Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 21 May 2026. – Orbán Viktor v 24.hu Szerkesztősége.

1

This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Article 3 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1083 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 establishing a common framework for media services in the internal market and amending Directive 2010/13/EU (European Media Freedom Act) (OJ L, 2024/1083), as well as Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’).

2

The request has been made in proceedings between Mr Viktor Orbán and 24.hu Szerkesztősége, an online news website, concerning a request for rectification, in the press, of a press article published in Hungary which references content from another article published in another Member State and reporting a fact which is, allegedly, false.

3

Article 3 of Regulation 2024/1083, entitled ‘Right of recipients of media services’, provides:

‘Member States shall respect the right of recipients of media services to have access to a plurality of editorially independent media content and ensure that framework conditions are in place in line with this Regulation to safeguard that right, to the benefit of free and democratic discourse.’

4

Article 29 of that regulation, entitled ‘Entry into force and application’, states:

‘This Regulation shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall apply from 8 August 2025. However:

…’

5

Paragraph 12 of the a sajtószabadságról és a médiatartalmak alapvető szabályairól szóló 2010. évi CIV. törvény (Law No CIV of 2010 on the freedom of the press and the fundamental rules applicable to media content) (Magyar Közlöny 2010/170), in the version applicable to the dispute in the main proceedings, provides, in subparagraph 1 thereof:

‘Where any form of media content asserts or disseminates false facts about a person, or distorts true facts about that person, the person concerned shall be entitled to demand the publication of a statement of rectification indicating which of the published assertions of fact are false or unfounded, or which facts have been distorted, and indicating, by contrast, the actual facts.’

6

Paragraph 496 of the a polgári perrendtartásról szóló 2016. évi CXXX. törvény (Law No CXXX of 2016 laying down the Code of Civil Procedure) (Magyar Közlöny 2016/190), in the version applicable to the dispute in the main proceedings, provides, in subparagraph 1 thereof:

‘If the news media outlet fails to fulfil its obligation to publish a rectification within the time limit, or fails to do so in a manner consistent with the request for rectification, the person requesting rectification may bring an action against that news media outlet for publication of a statement of rectification. …’

7

On 17 March 2024, 24.hu Szerkesztősége published an article entitled ‘Spar has begun withdrawing its assets from Hungary’ (‘the article at issue in the main proceedings’). The article at issue in the main proceedings quoted, inter alia, a statement by the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Spar Austria, the Austrian subsidiary of the Spar Group, which had appeared in an Austrian magazine and according to which the Hungarian Prime Minister, Mr Orbán, had asked that group to allow one of his relatives to invest in the group’s Hungarian subsidiary (‘the statement at issue in the main proceedings’).

8

On 3 April 2024, Mr Orbán, on the basis of Hungarian legislation, requested 24.hu Szerkesztősége to rectify, in the press, the content of the article at issue in the main proceedings. 24.hu Szerkesztősége did not grant that request. However, on 10 April 2024, it added a supplement to the end of that article, entitled ‘Latest developments – Complaints’, in which it was, inter alia, indicated that Mr Orbán had made a request for rectification in which he maintained that 24.hu Szerkesztősége had disseminated a false fact by making the statement at issue in the main proceedings public, even though that statement was false.

9

Taking the view that 24.hu Szerkesztősége had failed to fulfil its obligation to publish the requested rectification, Mr Orbán brought an action before the Fővárosi Törvényszék (Budapest-Capital Regional Court, Hungary), which is the referring court. That court indicates that the proceedings must be reopened as the judgment which it handed down on 17 May 2024 has been set aside as being vitiated by a procedural defect.

10

In his application, without disputing that the statement at issue in the main proceedings was faithfully reproduced in the article at issue in the main proceedings, Mr Orbán requests that 24.hu Szerkesztősége be ordered, in accordance with Hungarian legislation, to publish a statement of rectification indicating that (i) 24.hu Szerkesztősége disseminated a false fact by publishing the statement at issue in the main proceedings and (ii) the truth of the matter is, on the contrary, that he did not ask the CEO of Spar Austria or any other shareholder, representative or employee of the Spar Group to allow one of his relatives to invest in that group’s Hungarian subsidiary.

11

In its defence, 24.hu Szerkesztősége maintains that the statement at issue in the main proceedings does not constitute the communication of a fact, but the expression of the opinion and value judgement of one of its journalists, which is protected by law. Furthermore, 24.hu Szerkesztősége contends that the article at issue in the main proceedings, once accompanied by the supplement thereto of 10 April 2024, as set out in paragraph 8 of the present judgment, reported both Mr Orbán’s request for rectification and the way in which he wished the facts to be portrayed, so that the reader might have a comprehensive overview.

12

The referring court indicates that, in the Hungarian legal order, rectification in the press is an instrument provided for in civil law to protect personality rights and is capable of effectively remedying public damage to those rights. The possibility of submitting a request for rectification is open, within a short period, to any person in respect of whom a fact, the veracity of which is not established, has been asserted or disseminated in a form of media content, or in respect of whom true facts have been distorted in a form of media content. If the news media outlet concerned fails to fulfil its obligation to rectify, that person may assert his or her right to rectification by initiating judicial proceedings.

13

The referring court specifies that the assessment criteria to be taken into consideration when applying the rules relating to the procedures for rectification in the press are, as regards the issues relating to proof which are relevant to the dispute in the main proceedings, set out in opinion No 14 of the Civil Chamber of the Kúria (Supreme Court, Hungary), applicable since 1 June 1984. The referring court indicates that it is apparent from that opinion that, given that it is, at the very least, extremely difficult to prove a negative, it is for the news media outlet concerned to demonstrate the veracity of the disputed assertion of fact included in the press article concerned. That is also the case, in general, where that press article faithfully reproduces an assertion of fact or a statement made by a person or where it references an article from another news media outlet. Those principles have been set out in the case-law developed by the Kúria (Supreme Court) following opinion No 14 of its Civil Chamber; case-law which is binding on the Hungarian courts.

14

In that context, the referring court questions whether the act, as provided for in the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings, of imposing on the media, as a general rule, an obligation to establish the veracity of what has been reported, in the case of the referencing of a form of media content published under editorial responsibility in another Member State or the mere communication of that form of media content, is in line with EU law, in particular with Article 3 of Regulation 2024/1083, which requires the Member States, inter alia, to respect the right of recipients of media services to have access to a plurality of editorially independent media content, as well as Article 11 of the Charter, which guarantees the freedom and pluralism of the media.

15

The referring court considers that the procedures for rectification in the press are procedures implementing Article 3 of Regulation 2024/1083, with the result that the Charter is also applicable in accordance with Article 51(1) thereof. The principles and objectives of that regulation must, inter alia, be applied to those procedures, which constitute an important part of guaranteeing media freedom, and media pluralism cannot be restricted by means of those procedures.

16

That being so, that court notes that the date of publication of the article at issue in the main proceedings is 17 March 2024, whereas Article 3 of Regulation 2024/1083 has been applicable, pursuant to Article 29 thereof, only since 8 November 2024. The question therefore arises as to whether the application of Article 3 of that regulation in the dispute in the main proceedings would be tantamount to a prohibited retroactive application of that provision.

17

Furthermore, it can be seen from Article 2 TEU that the European Union is founded on values, such as the rule of law, which are common to the Member States in a society in which, inter alia, justice prevails. In the dispute in the main proceedings, given that it follows from the case-law of the Court that a Member State cannot amend its legislation in such a way as to bring about a reduction in the protection of the value of the rule of law, it is necessary to determine whether one of the possible interpretations of the national legislation concerned would bring about such a reduction by undermining the right of citizens to have access to a plurality of independent media. Thus, the jurisdiction of the Court could also be established, irrespective of whether Article 3 of Regulation 2024/1083 is applicable, directly on the basis of the provisions of the Charter.

18

In those circumstances, the Fővárosi Törvényszék (Budapest-Capital Regional Court) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:

19

By its first question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 3 of Regulation 2024/1083 is to be interpreted as applying to a dispute concerning a request for rectification in the press, pursuant to the legislation of a Member State, in respect of a press article that disseminates an allegedly false fact included in a publication from another Member State where that press article was published on a date preceding the date on which that provision, pursuant to Article 29 of that regulation, became applicable.

20

It should be borne in mind that a new rule of law applies from the entry into force of the act introducing it, and, while it does not apply to legal situations that have arisen and become definitive under the old law, it does apply to their future effects, and to new legal situations. It is otherwise, subject to the principle of the non‑retroactivity of legal acts, only if the new rule is accompanied by special provisions which specifically lay down its conditions of temporal application. In that regard, unlike procedural rules, which are generally taken to apply from the date on which they enter into force, substantive EU law rules must be interpreted, with a view to ensuring respect for the principles of legal certainty and the protection of legitimate expectations, as applying to situations existing before their entry into force only in so far as it follows clearly from their terms, their objectives or their general scheme that such an effect must be given to them (see judgments of 12 November 1981, Meridionale Industria Salumi and Others, 212/80 to 217/80, EU:C:1981:270, paragraphs 9 and 10, and of 15 June 2021, Facebook Ireland and Others, C‑645/19, EU:C:2021:483, paragraph 100 and the case-law cited).

21

In the light of the foregoing considerations, it must be found, in the first place, that Article 3 of Regulation 2024/1083 constitutes a substantive law rule, inasmuch as it provides that Member States are to respect the right of recipients of media services to have access to a plurality of editorially independent media content and ensure that framework conditions are in place in line with that regulation to safeguard that right, to the benefit of free and democratic discourse.

22

In addition, Article 29 of Regulation 2024/1083 provides that that regulation is to enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union. As that regulation was published on 17 April 2024, it thus entered into force on 8 May 2024. That being so, Article 29 of Regulation 2024/1083 also lays down that regulation’s conditions of temporal application. In that regard, that article provides that Regulation 2024/1083 is to apply from 8 August 2025, while laying down a separate date of application in respect of certain provisions of that regulation, including Article 3 thereof, which is to apply from 8 November 2024.

23

In the second place, regarding the dispute in the main proceedings, it is apparent from the information provided by the referring court that, pursuant to Hungarian legislation, the right to rectification in the press is intended to remedy public damage to personality rights and is directly linked to the communication, in respect of the person concerned, in a form of media content, of a fact, whether asserted or disseminated, the veracity of which has not been established, or of facts which have been distorted.

24

Therefore, the situation at issue in the main proceedings became definitive with effect from 17 March 2024, the date on which the article at issue in those proceedings was published, without that finding being capable of being called into question by the judicial proceedings brought with a view to asserting that right to rectification in the press (see, to that effect, judgment of 27 October 2022, Stadt Mainz, C‑544/21, EU:C:2022:843, paragraph 23).

25

Accordingly, given that that situation became definitive before the date on which Article 3 of Regulation 2024/1083 became applicable, that article does not apply ratione temporis to the dispute at issue in the main proceedings.

26

In order to provide an answer that will be fully of use to the referring court, which alludes to the possible application of Article 11 of the Charter, it should also be borne in mind that, under Article 51(1) of the Charter, the provisions of the Charter are addressed to the Member States only when they are implementing Union law.

27

The fundamental rights guaranteed in the legal order of the European Union are thus applicable in all situations governed by EU law, but not outside such situations (see judgments of 26 February 2013, Åkerberg Fransson, C‑617/10, EU:C:2013:105, paragraph 19, and of 26 February 2026, Commission v Hungary (Right to provide media services in a radio frequency), C‑92/23, EU:C:2026:108, paragraph 95 and the case-law cited).

28

Moreover, it should be borne in mind that, according to the case-law of the Court, where a legal situation does not come within the scope of EU law, the Court does not have jurisdiction to rule on it and any provisions of the Charter relied upon cannot, of themselves, form the basis for such jurisdiction (see judgments of 26 February 2013, Åkerberg Fransson, C‑617/10, EU:C:2013:105, paragraph 22, and of 6 October 2015, Delvigne, C‑650/13, EU:C:2015:648, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited).

29

First, as has been explained in paragraph 25 of the present judgment, Article 3 of Regulation 2024/1083 is not applicable ratione temporis to the dispute in the main proceedings.

30

Second, the application of Article 11 of the Charter to that dispute cannot be justified solely through the referring court’s reliance on the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU. Indeed, Article 2 TEU cannot deprive the limits imposed on the scope of other provisions of EU law, and, in particular, the provisions of the Charter, which, pursuant to Article 51(1) thereof, are addressed to the Member States only when they are implementing Union law, of all effectiveness (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 April 2026, Commission v Hungary (Values of the European Union), C‑769/22, EU:C:2026:326, paragraph 550).

31

In those circumstances, given that the order for reference does not reveal any connection with other provisions of EU law, it must be held that Article 11 of the Charter is not applicable to the dispute in the main proceedings.

32

Having regard to all the foregoing considerations, the answer to the first question is that Article 3 of Regulation 2024/1083 must be interpreted as not applying to a dispute concerning a request for rectification in the press, pursuant to the legislation of a Member State, in respect of a press article that disseminates an allegedly false fact included in a publication from another Member State where that press article was published on a date preceding the date on which that provision, pursuant to Article 29 of that regulation, became applicable.

33

In view of the answer given to the first question, there is no need to answer the second and third questions.

34

Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the referring court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs of those parties, are not recoverable.

On those grounds, the Court (Fifth Chamber) hereby rules:

Article 3 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1083 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 establishing a common framework for media services in the internal market and amending Directive 2010/13/EU (European Media Freedom Act)

must be interpreted as not applying to a dispute concerning a request for rectification in the press, pursuant to the legislation of a Member State, in respect of a press article that disseminates an allegedly false fact included in a publication from another Member State where that press article was published on a date preceding the date on which that provision, pursuant to Article 29 of that regulation, became applicable.