1) to (3) of Annex III to the Staff Regulations, EPSO provides its assistance to the various institutions by defining and organising the selection procedures for officials in accordance with the general rules adopted by those institutions (see judgment of 14 December 2022, SY v Commission, T‑312/21, EU:T:2022:814, paragraph 51 and the case-law cited).

73

In the present case, in the context of Article 7(1) of Annex III to the Staff Regulations, as is apparent from the minutes of the meeting of 11 October 2022, the members of the selection board discussed the statistical analysis and the normalisation explained by EPSO of the marks of all the candidates admitted to the assessment centre for the written test, the general competency-based interview and the situational competency-based interview, and then decided to endorse the scores resulting from that normalisation. The field-related interview was not subject to that method, since it was assessed by two markers simultaneously.

74

At the hearing, the Commission stated that EPSO had analysed the marks given by the markers from a statistical perspective, test by test, and had provided the selection board with the marking profile of each marker for each of the three tests. The selection board, with the help of a PowerPoint document prepared by EPSO, was able to observe that there were discrepancies in the marking profiles of the markers, which indicated that those marks had been influenced by their subjectivity. The selection board then found such heterogeneity to be incompatible with the principle of equal treatment and decided to apply the normalisation procedure.

75

As the Commission stated at the hearing, without being contradicted by the applicant, in the context of the normalisation procedure, EPSO applied a scientifically proven mathematical formula to the marks given by the markers. The selection board examined the results of the harmonised marks and ultimately decided to adopt one of the two normalisation proposals made by EPSO.

76

Accordingly, EPSO’s intervention was limited to technical support, and the selection board alone decided, on the basis of statistical data, to have recourse to the normalisation procedure in order to implement the principle of equal treatment, which was in jeopardy as a result of the discrepancies identified in the marking profiles of the markers.

77

The selection board therefore did not, in any way, delegate the decision-making power enabling it to make a value judgement on the candidates’ performance. It retained control over the proceedings and kept its discretionary power to make a final assessment of whether the normalised scores were representative.

78

Third, as regards the applicant’s argument that, contrary to the requirements of Article 27 of the Staff Regulations, the normalisation criteria are not based on the merits of the candidates, but rather on the assessors’ lack of objectivity, on which EPSO bases its adjustments, it is clear that the applicant is not disputing that normalisation is intended to implement the principle of equal treatment, by seeking to neutralise the relative subjectivity of the different markers, and thereby to ensure that the assessment is uniform, and does not make clear in what way seeking to do so undermines a recruitment process based on the merits of the candidates. Indeed, it should be noted that the scores adopted by the selection board following the normalisation reflect the merit-based assessments of the candidates’ performance made by it.

79

Fourth, it is necessary to reject the applicant’s argument alleging infringement of Article 41 of the Charter as a result of the selection board’s decision to depart from the marking criteria set out in the notice of competition, following EPSO’s intervention, given that it has been found in paragraph 69 above that the selection board had not departed from that notice.

80

It follows from all the foregoing, without any need to rule on the plea of inadmissibility raised by the Commission on the ground that the applicant’s arguments were unclear, that the second plea in law must be rejected as unfounded.

81

The applicant claims, in essence, that there was an irregularity in the recruitment procedure as implemented in the contested decision, in so far as the selection board failed to observe the criteria for the drawing up of the reserve list set out in the notice of competition, pursuant to Article 5 of Annex III to the Staff Regulations, because, as a result of the normalisation, the names of the candidates who obtained all pass marks and the highest marks in the assessment centre tests were not included on that list.

82

The Commission raises a plea of inadmissibility alleging infringement of Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure, in so far as the applicant merely makes vague statements as regards infringement of Article 5 of Annex III to the Staff Regulations, based on the selection board’s report of 16 December 2022. In any event, the Commission disputes the applicant’s arguments.

83

In that regard, it is apparent from the application that the applicant claims, under the third plea in law, that there was an irregularity in the recruitment procedure for two reasons. First, as a result of the failure to publish the normalisation method, as is apparent from the first plea in law, the recruitment procedure is vitiated by irregularity. Second, the reserve list contains only the names of the candidates who obtained the highest marks following normalisation, but not the names of the candidates who obtained all pass marks and the highest marks in the assessment centre tests.

84

However, as is apparent from the first plea in law, first, the recruitment procedure, as implemented in the contested decision, is not vitiated by any irregularity resulting from recourse to normalisation without it being made public in the notice of competition or predetermined before the beginning of the tests. Second, only the scores adopted by the selection board following the normalisation reflect the assessments made by it of the candidates’ performance in the various tests, since the marks awarded by the markers, before the selection board proceedings, were only interim scores.

85

Accordingly, the reserve list, as drawn up by the selection board, complies with Article 5 of Annex III to the Staff Regulations, in so far as it contains the names of the candidates who obtained all pass marks (at least 123 points according to the notice of competition) and the highest marks in the assessment centre tests.

86

Therefore, without any need to rule on the plea of inadmissibility raised by the Commission, the third plea in law should be rejected as unfounded.

87

The applicant claims that the contested decision does not enable her to know what impact the normalisation had on her score and therefore to understand why her name was not included on the reserve list. As a result of that normalisation, only communication of the score established following normalisation could constitute a sufficient statement of reasons.

88

The Commission raises a plea of inadmissibility alleging infringement of Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure, in so far as the plea in law alleging breach of the obligation to state reasons contains no specific claim directed against the contested decision. In any event, the Commission disputes the applicant’s arguments.

89

In that regard, it should be recalled that it is settled case-law that an absence of or an inadequate statement of reasons constitutes an infringement of an essential procedural requirement and is a plea involving a matter of public policy which may, and even must, be raised by the EU Courts of their own motion (see judgment of 9 June 2021, Lianopoulou v Commission, T‑880/19, not published, EU:T:2021:325, paragraph 40 and the case-law cited).

90

The plea of inadmissibility raised by the Commission must therefore be rejected.

91

Next, it should be noted that, according to settled case-law, it is not necessary for the reasoning to go into all the relevant facts and points of law, since the question whether the statement of reasons meets the requirements of Article 296 TFEU must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question (see judgment of 11 June 2020, Commission v Di Bernardo, C‑114/19 P, EU:C:2020:457, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited).

92

In so far as concerns decisions taken by a selection board in a competition, the obligation to state reasons must be reconciled with observance of the secrecy surrounding the proceedings of selection boards by virtue of Article 6 of Annex III to the Staff Regulations. That secrecy was introduced with a view to guaranteeing the independence of selection boards and the objectivity of their proceedings, by protecting them from all external interference and pressures, whether they come from the EU administration itself or the candidates concerned or third parties. Observance of that secrecy therefore precludes both disclosure of the attitudes adopted by individual members of selection boards and disclosure of any factors relating to individual or comparative assessments of candidates (judgment of 4 July 1996, Parliament v Innamorati, C‑254/95 P, EU:C:1996:276, paragraph 24).

93

Accordingly, disclosure of the marks obtained in the various tests constitutes an adequate statement of the reasons on which the board’s decisions are based. Such a statement of reasons is not prejudicial to the candidates’ rights, since it enables them to know the value set on their performance and to ascertain, if such is the case, that they have not in fact obtained the number of marks required by the notice of competition (judgment of 4 July 1996, Parliament v Innamorati, C‑254/95 P, EU:C:1996:276, paragraphs 31 and 32).

94

In the present case, the original non-inclusion decision and the contested decision, both addressed to the applicant, state that she was not among the candidates who had obtained the highest marks in the assessment centre tests.

95

Moreover, annexed to the original non-inclusion decision, the applicant received her competency passport, which, in accordance with the indications in that decision, contains a breakdown of the marks that she obtained and her performance for each general and each specific competency assessed in the assessment centre tests.

96

The contested decision therefore satisfies the requirements set out by the case-law cited in paragraph 93 above.

97

That conclusion cannot be called into question by the applicant’s argument that recourse to normalisation required that additional reasons be stated.

98

Indeed, since normalisation is intended to contribute to a comparative examination of the candidates (see paragraph 39 above), the applicant’s request seeking to know the impact of the normalisation on her score would involve providing her with both her interim score and the interim scores of the other candidates. Knowing that impact would also involve disclosure of the calculations performed.

99

The interim scores, disclosure of which could disclose factors relating to individual or comparative assessments of candidates (see paragraph 92 above) are necessarily covered by the secrecy inherent in the proceedings of selection boards.

100

Accordingly, given the need to reconcile the obligation to state reasons with observance of the secrecy surrounding the proceedings of the selection board, neither the applicant’s interim score nor the interim scores of the other candidates can be disclosed to her. Similarly, the calculations performed on the basis of the interim scores cannot be disclosed to her, since disclosure of those calculations would necessarily reveal those interim scores.

101

The fourth plea in law must therefore be rejected as unfounded.

102

The applicant alleges a breach of her rights of defence due to a failure to disclose relevant information or because that information was disclosed to her late. She was therefore unable to identify potential arithmetical errors in the calculation of her scores. Furthermore, the opaqueness of EPSO’s intervention in the examination marking system prevents any meaningful review. In addition, the denial of access to the precise wording of the final question in the field-related interview prevented her from referring to it throughout the administrative proceedings.

103

The Commission raises a plea of inadmissibility alleging infringement of Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure, in so far as the plea in law alleging breach of the rights of the defence contains no specific claim directed against the contested decision in that respect. In any event, the Commission disputes the applicant’s arguments.

104

In that regard, it should be recalled that it follows from the general principle of EU law of respect for the rights of the defence, and in particular for the right to be heard enshrined in Article 41(2)(a) of the Charter, that the person concerned must be given the opportunity, before the drawing up of a decision adversely affecting him or her, to make known effectively his or her views as to the truth and relevance of the facts and circumstances on which the administration intends to base its decision. Furthermore, respect for the right to be heard is required even where the applicable legislation does not expressly provide for such a procedural requirement (see judgment of 6 February 2019, TN v ENISA, T‑461/17, not published, EU:T:2019:63, paragraph 111 and the case-law cited).

105

Accordingly, a decision adversely affecting him or her can be taken only after the person concerned has been given the opportunity to put forward his or her view concerning the draft decision, in the context of an oral and/or written exchange of views initiated by the appointing authority, proof of which must be adduced by the latter (see judgment of 6 February 2019, TN v ENISA, T‑461/17, not published, EU:T:2019:63, paragraph 112 and the case-law cited).

106

It should also be recalled that, according to settled case-law, an infringement of the rights of the defence results in the annulment of the decision taken at the end of the administrative procedure at issue only if, had it not been for such an irregularity, the outcome of the procedure might have been different (see judgment of 18 June 2020, Commission v RQ, C‑831/18 P, EU:C:2020:481, paragraph 105 and the case-law cited).

107

To establish that that is the case, the applicant must explain what arguments and evidence he or she would have relied on if his or her rights of defence had been respected and must demonstrate, as appropriate, that such arguments and evidence might have led in the case in question to a different result (see judgment of 3 July 2019, PT v EIB, T‑573/16, EU:T:2019:481, paragraph 269 (not published) and the case-law cited).

108

Nevertheless, an appellant who relies on infringement of his or her rights of defence cannot be required to show that the decision of the EU institution concerned would have been different in content, but simply that such a possibility cannot be totally ruled out (see judgment of 18 June 2020, Commission v RQ, C‑831/18 P, EU:C:2020:481, paragraph 106 and the case-law cited).

109

The assessment of that question must, moreover, be made in the light of the factual and legal circumstances of each case (see judgment of 18 June 2020, Commission v RQ, C‑831/18 P, EU:C:2020:481, paragraph 107 and the case-law cited).

110

In the present case, as previously noted (see paragraphs 94 and 95 above), in the original non-inclusion decision, the applicant was informed of the ground for the refusal to include her name on the competition reserve list, that is to say, the fact that she was not among the candidates who had obtained the highest marks in the assessment centre tests, and was provided with her competency passport, which shows the breakdown of her marks and her performance for each general and each specific competency assessed in the assessment centre tests.

111

In addition, following her request, on 5 January 2023 the applicant obtained an uncorrected copy of her written assessment centre test (see paragraph 6 above).

112

It should also be noted that the applicant was able, in good time, on the basis of the general rules contained in Annex III to the notice of competition, to request review of the original non-inclusion decision and to make her grievances known (see paragraphs 7 and 8 above).

113

In that regard, it should be noted that a review procedure, the purpose of which is to enable the candidate to rely on all the facts and points of law that he or she considers capable of influencing the decision that could be made in relation to that candidate, and which is capable of giving rise to a positive response by the selection board that could lead to the candidate being reintegrated into the competition at the stage from which he or she was excluded, serves to ensure compliance with the rights of the defence (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 September 2018, PH v Commission, T‑613/16, not published, EU:T:2018:529, paragraphs 199 to 207).

114

In that context, it should be recalled that, as is apparent from paragraph 29 above, the decision adopted by the selection board on completion of the review procedure is the act adversely affecting the person concerned and which is the subject matter of the present action.

115

It must therefore be found that the applicant exercised her rights of defence before a decision adversely affecting her was addressed to her.

116

That finding cannot be called into question by the arguments put forward by the applicant.

117

First, as regards the applicant’s argument concerning a failure to disclose information about how the normalisation affected her score, it is apparent from paragraphs 99 and 100 above that disclosure of the interim scores and the calculations performed in the context of the normalisation would undermine the balance between the rights of the defence and the secrecy of proceedings of the selection board.

118

In addition, as the Commission conceded at the hearing, the mathematical formula applied in the context of the normalisation is indeed in the public domain and is not covered by the secrecy of the proceedings of the selection board. It is clear that the formula in question was not disclosed to the applicant when she was informed, by the letter of 18 March 2024, that a normalisation procedure had been applied.

119

However, it should be noted that the mathematical formula applied in the context of the normalisation, considered separately, does not constitute a factor in the light of which the applicant should have been able to defend herself. As noted in paragraph 98 above, since normalisation consists in a comparative method, requiring knowledge of the applicant’s interim scores and of those of the other candidates, while those scores cannot be disclosed, it should be found that the normalisation formula on its own is not a piece of information necessary for the applicant to be able to challenge how the normalisation affected her score.

120

In any event, the applicant merely refers to the possibility of an arithmetical error at the normalisation stage that may have contributed to her name not being included on the reserve list, but neither questions the normalisation method used by the selection board nor provides the slightest indication of any such arithmetical error. Since only the final scores adopted by the selection board constitute the basis of the contested decision, that argument cannot satisfy the requirements set out in paragraphs 107 and 108 above.

121

Second, as regards the alleged opaqueness in relation to EPSO’s intervention, it is apparent from paragraphs 69 to 80 above that that office did not act outside the legal framework governing its powers. Its role in the context of the normalisation procedure was ascertainable by the applicant by virtue of the legal framework apparent from the Staff Regulations. She was therefore in a position to make her grievances against EPSO’s role known, and did in fact do so in the context of her complaint.

122

Third, the applicant submits that, in order for the rights of defence to be respected, she should have been provided with the precise wording of the last question in the field-related interview.

123

In that regard, it should be noted that, in her complaint, neither the relevance of the question posed nor the validity of the answer considered to be correct are challenged by the applicant, which might have justified that question being provided to her as part of the response to her complaint. On the contrary, when it sets out the nature of the error in the wording of the question during her field-related interview, that is to say, a confusion between two terms, and the intervention by the chair of the selection board to correct the error, it is clear from her complaint that the applicant was indeed able to submit her grievances in her request for review and in her complaint.

124

Therefore, without any need to rule on the plea of inadmissibility raised by the Commission, the fifth plea in law must be rejected as unfounded.

125

The applicant claims that the administration infringed the principle of good administration enshrined by Article 41 of the Charter as a result of the time taken to handle her requests for access to documents and to personal data submitted following the original non-inclusion decision and her complaint against the contested decision. First, she criticises the administration for the delay in responding to her complaint, on 24 January 2024, even though the original non-inclusion decision was adopted on 19 December 2022. Second, she takes issue with the inconsistencies in the responses given to her request for access to documents in so far as concerns the content of a document entitled ‘Decision Table F1’ and whether meetings of the selection board were held on the requests for review, and with the time taken to respond. EPSO withheld essential details about the normalisation and only disclosed them after the time limit for a complaint had passed. Accordingly, EPSO failed to ensure an adequate level of transparency allowing her to verify whether the principle of equal treatment had been observed during the competition process.

126

The Commission raises a plea of inadmissibility alleging infringement of Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure, in so far as the plea in law alleging breach of the principle of good administration contains no specific claim directed against the contested decision in that respect. In any event, the Commission disputes the applicant’s arguments.

127

In that regard, it should be recalled that the obligation to conduct administrative procedures within a reasonable time is a general principle of EU law, the observance of which the EU Courts must ensure and which is laid down, as an element of the right to good administration, by Article 41(1) of the Charter (judgment of 6 December 2012, Füller-Tomlinson v Parliament, T‑390/10 P, EU:T:2012:652, paragraph 115; see also, to that effect, judgment of 7 April 2011, Greece v Commission, C‑321/09 P, not published, EU:C:2011:218, paragraph 32).

128

The question of whether the duration of an administrative procedure is reasonable must be determined in relation to the particular circumstances of each case and, in particular, its context, the various procedural stages followed by the institution, the conduct of the parties in the course of the procedure, the complexity of the case and its importance for the various parties involved (see, to that effect, judgment of 30 June 2005, Branco v Commission, T‑347/03, EU:T:2005:265, paragraph 114 and the case-law cited).

129

First, as regards the alleged late notification to the applicant of the decision rejecting the complaint, it should be noted that the four-month time limit, laid down in Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations, began to run only from the lodging of the complaint, that is to say, 14 August 2023, and expired on 14 December 2023. The express decision rejecting the complaint was indeed notified to the applicant only on 24 January 2024, that is to say, after expiry of the four-month period laid down in that respect.

130

However, as regards the period which elapsed between the lodging of the complaint and the decision rejecting it, it should be recalled that, under Article 90 of the Staff Regulations, failure to reply within that four-month period constitutes an implied rejection, against which an action may be brought before the courts. It is also important to recall that an action before the General Court must be brought within three months. That period runs from the date of expiry of the period prescribed for reply where the action concerns an implied decision rejecting a complaint. Nevertheless, according to the second indent of Article 91(3) of the Staff Regulations, where a complaint is rejected by express decision after being rejected by implied decision but before the period for lodging an appeal has expired, the period for lodging the appeal is to start to run afresh (see judgment of 2 April 2020, Barata v Parliament, T‑81/18, not published, EU:T:2020:137, paragraphs 83 and 84).

131

As regards the decision rejecting the complaint, it should be noted that, if the decision rejecting the complaint is adopted after expiry of the four-month period in which to reply, that delay is not likely to have an effect on the actual substance of the decision adopted at the end of the administrative procedure (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 July 2018, Curto v Parliament, T‑275/17, EU:T:2018:479, paragraph 104).

132

That argument is, therefore, unfounded.

133

Second, as regards the time taken to handle her requests for access to documents and for access to personal data, the applicant has not put forward any argument to explain in what respect alleged delays affected the lawfulness of the contested decision. Indeed, it should be borne in mind that the present action concerns the contested decision rejecting the applicant’s request for review (see paragraph 29 above). The applicant is not disputing the lawfulness of either the decision confirming access to documents or of the decision of 16 October 2023 relating to access to her personal data. Therefore, even assuming it to be well founded, that argument is not capable of giving rise to annulment of the contested decision.

134

That argument must therefore be rejected as ineffective.

135

Moreover, the applicant cannot criticise the Commission for withholding essential details about the normalisation until expiry of the time limit for a complaint. It is clear from the case file that the applicant made a request for access to documents, including in relation to the normalisation, only on 3 July 2023, that is to say, nearly two months after the adoption of the contested decision on 15 May 2023. As a result of that request, she received, on 17 August 2023, the document entitled ‘Third marking rules – Markers effect – Normalisation’ (see paragraph 14 above). Then, in response to her confirmatory application for access to documents of 31 August 2023, she received, on 18 March 2024, the document entitled ‘guidelines on normalisation’ (see paragraph 18 above). Accordingly, in so far as the applicant considers that she received those documents too late to be able to use them effectively in the context of her complaint, that circumstance was due primarily to the fact that her request for access to them was made late, rather than to the Commission’s conduct.

136

Third, as regards the alleged inconsistencies in the responses to her request for access to documents, adduced by the applicant, she does not explain in what respect they affect the lawfulness of the contested decision.

137

That argument must therefore be found to be ineffective.

138

In any event, it must be noted that, as regards whether a meeting was held concerning the applicant’s request for review and the existence of minutes, it is apparent neither from the decision rejecting the complaint nor from the decisions relating to the request for access to documents that the applicant was given contradictory information. Therefore, without any need to rule on the plea of inadmissibility raised by the Commission, the sixth plea in law must be rejected as in part ineffective and in part unfounded.

139

The applicant claims that, as the result of a material irregularity, the selection board failed to ensure observance of the principle of equal treatment of candidates during the field-related interview. Following an incident relating to the last question in that test, put by one of the members of the selection board, who twice made a mistake in the wording of that question before it was corrected by the chair of the board, that question was amended, thereby interfering with the equal treatment of candidates.

140

The Commission disputes the applicant’s arguments.

141

In that regard, it should be recalled that the assessments made by a selection board in a competition when it evaluates the abilities of candidates, and the decisions whereby the selection board determines that a candidate has failed a test constitute the expression of a value judgement. They therefore fall within the wide discretion enjoyed by the selection board and are amenable to review by the EU Courts only where there has been a flagrant breach of the rules governing the proceedings of the selection board (see judgment of 7 September 2022, Rauff-Nisthar v Commission, T‑341/21, not published, EU:T:2022:516, paragraph 45 and the case-law cited).

142

Furthermore, in accordance with the principles of good administration and equal treatment, the EU institutions have a duty to all candidates in a competition to ensure that the tests are conducted as smoothly and properly as possible (see judgment of 24 April 2001, Torre and Others v Commission, T‑159/98, EU:T:2001:121, paragraph 46 and the case-law cited).

143

Nevertheless, according to settled case-law, an irregularity that occurs during the tests in a competition does not affect the lawfulness of the tests unless that irregularity is substantive in nature or if the applicant establishes that it has been capable of distorting the results of the tests (see judgment of 14 May 2025, Zardini v Commission, T‑9/24, not published, EU:T:2025:496, paragraph 74 and the case-law cited).

144

Moreover, having regard, first, to the fact that an administrative act is presumed to be lawful and, second, to the fact that the burden of proving that it is vitiated by unlawfulness lies, as a matter of principle, on the person so claiming, it is for applicants to provide at the very least sufficiently precise, objective and consistent information to corroborate the truth or likelihood of the facts in support of their claims (see judgment of 14 May 2025, LA v Commission, T‑4/24, not published, EU:T:2025:495, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited).

145

As regards, specifically, oral tests in a competition, the discretion of the selection board is further increased by the element of freedom and uncertainty characterising that type of test. It is, by its very nature, less uniform than the written test and its content may vary depending on the experience and the personality of the different candidates and the responses given by them to the selection board’s questions (judgment of 24 April 2013, BX v Commission, F‑88/11, EU:F:2013:51, paragraph 60).

146

In the present case, the applicant claims that the procedural irregularity is the result of a modification of one of the questions put during the field-related interview, following a problem with the wording of that question, namely the use, during the first assessments, of the term in English ‘outcome’ instead of the term ‘output’.

147

However, it should be noted that the applicant has not explained why that modification of the question constitutes a substantive irregularity capable of rendering the contested decision unlawful within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraph 143 above.

148

Furthermore, the selection board confirmed, in the response to the request for review, that the incident to which the applicant refers had not had any negative effect on her overall evaluation and that the other candidates had benefited from the same treatment.

149

While it is true that the party with whom the burden of proof lies, in the present case, the applicant, cannot be required to bear a burden of proof which it is impossible to discharge, the fact remains that she confines herself to stating, without producing any evidence in support of her claim, that the modification of the wording of one of the questions in the field-related interview during the tests in itself constitutes a breach of the principle of equal treatment.

150

In that regard, it should be noted that, even if it were to be accepted that one of the questions in the field-related interview was worded differently, that does not mean that the question on which the applicant was examined, the mistake in the wording of which was, as she acknowledges, corrected by the chair of the selection board during her test, was necessarily more difficult to understand than the question put to the following candidates and therefore that there was a breach of the principle of equal treatment.

151

In addition, assuming that the applicant considers that the irregularity arises from the disadvantage incurred as a result of the lack of time in which to answer the last question in the field-related interview on account of the mistake in the wording of the question, she confines herself to stating that use of the term ‘outcome’ instead of the term ‘output’ caused a complete change of meaning which prevented her from responding. However, the applicant produces no evidence in support of her statement, which is very general.

152

Mere difficulty in understanding, in essence, the question put during an oral test and the potential resulting loss of time for a candidate to give his or her answer as compared with other candidates cannot constitute a breach of the principle of equal treatment within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraphs 141 to 145 above.

153

According to the applicant, ‘the question was repeated twice since it was unclear’, to the extent that the ‘chair of the panel had to intervene by reformulating the question a third time’. It is therefore clear from that account that the chair of the selection board intervened immediately to correct the mistake in question, which moreover concerned only a single word. The selection board, as indicated in the decision rejecting the complaint, was in that way able to find, after examining her marks, that neither the limited time given to the applicant nor the alleged ‘confusion’ which she mentioned had ‘a negative effect’ on her overall evaluation.

154

Therefore, in the light of all the foregoing considerations, the seventh plea in law must be rejected as unfounded and, consequently, the claim for annulment must be rejected in its entirety.

155

The applicant claims that, as a result of the unlawfulness of the contested decision, she suffered material damage by losing an opportunity to be recruited at Grade AD 7 and non-material damage, and seeks compensation for both.

156

As regards material damage, the applicant submits that she is entitled to claim compensation resulting from loss of the opportunity, first, to be included on the reserve list in the competition in question and second, in the longer term, to receive higher remuneration and a higher retirement pension. She considers that there would have been a 50% probability of her being recruited if she had been included on that reserve list and submits that that percentage should be applied to the amount of the potential loss of earnings. In addition, that calculation should take into account the differences in basic remuneration between her current post and that of a permanent official, specific allowances and pension rights.

157

As regards non-material damage, the applicant seeks compensation for the uncertainty and anxiety caused by the unlawfulness of the contested decision. She also submits that the lack of care with which her file was handled caused non-material damage. She considers that the non-material damage in question cannot be remedied by annulment of the contested decision alone and seeks compensation of EUR 5000.

158

The Commission disputes the applicant’s arguments.

159

In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, in the context of a claim for damages made by an official or servant, the institution can be held liable in damages only if a number of conditions are satisfied: the unlawfulness of the allegedly wrongful act committed by the institution, actual harm suffered and the existence of a causal link between the act and the damage alleged to have been suffered. The three conditions for liability are cumulative, which means that where one of them is not met, the institution cannot be held liable (see judgment of 19 October 2022, JS v SRB, T‑271/20, not published, EU:T:2022:652, paragraph 177 and the case-law cited).

160

According to settled case-law, claims for compensation for material or non-material damage must be rejected where they are closely linked with the claims seeking annulment, which themselves have been rejected as inadmissible or unfounded (see judgment of 19 October 2022, MV v Commission, T‑624/20, not published, EU:T:2022:653, paragraph 145 and the case-law cited).

161

In the present case, it is apparent from the application that the claim for damages is closely linked to the claim for annulment. The material damage and the non-material damage for which the applicant seeks compensation arise from the unlawfulness vitiating the contested decision.

162

Consequently, since the claim for annulment of the contested decision is rejected, the same applies to the claim for compensation.

163

Under the seventh plea in law, alleging breach of the principle of equal treatment during the field-related interview, the applicant requests the Court to invite the Commission, by way of a measure of organisation of procedure, with a view to enabling judicial review of the contested decision, to produce a document showing the manner in which the normalisation was applied to her marks in the written test, the general competency-based interview and the situational competency-based interview.

164

The Commission objects to that request, relying on the absence of any explanation of how that document would be useful for the purposes of the proceedings.

165

In that regard, it must be borne in mind that it is for the Court to decide on the need to make use of its power to adopt measures of organisation of procedure to supplement the information available to it, given that whether or not the evidence is sufficient is a matter to be appraised by it alone (see judgment of 6 December 2023, QI v Commission, T‑807/21, not published, EU:T:2023:786, paragraph 176 and the case-law cited).

166

In the present case, the applicant submits that the document she is requesting is necessary to prove and substantiate the seventh plea in law, alleging ‘breach of the principle of equal treatment during the field-related interview’ as the result of a material irregularity (see paragraph 139 above).

167

However, first, the applicant is referring to a document which does not relate to the ‘field-related’ interview, but relates to the other tests, that is to say, the written test, the general competency-based interview and the situational competency-based interview (see paragraph 163 above).

168

Such a document therefore does not appear to be useful for the purpose of resolving the dispute.

169

Second, assuming that this is a matter of a clerical error by the applicant, in the sense that she omitted to refer to the ‘field-related interview’ in her document request, the information in the file is, in any event, sufficient to enable the Court to give a ruling, since it has been able to rule on the basis of the forms of order sought, the pleas in law and the arguments put forward during the proceedings, and in the light of the documents lodged by the parties, without there being any need to order a measure of organisation of procedure.

170

Therefore, the request for measures of organisation of procedure must be rejected.

171

It is apparent from all the foregoing that the action must be dismissed in its entirety.

172

Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.

173

Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, she must be ordered to pay the costs, in accordance with the form of order sought by the Commission.

On those grounds,

THE GENERAL COURT (Tenth Chamber)

hereby: