Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber) of 5 November 2026. – SC v Eulex Kosovo.

1

By her appeal, SC seeks to have set aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 6 November 2024, SC v Eulex Kosovo (T‑242/17 RENV-OP, EU:T:2024:772; ‘the judgment under appeal’), by which the General Court set aside the judgment of 19 October 2022, SC v Eulex Kosovo (T‑242/17 RENV, EU:T:2022:637), and dismissed the action registered under Case number T‑242/17.

2

The Eulex Kosovo Mission was created by Council Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP of 4 February 2008 on the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, EULEX KOSOVO (OJ 2008 L 42, p. 92). That joint action was extended several times.

3

Under Article 4(4) of that joint action, the Council of the European Union is to approve the Operation Plan (‘OPLAN’) of the Eulex Kosovo Mission.

4

Article 8(1a) of that Joint Action, as amended by Council Decision 2014/349/CFSP of 12 June 2014 (OJ 2014 L 174, p. 42), provides that the Head of Mission of Eulex Kosovo is to be the representative of that mission and may delegate management tasks in staff and financial matters to staff members of that mission.

5

Article 10(3) of Joint Action 2008/124, as amended by Decision 2014/349, provides that the conditions of employment and the rights and obligations of international and local staff are to be laid down in the contracts to be concluded between Eulex Kosovo and the staff member concerned.

6

The background to the dispute, as set out in paragraphs 2 to 19 of the judgment under appeal, may, for the purposes of the present proceedings, be summarised as follows.

7

The appellant is a former member of the international contract staff of Eulex Kosovo. She was employed by Eulex Kosovo as a prosecutor, with the status of international contractual staff, on the basis of five consecutive fixed-term contracts during the period from 4 January 2014 to 14 November 2016.

8

The final three fixed-term contracts provided that any disputes relating to the employment contract were to be referred to the jurisdiction of the ‘Court of Justice of the European Union, pursuant to Article 272 [TFEU]’.

9

On 14 April 2014, the appellant had a meeting with, inter alia, her line manager at the time (‘the line manager in question’), who was Eulex Kosovo’s Prosecutor General, to discuss her performance evaluation report (‘the PER’) for 2014 (‘the first 2014 PER’). At that meeting, she was provided with a copy of the first 2014 PER. In that report, the line manager in question had, inter alia, assessed the appellant’s activity by stating that ‘she [had] not demonstrated a willingness to work [and] an understanding of the role and factors pertinent to the job’ and that‘[she had] not accepted guidance and [had], on a number of occasions, been openly dishonest’. On the basis of that assessment, the line manager in question had stated that she did not recommend the extension of the appellant’s employment contract.

10

On 28 April 2014, the appellant lodged a complaint against the first 2014 PER (‘the first complaint’), in which she challenged the assessments contained in that report and claimed, in general terms, that irregularities were committed in the evaluation procedure. By decision of 12 August 2014, the Head of Mission of Eulex Kosovo informed the appellant that the first 2014 PER had been annulled, on the ground that the three-month evaluation period was too short to draw a definitive conclusion on the unsatisfactory performance of a member of staff.

11

On 1 July 2014, the appellant was informed that owing to the reduction, provided for by the 2014 OPLAN, in the number of prosecutor’s posts, Eulex Kosovo was organising an internal competition (‘the 2014 internal competition’), as provided for in Article 4.3 of the Standard Operating Procedure on the Principles and Process of Reconfiguration of Eulex Kosovo (‘the SOP on reconfiguration’). According to that article, the current contracts of unsuccessful candidates will not be renewed beyond their expiry, whereas a positive result for that competition entails the renewal of those contracts.

12

The appellant took part in the 2014 internal competition, which took place in the summer of 2014. On 19 August 2014, she was informed by the line manager in question that she had failed that competition.

13

On 25 August 2014, the appellant lodged a complaint against the result of the 2014 internal competition (‘the second complaint’). She challenged, first, the fact that the chairperson of the selection board of that competition and another member of that board had the same nationality and, second, the fact that the line manager in question was chairing that selection board inasmuch as the latter was involved in the procedure relating to first complaint, which was still pending at the date of organisation of that competition. The Head of Mission of Eulex Kosovo annulled that competition on the ground that two members of that board had the same nationality.

14

On 7 October 2014, the line manager in question drew up a new PER for the appellant for 2014, in which she proposed the renewal of her contract (‘the second 2014 PER’).

15

By letter of 24 June 2016, the appellant was informed of the organisation of an internal competition (‘the 2016 internal competition’), since a decision to reduce the number of prosecutor’s posts in Eulex Kosovo from 22 to 13 had been taken on the basis of the 2016 OPLAN and Eulex Kosovo’s deployment plan approved on 20 June 2016 by the Civilian Operations Commander. In that letter, it was stated that failure to take part in that competition or unsatisfactory results meant that the appellant’s final employment contract would not be renewed, whereas a positive result in the competition would lead to its renewal.

16

On 19 July 2016, in the 2016 internal competition, the appellant took part in an interview before the selection board of that competition. Both before and during that interview, the appellant challenged the composition of that selection board on the ground that the chairperson of that board was the line manager in question, who had been involved in the first and second complaints, in both of which the appellant had been successful. Accordingly, the appellant claimed that the composition of that selection board did not meet the requirement of impartiality laid down in the OPLAN and the standard operating procedures.

17

By letter of 30 September 2016, the appellant was informed of the decision not to accept her application following the 2016 internal competition and of the decision not to renew her final employment contract (together, ‘the decisions at issue’).

18

Following the interview held as part of the 2016 internal competition, the appellant obtained a total score of 46% and a mark of 0 respectively in that interview and for the criterion ‘Required competency, based on the Job Description [and] Integrity’. The evaluation grid for that interview stated that the candidate who scored 0 in any one criterion or a final score of less than 50% would be ineligible to be recommended for the position. The appellant was placed second-to-last on the reserve list for that internal competition, with a total of 55.53 points.

19

By letter of 10 October 2016, the appellant, in accordance with Article 5 of the SOP on reconfiguration, lodged a complaint against the decisions at issue. She claimed that the chairperson of the selection board for the 2016 internal competition had a conflict of interests, in breach of the provisions of the SOP on reconfiguration and the standard operating procedure relating to the selection of Eulex Kosovo’s staff.

20

By letter of 31 October 2016, the Head of Mission of Eulex Kosovo rejected that complaint. The request for arbitration made by the appellant to that Head of Mission was also rejected on 14 November 2016, the day on which her final employment contract expired.

21

On 25 April 2017, the appellant brought an action under Articles 263, 268 and 272 TFEU before the General Court, by which she asked the General Court, in essence, first, to find that Eulex Kosovo had breached its contractual and non-contractual obligations and that the decisions at issue were unlawful and, second, to order Eulex Kosovo to pay compensation for the material and non-material damage which she claimed to have suffered as a result.

22

By order of 19 September 2018, SC v Eulex Kosovo (T‑242/17, EU:T:2018:586), the General Court dismissed that action as, in part, manifestly inadmissible and, in part, manifestly lacking any foundation in law. By judgment of 25 June 2020, SC v Eulex Kosovo (C‑730/18 P, EU:C:2020:505), the Court of Justice set aside that order and referred the case back to the General Court.

23

Since Eulex Kosovo failed to lodge a defence within the period prescribed in Article 81(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, that court, by judgment of 19 October 2022, SC v Eulex Kosovo (T‑242/17 RENV, EU:T:2022:637), gave judgment in favour of the appellant, in accordance with Article 123 of those rules. Accordingly, the General Court ordered Eulex Kosovo to pay the appellant compensation in respect of the material damage suffered, equivalent to 19 months’ gross salary, to which the daily subsistence allowance and the salary increase had to be added, to correspond to the situation in which the final employment contract was renewed until 14 June 2018, together with compensation for the non-material damage suffered, assessed ex æquo et bono at EUR 50000.

24

Pursuant to Article 166(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, Eulex Kosovo lodged an application to set aside that judgment. At the same time, Eulex Kosovo lodged an appeal against that judgment pursuant to Article 56 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union. By judgment of 18 January 2024, Eulex Kosovo v SC (C‑785/22 P, EU:C:2024:52), the Court of Justice declared the appeal inadmissible.

25

By the judgment under appeal, the General Court, inter alia, set aside the judgment of 19 October 2022, SC v Eulex Kosovo (T‑242/17 RENV, EU:T:2022:637), dismissed the action registered under Case number T‑242/17 and ordered Eulex Kosovo and SC each to bear their own costs relating to Cases T‑242/17 and T‑242/17 RENV-OP.

26

The appellant claims that the Court of Justice should:

27

Eulex Kosovo contends that the Court should dismiss the appeal in its entirety as manifestly lacking any foundation in law and order the appellant to pay the costs.

28

Under point (b) of the second paragraph of Article 58a of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, an appeal brought against a decision of the General Court relating to the performance of a contract containing an arbitration clause, within the meaning of Article 272 TFEU, is not to proceed unless the Court of Justice first decides that it should be allowed to do so.

29

By document lodged on 6 January 2025, SC requested, pursuant to Article 170a(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, that her appeal be allowed to proceed, in accordance with point (b) of the second paragraph of Article 58a of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union.

30

By order of 29 April 2025, SC v Eulex Kosovo (C‑881/24 P, EU:C:2025:313), the appeal was allowed to proceed so far as concerns the first and second grounds.

31

In support of her appeal, as allowed to proceed, the appellant raises two grounds of appeal. The first ground of appeal alleges infringement of the requirement of objective impartiality enshrined in Article 41(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’). The second ground of appeal alleges infringement of the requirement of subjective impartiality enshrined in that provision and distortion of the facts and evidence.

32

Since, in the judgment under appeal, the General Court began by examining the appellant’s complaints alleging infringement of the requirement of subjective impartiality and the existence of a conflict of interests, the Court considers it appropriate to examine the second ground of appeal before the first one.

33

In the first place, the appellant submits that, in paragraph 56 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court erred in deciding to examine together the second and third pleas which she raised at first instance, alleging, respectively, a conflict of interests on the part of the line manager in question and infringement of the requirement of impartiality.

34

As is apparent from paragraphs 63 to 80 of the judgment under appeal, that joint examination led the General Court, first of all, erroneously to equate the concepts of lack of impartiality and conflict of interests, next, to require, in the light of its own case-law and that of the Civil Service Tribunal, a higher standard of proof of a lack of impartiality than that required by the case-law of the Court of Justice resulting from the judgments of 21 October 2021, Parliament v UZ (C‑894/19 P, EU:C:2021:863), and of 11 January 2024, Hamers v Cedefop (C‑111/22 P, EU:C:2024:5), and, lastly, to disregard the standard of proof required by that case-law in order to establish the existence of a conflict of interests involving an official.

35

In that regard, the appellant observes that, as is apparent from the Opinion of Advocate General Pikamäe in Parliament v UZ (C‑894/19 P, EU:C:2021:497), the lack of impartiality is a more general concept than that of conflict of interests, the latter taking the form of a personal interest in favouring a person or placing a person at a disadvantage, thus constituting a particularly serious case of lack of impartiality.

36

According to the appellant, it is apparent from paragraph 65 of the judgment under appeal that the General Court conflated those two concepts.

37

In addition, the appellant claims that in paragraph 65 of that judgment, the General Court incorrectly required her to establish, on the basis of objective, relevant and consistent evidence, the existence of a conflict of interests on the part of the line manager in question, in order for it to be found that there had been a failure to have regard to the obligation of impartiality, as enshrined in Article 41 of the Charter.

38

In so doing, in paragraphs 65 to 68 and 71 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court required the evidence demonstrating a lack of impartiality to reach a different and higher standard of proof than that which follows from the case-law of the Court of Justice, which merely requires that the line of argument of the applicant concerned be such as to give rise to a legitimate doubt, in the minds of third parties, as to the subjective impartiality of the official in question.

39

Similarly, in paragraph 66 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court required the appellant to provide objective, relevant and consistent evidence capable of demonstrating a conflict of interests on the part of the line manager in question, which, according to the appellant, runs counter to the criterion which follows from paragraph 52 of the judgment of 11 January 2024, Hamers v Cedefop (C‑111/22 P, EU:C:2024:5), according to which it is sufficient to demonstrate that it is not possible to dispel all suspicion as to the existence of a possible conflict of interests capable of giving rise to a legitimate doubt, in the minds of third parties, as to the impartiality of the line manager in question.

40

The appellant claims that the General Court also erred in its assessment, in paragraphs 75 to 77 of the judgment under appeal, according to which, in essence, she had not succeeded in proving that the alleged irritation of the line manager in question towards her, on account of the objections which the appellant submitted during the interview held as part of the 2016 internal competition regarding the presence of that line manager on the selection board in that competition, could have affected the judgment of that line manager concerning the appellant’s performance in that interview.

41

In the second place, the appellant claims that the General Court distorted the facts and evidence relating to the handwritten annotations of the members of the selection board for the 2016 internal competition when it held, in paragraph 79 of the judgment under appeal, that those annotations contain only the comments of the members of that selection board on the content of the answers provided by the appellant during that interview and do not reveal any personal prejudice or bias which could legitimately raise doubts as to their impartiality.

42

In that regard, the appellant claims that, as is clear from the documents in the case, the handwritten annotations of the line manager in question are largely illegible and incomprehensible, in particular as regards her answer to the question on ‘integrity’ which led to her being eliminated from the 2016 internal competition. In the appellant’s view, the General Court was therefore not entitled to rely on illegible and incomprehensible handwritten annotations in order to dispel any legitimate doubt as to the subjective impartiality of that line manager.

43

Eulex Kosovo submits that the second ground of appeal is based on inaccurate facts and unfounded arguments and that it must be rejected.

44

Eulex Kosovo submits, first of all, in general terms, that any reasoning by analogy with the cases which gave rise to the judgments of 21 October 2021, Parliament v UZ (C‑894/19 P, EU:C:2021:863), and of 11 January 2024, Hamers v Cedefop (C‑111/22 P, EU:C:2024:5), is ruled out since those cases did not concern a procedure for the selection of candidates for an internal competition, but disciplinary proceedings.

45

Next, the findings of the General Court in paragraphs 68 to 77 of the judgment under appeal are free from errors of law since the General Court was correct in requiring the appellant to demonstrate, through objective, relevant and consistent evidence, that the line manager in question had, directly or indirectly, a personal interest in excluding her from the selection procedure or in placing her at a disadvantage.

46

In that regard, Eulex Kosovo contends that the General Court cannot rely, as the appellant suggests, on a mere risk, which has not been demonstrated, of bias on the part of the line manager in question. Eulex Kosovo adds that such an approach would lead to situations in which any member of staff participating in an internal competition could, without relying on objective, relevant and consistent evidence, allege that there is such a risk in order to obtain the appointment of a competition selection board which is ‘tailor-made’ for him or her. That is contrary to the principles of equality and transparency, since all candidates must be assessed by the same members of the selection board and according to the same objective criteria.

47

In any event, Eulex Kosovo recalls that, as is apparent from paragraph 87 of the judgment under appeal, it is settled case-law that, first, for a procedural irregularity to justify the annulment of an act, it is necessary that, in the absence of that irregularity, the procedure could have led to a different result and, second, in the context of such an examination, account must be taken of all the circumstances of the case and, in particular, the nature of the complaints and the extent of the procedural irregularities committed in relation to the guarantees from which the official concerned benefited. In the present case, the appellant was unanimously awarded the eliminatory mark of ‘0’ by the selection board for the 2016 internal competition, which could not have led to her obtaining a different ranking in that competition.

48

Lastly, as regards the appellant’s complaint relating to the distortion of the handwritten annotations of the members of the selection board in that competition, Eulex Kosovo states that the Court of Justice did not accept the third ground of appeal by which the appellant criticises the General Court’s refusal to order Eulex Kosovo to disclose full and legible documentation relating to the interview held as part of the 2016 internal competition and to provide explanations regarding the evaluation grid.

49

As a preliminary point, it must be borne in mind that, under Article 41(1) of the Charter, every person has the right to have his or her affairs handled impartially by the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the European Union.

50

It follows from settled case-law that the need for impartiality, required of those institutions, bodies, offices and agencies in carrying out their missions, is intended to guarantee equality of treatment, which is a fundamental principle of EU law. That requirement is intended, inter alia, to avoid a situation where there could be a conflict of interests on the part of officials or agents acting on behalf of those institutions, bodies, offices and agencies. Having regard to the fundamental importance of ensuring the independence and probity of EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies as regards both their internal functioning and external reputation, the requirement of impartiality covers all circumstances which an official or agent who is called upon to decide on an issue must reasonably regard as being of such a nature as to be viewed by third parties as a possible source of impairment of his or her independence in that matter (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 October 2021, Parliament v UZ, C‑894/19 P, EU:C:2021:863, paragraph 53 and the case-law cited).

51

In addition, as the General Court correctly observed in paragraph 63 of the judgment under appeal, it is incumbent upon those institutions, bodies, offices and agencies to comply with both components of the requirement of impartiality, which are, first, subjective impartiality, by virtue of which no member of the institution concerned may show bias or personal prejudice and, second, objective impartiality, under which there must be sufficient guarantees to exclude any legitimate doubt as to possible bias on the part of the institution concerned (judgments of 21 October 2021, Parliament v UZ, C‑894/19 P, EU:C:2021:863, paragraph 54, and of 11 January 2024, Hamers v Cedefop, C‑111/22 P, EU:C:2024:5, paragraph 47).

52

In that regard, contrary to Eulex Kosovo’s submissions, it is not necessary to rule out the application of that case-law to an administrative procedure relating to the organisation of an internal competition, such as that at issue in the present case.

53

First, having regard to the wording of Article 41(1) of the Charter, the right to have his or her affairs handled impartially by the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the European Union is conferred on every person and therefore also benefits any member of staff of an EU office or agency, such as Eulex Kosovo.

54

Second, it is apparent from the case-law of the Court referred to in paragraph 50 of the present judgment that, in view of its fundamental importance, the requirement of impartiality covers ‘all circumstances’ which an official or agent of an EU institution, body, office or agency who is called upon to decide on an issue must reasonably regard as being of such a nature as to be viewed by third parties as a possible source of impairment of his or her impartiality in an administrative procedure relating to the organisation of an internal competition.

55

Compliance with that requirement is therefore binding on the members of the selection board in an internal competition organised within an EU institution, body, office or agency in respect of each member of staff who applies for or participates in that competition.

56

The appellant criticises the General Court’s decision, in paragraph 56 of the judgment under appeal, to examine together the second and third pleas raised before it, alleging, respectively, a conflict of interests and a lack of impartiality on the part of the line manager in question in the 2016 internal competition, on the ground that ‘the conflict of interest is merely a variant of the defect of bias’. The appellant submits that that decision led the General Court to vitiate paragraphs 65 and 66 of the judgment under appeal with errors of law in the examination of the alleged lack of subjective impartiality.

57

In that regard, as regards the appellant’s complaint relating to the incorrect conflation of two different legal concepts, namely, first, that of subjective impartiality and, second, that of conflict of interests, the General Court, after noting, in paragraph 64 of the judgment under appeal, that such subjective impartiality is presumed in the absence of evidence to the contrary, held as follows in paragraphs 65 and 66:

58

By holding, in the second sentence of paragraph 65 of the judgment under appeal, that it is only in the event of a conflict of interests on the part of a member of the competition selection board that the obligation of impartiality requires that that member be unable to express his or her opinion on the merits of a candidate, the General Court misinterpreted the Court’s case-law, according to which a conflict of interests constitutes only one manifestation of a lack of subjective impartiality.

59

As is apparent from the case-law referred to in paragraphs 50 and 51 of the present judgment, the requirement of impartiality is intended ‘inter alia’ to avoid a situation where there could be a conflict of interests on the part of officials or agents acting on behalf of the EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, while the subjective component of that requirement encompasses, more generally, the prohibition on showing bias or personal prejudice towards any person.

60

Accordingly, the requirement of impartiality, in so far as it prohibits an official or agent from showing bias or personal prejudice, is not intended solely to prohibit a situation in which that official or agent has, directly or indirectly, a personal interest in favouring a person or placing a person at a disadvantage, that is to say, a conflict of interests.

61

The General Court was not entitled to base the assessment in the second sentence of paragraph 65 of the judgment under appeal on the order of 30 November 2015, O’Riain v Commission (F‑104/14, EU:F:2015:143), precisely because the lack of subjective impartiality of a member of a competition selection board cannot be reduced solely to the case where that member has a conflict of interests.

62

The case which gave rise to that order concerned the application of Article 11a(1) of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union, which refers to a situation of conflict of interests, providing that, in the performance of his or her duties, an official is not to deal with a matter in which, directly or indirectly, he or she has any personal interest such as to impair his or her independence, and, in particular, family and financial interests.

63

In any event, it should be noted that that provision cannot serve as a basis for limiting the scope of Article 41(1) of the Charter.

64

In the present case, it is true that the line of argument put forward by the appellant before the General Court concerning the subjective component of the requirement of impartiality alleged that the line manager in question was in a situation of conflict of interests. However, it is apparent from the application initiating proceedings that the appellant alleged, more broadly, an infringement of that requirement, for the purposes of Article 41(1) of the Charter, encompassing the existence of bias or personal prejudice towards her, as from the date on which the first 2014 PER had been drawn up, wherein she had been criticised, inter alia, for having, ‘on a number of occasions, been openly dishonest’.

65

It follows that the second sentence of paragraph 65 of the judgment under appeal is vitiated by an error of law in that the General Court limited the scope of its examination of the infringement of the subjective impartiality of the line manager in question solely to the existence of a conflict of interests on the part of that line manager.

66

Consequently, the General Court vitiated paragraph 66 of the judgment under appeal by an additional error of law by requiring the appellant to adduce objective, relevant and consistent evidence capable of demonstrating that the line manager in question had, directly or indirectly, a personal interest in placing her at a disadvantage.

67

In that regard, although the standard of proof required by the General Court is not, as such, vitiated by an error of law, the General Court, by contrast, committed such an error by limiting the subject matter of that evidence solely to the situation of a conflict of interests.

68

Thus, contrary to what the appellant claims in relying on paragraphs 51 and 52 of the judgment of 11 January 2024, Hamers v Cedefop (C‑111/22 P, EU:C:2024:5), it is not sufficient for an applicant to raise the existence of a legitimate doubt, which cannot be dispelled, as to the failure to observe subjective impartiality in order to conclude that evidence of bias or personal prejudice towards him or her has been adduced.

69

It is unambiguously clear from paragraphs 48 to 52 of the judgment of 11 January 2024, Hamers v Cedefop (C‑111/22 P, EU:C:2024:5), that, in those paragraphs, the Court of Justice examined compliance with the objective component of the requirement of impartiality, which is to be assessed independently of the specific conduct of the person concerned and does not therefore require the applicant to adduce proof of specific indications of a lack of impartiality on the part of the person concerned (see, to that effect, judgments of 14 March 2024, D & A Pharma v Commissionand EMA, C‑291/22 P, EU:C:2024:228, paragraph 80, and of 12 December 2024, DD v FRA, C‑680/22 P, EU:C:2024:1019, paragraphs 31 and 32). The position is different as regards the subjective component of that requirement, compliance with which must be assessed in the light of the specific conduct of the person concerned.

70

It is therefore necessary to draw a distinction between, on the one hand, the subject matter and the standard of proof for an infringement of the requirement of subjective impartiality, which require the applicant to establish, on the basis of objective, relevant and consistent evidence, that a member of the institution concerned has shown bias or personal prejudice towards him or her, and, on the other hand, those for an infringement of the requirement of objective impartiality, which require the applicant to establish that the administrative procedure in question does not offer sufficient guarantees to exclude any legitimate doubt as to possible bias.

71

It follows that, although the lack of subjective impartiality is not limited solely to the case of a conflict of interests, so that proof of such a conflict is not required in order to establish that lack of impartiality, mere doubt as to the existence of bias or personal prejudice on the part of the line manager in question is also not sufficient to establish that lack of impartiality. That is the reason why it was for the General Court to ascertain, which it incorrectly failed to do, whether the appellant had adduced objective, relevant and consistent evidence capable of demonstrating that the line manager had shown bias or personal prejudice towards her, within the meaning of the case-law referred to in paragraph 51 of the present judgment, without being limited solely to the situation of a conflict of interests.

72

In the light of the foregoing, it must be held that the General Court misinterpreted and misapplied the requirement relating to subjective impartiality enshrined in Article 41(1) of the Charter, without there being any need to assess the merits of the other complaints relied on by the appellant in support of her second ground of appeal.

73

Consequently, the second ground of appeal must be upheld.

74

In the first place, although the appellant does not dispute the merits of the principles arising from paragraph 48 of the judgment of 11 January 2024, Hamers v Cedefop (C‑111/22 P, EU:C:2024:5), referred to in paragraph 81 of the judgment under appeal, according to which prior knowledge of the facts by those called upon to take part in the adoption of a judicial or administrative decision does not, in itself, constitute a circumstance capable of vitiating that decision by a procedural defect taking the form of a lack of impartiality, she claims that the General Court nevertheless vitiated paragraph 82 of the judgment under appeal by two errors of law.

75

First, the appellant submits that the General Court erred in failing to examine, contrary to what is apparent from paragraph 59 of the judgment of 21 October 2021, Parliament v UZ (C‑894/19 P, EU:C:2021:863), whether, as a result of prior knowledge of the facts, the line manager in question could have had a preconceived negative opinion of her, since the first and second complaints which the appellant had lodged against that line manager had been upheld by the Head of Mission of Eulex Kosovo.

76

Second, the appellant claims that the present case concerns a situation not of ‘prior knowledge’ of the facts, but rather of ‘prior participation’ of the line manager in question in the administrative procedures referred to in her first and second complaints. Therefore, according to the appellant, the objective factors of a particular case are sometimes capable of establishing ‘weak prior participation’ with a lesser risk of giving rise to a legitimate doubt, in the minds of third parties, as to the impartiality of the person involved, or, on the contrary, ‘strong prior participation’, which gives rise to a higher risk of negative bias, as in the present case. The General Court failed to take account of such circumstances, which gave rise to a legitimate doubt, in the minds of third parties, as to the impartiality of the line manager in question.

77

The appellant adds that strict observance of the requirement of objective impartiality is just as necessary in the context of failure to succeed in an internal competition, as in the present case, which generally leads to the termination or non-renewal of contracts, as in the context of administrative investigations liable to result in disciplinary penalties, as in the situation at issue in the case which gave rise to the judgment of 21 October 2021, Parliament v UZ (C‑894/19 P, EU:C:2021:863).

78

In the second place, as regards the absence of any conflict of interests on the part of the line manager in question, also found by the General Court in paragraph 82 of the judgment under appeal, the appellant submits, in essence, that, in accordance with the case-law arising from the judgment of 21 October 2021, Parliament v UZ (C‑894/19 P, EU:C:2021:863), the standard of proof required for demonstrating such a conflict of interests is the same as that required to establish the existence of a legitimate doubt. In paragraph 82 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court erred in referring to the findings it made in paragraphs 66 to 74 of that judgment, relating to the assessment of alleged lack of subjective impartiality on the part of the line manager in question and to the higher standard of proof it would have required from the appellant in that regard.

79

Eulex Kosovo contends that the first ground of appeal should be rejected.

80

It submits that the appellant presents a distorted version of the facts, fails to take account of the OPLAN provisions and provides an erroneous analysis of the context of the first and second complaints.

81

As regards the points of law relied on in support of its position, Eulex Kosovo submits, first, that the General Court was correct in rejecting the appellant’s line of argument on the ground that there was no objective, relevant and consistent evidence capable of demonstrating that the line manager in question had, directly or indirectly, a personal interest in placing her at a disadvantage.

82

Second, the General Court was correct in holding, in paragraph 82 of the judgment under appeal, with reference to paragraph 48 of the judgment of 11 January 2024, Hamers v Cedefop (C‑111/22 P, EU:C:2024:5), that mere prior knowledge of the facts by the persons involved in the adoption of an administrative decision does not, in itself, constitute a circumstance capable of vitiating that decision by a procedural defect taking the form of a lack of objective impartiality. In the present case, Eulex Kosovo notes that the circumstance that the line manager in question was part of the internal competition selection board applied equally to all candidates.

83

As the General Court correctly observed in paragraph 81 of the judgment under appeal, which, moreover, is not disputed by the appellant, as regards the requirement of objective impartiality, prior knowledge of the facts by those called upon to take part in the adoption of an administrative decision does not, in itself, constitute a circumstance capable of vitiating that decision by a procedural defect taking the form of a lack of impartiality, since such prior knowledge is sometimes inevitable in view of a professional activity carried out previously or in parallel by the persons concerned (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 January 2024, Hamers v Cedefop, C‑111/22 P, EU:C:2024:5, paragraph 48 and the case-law cited).

84

However, the appellant criticises the General Court, first, for failing to verify, contrary to its approach in paragraph 52 of the judgment of 20 September 2019, UZ v Parliament (T‑47/18, EU:T:2019:650), and as the Court of Justice required in paragraph 59 of the judgment of 21 October 2021, Parliament v UZ (C‑894/19 P, EU:C:2021:863), whether there could be a legitimate doubt, in the minds of third parties, – which cannot be dispelled – as to possible bias on the part of the line manager in question, precisely because that line manager had prior knowledge of the facts. Second, the appellant submits that the General Court should have taken account of the ‘strong prior participation’ of that line manager on account of her participation in the administrative procedures relating to the appellant’s first and second complaints, which were upheld by the Head of Mission Eulex Kosovo, which gave rise to a legitimate doubt, in the minds of third parties, as to the impartiality of that line manager.

85

In that regard, it must be borne in mind that, in paragraph 82 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court ruled as follows:

‘In the present case, the mere fact that the line manager in question, two years before the 2016 internal competition and in the performance of her professional activity, chaired another selection board in a competition in which the [appellant] had taken part and assessed the latter’s merits in a PER is not in itself sufficient to give rise to a legitimate doubt, in the minds of third parties, as to her impartiality. Furthermore, as has been stated in paragraphs 66 to 74 [of the judgment under appeal], the [appellant] has not been able to adduce the slightest evidence of the existence of a conflict of interests on the part of that line manager resulting from her involvement in the adoption of the acts which are the subject of the first and second complaints.’

86

In the first place, it should be stated that the appellant misreads the first sentence of paragraph 82 of the judgment under appeal. It is clear from that first sentence that the General Court did not confine itself to assessing mere prior knowledge of the facts by the line manager in question, but stated that it had examined whether that line manager’s prior participation in the internal procedures prior to the 2016 internal competition was capable of giving rise to a legitimate doubt as to her impartiality.

87

The argument directed against the first sentence of paragraph 82 of the judgment under appeal should therefore be rejected.

88

In the second place, it must be stated that the appellant is correct in claiming that the second sentence of paragraph 82 of the judgment under appeal is vitiated by an error of law.

89

In rejecting the claim alleging a lack of objective impartiality on the ground that the appellant had not adduced evidence of the existence of a conflict of interests on the part of the line manager in question, the General Court disregarded the case-law of the Court of Justice according to which compliance with the requirement of objective impartiality requires verification of whether the administrative procedure offers sufficient guarantees to exclude, in the minds of third parties, any legitimate doubt as to possible bias and is to be assessed independently of the specific conduct of the person concerned (see, to that effect, judgments of 14 March 2024, D & A Pharma v Commission and EMA, C‑291/22 P, EU:C:2024:228, paragraph 80, and of 12 December 2024, DD v FRA, C‑680/22 P, EU:C:2024:1019, paragraph 32).

90

However, it should be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, arguments directed against grounds included in a decision of the General Court purely for the sake of completeness cannot lead to the decision being set aside and are therefore ineffective (judgment of 26 March 2026, Pumpyanskiy and Others v Council, C‑696/23 P, C‑704/23 P, C‑711/23 P, C‑35/24 P and C‑111/24 P, EU:C:2026:245, paragraph 240 and the case-law cited).

91

It is also apparent from the second sentence of paragraph 82 of the judgment under appeal that the ground set out therein is intended only to corroborate the ground set out in the first sentence of paragraph 82 and in respect of which the appellant’s criticism has been rejected in paragraph 87 of the present judgment. That ground is therefore included purely for the sake of completeness in relation to the ground which precedes it.

92

Therefore, the appellant’s argument directed against that second sentence must be rejected as ineffective.

93

Consequently, the first ground of appeal must be rejected.

94

It follows from all the foregoing that the judgment under appeal is set aside in so far as it concerns the General Court’s assessment of the part of the third plea raised before it alleging infringement of the subjective component of the requirement of impartiality and the rejection, on that basis, of the appellant’s heads of claim seeking a declaration that the decisions at issue are unlawful and seeking the award of compensation.

95

In accordance with the first paragraph of Article 61 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, if the decision of the General Court is set aside, the Court of Justice may itself give final judgment in the matter, where the state of the proceedings so permits.

96

In the present case, the appellant’s head of claim concerning the lawfulness of the decisions at issue was the subject of an exchange of arguments before the General Court and its examination does not require any further measure of organisation of procedure or inquiry to be taken in the case. It is therefore necessary to give final judgment on that head of claim within the limits of the matter before the Court of Justice (see, to that effect, judgment of 4 March 2021, Commission v Fútbol Club Barcelona, C‑362/19 P, EU:C:2021:169, paragraph 108 and the case-law cited).

97

In that regard, it should first be noted that the appellant did not appeal against the General Court’s assessment of the fourth plea raised before it, and therefore that assessment has become final and there is no need to give judgment on that fourth plea. Next, in the order of 29 April 2025, SC v Eulex Kosovo (C‑881/24 P, EU:C:2025:313), the Court of Justice did not allow the appeal to proceed so far as concerns the third and fourth grounds of that appeal seeking to challenge the General Court’s assessment in response to the first plea raised before the General Court and the refusal of that court to adopt the measures of organisation of procedure requested by the appellant, and therefore that assessment has also become final and there is likewise no need to give judgment on that first plea. Lastly, given that the first ground of appeal criticising the General Court’s assessment of the objective component of the requirement of impartiality has been rejected in paragraphs 86 to 93 of the present judgment, the examination of the pleas raised at first instance alleging a lack of subjective impartiality on the part of the line manager in question in the 2016 internal competition remains a matter before the Court of Justice. Consequently, it is appropriate to give final judgment on those pleas.

98

First, the appellant claims that the line manager in question was unable to assess her application during the 2016 internal competition. The line manager was already involved in the first and second complaints, both of which were upheld: one against the first 2014 PER, wherein the assessments were extremely negative and insulting; the other against the 2014 internal competition, the selection board of which was chaired by the line manager in question. According to the appellant, that line manager showed personal bias towards her, including during the interview which took place as part of the 2016 internal competition.

99

Second, the appellant submits that the fact that she was required, on the advice of the Director of Human Resources at Eulex Kosovo, to raise orally during that interview her objections regarding the participation of the line manager in question in the selection board for the 2016 internal competition, which the line manager also chaired, proves that that line manager could not have been subjectively impartial during that interview.

100

Third, the appellant claims that, in an article published on the website www.medium.com, a member of the selection board, namely the President of the Assembly of Eulex Judges, stated that he had participated, on two occasions, in competition selection boards whose other two members had already agreed in advance on the prosecutors who would not be selected, including, in particular, the prosecutors who had refused to bend to pressure from the Eulex Kosovo management to prosecute overtly political cases, and had adjusted the marking grids. According to the appellant, she was herself one of those prosecutors.

101

Fourth, the appellant submits that the handwritten annotations of the selection board members during the 2016 internal competition interview, which were submitted by Eulex Kosovo in its application to set aside, support the lack of subjective impartiality of the line manager in question and the irregularity of that interview, in particular as regards the assessment of her response to the question enabling evaluation of the criterion relating to the ‘Required competency, based on the Job Description [and] Integrity’, for which she obtained the eliminatory mark of 0.

102

In its application to set aside, Eulex Kosovo submits that the complaints put forward by the appellant are unfounded.

103

First of all, the appellant bases her allegation of bias on the part of the line manager in question not on objective and consistent evidence, but solely on her own assessment that the first and second complaints were directly and personally directed against the line manager. Eulex Kosovo observes that the appellant’s complaints were multiple and that those complaints were upheld not on the ground that the line manager in question was biased, but on procedural grounds. Furthermore, first, the appellant never lodged a formal complaint against the line manager in question and, second, with the exception of the first 2014 PER, all the appellant’s other PERs refer to positive assessments with regard to the appellant, thus precluding any intention on the part of the line manager in question to cause her harm.

104

Next, although the appellant invokes a risk or an allegation of bias for her failure in the 2016 internal competition, she does not demonstrate that, during the interview held as part of that competition, the line manager in question displayed a lack of impartiality. The appellant’s disqualification from that internal competition is based solely on the eliminatory mark of 0, awarded unanimously by the selection board in that competition, on account of her refusal to answer a key question during that interview.

105

Lastly, Eulex Kosovo submits that, in her capacity as Head of the Executive Division, the line manager in question could not – just as was the case with her participation on the selection board for the 2014 internal competition – recuse herself from chairing the selection board for the 2016 internal competition without infringing the provisions of Section 2.1 of Annex XIII to the 2016 OPLAN. In any event, the fact that the line manager in question was the subject of allegations of harassment or bias on the part of the appellant cannot, in itself, be regarded as calling into question the impartiality of that member of the selection board and should not entail an obligation on that member to recuse herself, as otherwise the composition of such a selection board would be rendered extremely difficult, if not almost impossible.

106

In response to the application to set aside, the appellant submits, inter alia, that Eulex Kosovo misreads Section 2.1 of Annex XIII to the OPLAN 2016, which provides that, within the selection board responsible for the selection of prosecutors, the Head of the Executive Division may be replaced.

107

In order to ascertain whether the appellant has adduced objective, relevant and consistent evidence to demonstrate that the line manager in question had shown bias or personal prejudice towards her, within the meaning of the case-law referred to in paragraph 51 of the present judgment, it must be observed, in the first place, that the first 2014 PER, drawn up three months after the appellant took up her duties, contained particularly negative comments about her. In particular, that report stated that the appellant ‘[had] not demonstrated a willingness to work’ and that she ‘[had], on a number of occasions, been openly dishonest’. On that basis, the line manager in question had stated that she did not recommend the extension of the appellant’s employment contract.

108

Following the first complaint, the first 2014 PER was annulled by the Head of Mission of Eulex Kosovo by decision of 12 August 2014, following the recommendations of the Advisory Board. While it is true that it is apparent from that decision that one of the reasons given by the Advisory Board was that the three-month evaluation period was too short to draw a definitive conclusion on the unsatisfactory performance of a member of staff, that decision also states that the Advisory Board had considered that the documents on which the evaluation carried out in the present case was based were not substantial and complete enough to give a well-grounded and indisputable justification for that evaluation.

109

In so far as the comments contained in the first 2014 PER called into question, after three months of service, the appellant’s professional integrity and honesty, without, moreover, those comments being supported by substantial and complete evidence, they cannot be regarded as remaining within the limits of the discretion of a reporting officer or the normal context of an employment relationship. Those comments therefore appear to constitute objective and relevant evidence of bias or personal prejudice towards the appellant.

110

In the second place, it should be emphasised that, after the second complaint, by decision of 4 September 2014, the Head of Mission of Eulex Kosovo annulled, following the recommendations of the Advisory Board, the 2014 internal competition, at the end of which the appellant had been ranked last in the final ranking for that competition. It follows from the statement of reasons for that decision that the presence, within the selection board of that competition, of two members of the same nationality constituted a breach of the provisions of Eulex Kosovo’s Standard Operating Procedures, ‘a violation [which] is serious as it concerns the basic rules of fairness established with relation to the composition of selection panels’. It is common ground that the line manager in question was one of those two members.

111

However, as Eulex Kosovo notes, in essence, that decision is not therefore based on the attitude of the line manager in question towards the appellant in the context of the 2014 internal competition.

112

Furthermore, other circumstances in or after 2014, which are also apparent from the file, are such as to preclude the appellant from establishing a lack of subjective impartiality on the part of the line manager in question during the 2016 internal competition.

113

Accordingly, first, while it is true that the line manager in question signed the first 2014 PER, the particularly negative comments in which may well have significantly influenced her initial opinion on the appellant’s professional integrity, those comments were nevertheless drafted by the appellant’s direct superior, Ms V. In that regard, it is clear from the first complaint that the appellant was complaining about the relationship difficulties which she was experiencing not with the line manager in question, but with Ms V, about which she had, moreover, confided in the line manager in question in several emails in May 2014.

114

Second, it follows from the decision of the Head of Mission of Eulex Kosovo of 12 August 2014, by which the first 2014 PER was annulled, that a replacement PER for the appellant’s period of activity from 4 January 2014 to 10 October 2014 had to be drawn up by the line manager in question, as the first reporting officer. The second 2014 PER, drawn up on 7 October 2014, contains positive comments with regard to the appellant in which the line manager in question gave a favourable assessment of the appellant’s work and qualities and proposed the renewal of her contract, which the appellant does not dispute. In that regard, it should be noted that the appellant’s comments, also dated 7 October 2014 and appearing on that second 2014 PER, indicate that it was a ‘fair PER’.

115

Third, although it is apparent from the documents before the Court that the line manager in question was no longer responsible for the appellant’s appraisal when the following PERs were drawn up, until the end of February 2016, since, from 10 October 2014, she had been transferred to another department, the line manager in question nevertheless proposed, as appeal assessor in an assessment replacing a full PER, for the period from 11 March to 15 May 2016, that is to say, approximately two months before the interview which took place on 19 July 2016 as part of the 2016 internal competition, an extension of the appellant’s contract.

116

Fourth, it is not apparent from any document in the file relating to the 2016 internal competition that the line manager in question expressed bias or personal prejudice towards the appellant during that interview.

117

Admittedly, as the appellant states, during that interview, she considered that she was under an obligation to object to the presence of the line manager in question among the members of the selection board in that internal competition. However, even if such an objection might have caused some irritation to that line manager, the appellant has not provided the slightest evidence that, during that interview, that line manager adopted a prejudicial attitude or expressed a preconceived opinion of her, affecting the line manager’s ability to assess the merits of her application.

118

Furthermore, it is apparent from the handwritten annotations of the members of the selection board for the 2016 internal competition containing their comments on the content of the answers provided by the appellant during the interview concerned that the answer which led to the elimination of the appellant from that internal competition did not meet the expectations of that selection board and was therefore considered to be incorrect, without any evidence substantiating the appellant’s allegation that the line manager in question influenced the members of that selection board or manipulated the results of that interview. In that regard, as regards the article published by the President of the Assembly of Eulex Judges, referred to in paragraph 100 of the present judgment, it is sufficient to note that that article does not refer to the 2016 internal competition or the appellant.

119

In the light of the overall assessment of all those circumstances, it must be held that the appellant has not been able to adduce objective, relevant and consistent evidence capable of establishing, with sufficient conclusiveness, that the line manager in question showed bias or personal prejudice towards her, so that Eulex Kosovo would have infringed the requirement of impartiality, in its subjective component, by allowing that line manager to chair the selection board for the 2016 internal competition.

120

Consequently, the grounds of appeal alleging a lack of subjective impartiality on the part of the line manager in question in the 2016 internal competition must be rejected as unfounded, including the complaint alleging the existence of a conflict of interests on the part of the line manager in question, in the light of the grounds set out in paragraphs 58 to 71 of the present judgment.

121

Consequently, the action registered under Case number T‑242/17 must be dismissed.

122

In accordance with Article 184(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, where the appeal is well founded and the Court itself gives final judgment in the case, the Court is to make a decision as to the costs.

123

Under Article 138(1) of those rules, applicable to appeal proceedings by virtue of Article 184(1) thereof, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Article 138(3) of those rules, also applicable to appeal proceedings by virtue of Article 184(1) thereof, provides, in addition, that, where each party succeeds on some and fails on other heads, the parties are to bear their own costs.

124

In the present case, since the parties have each been unsuccessful on one or more heads of claim, in respect of the appeal and Cases T‑242/17 and T‑242/17 RENV-OP, they must each be ordered to bear their own costs.

On those grounds, the Court (Fourth Chamber) hereby: