Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 23 April 2026. – LQ and Others v Minister for Justice and Equality.

1

This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Article 625 of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, of the one part, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, of the other part (OJ 2021 L 149, p. 10; ‘the TCA’), read in the light of Articles 47 to 50 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’).

2

The request has been made in connection with the execution, in Ireland, of arrest warrants issued by the courts of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland against LQ, NT and RM for the purposes of conducting criminal prosecutions.

3

Recital 23 of the TCA is drafted as follows:

‘Considering that cooperation between the United Kingdom and the [European] Union relating to the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences and to the execution of criminal penalties, including the safeguarding against and prevention of threats to public security, will enable the security of the United Kingdom and the Union to be strengthened’.

4

Article 1 of the TCA provides:

‘This Agreement establishes the basis for a broad relationship between the Parties, within an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness characterised by close and peaceful relations based on cooperation, respectful of the Parties’ autonomy and sovereignty.’

5

Article 524 of the TCA provides:

‘1.   The cooperation provided for in this Part is based on the Parties’ and Member States’ long-standing respect for democracy, the rule of law and the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals, including as set out in the [Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 (ECHR)], and on the importance of giving effect to the rights and freedoms in that Convention domestically.

2.   Nothing in this Part modifies the obligation to respect fundamental rights and legal principles as reflected, in particular, in [the ECHR] and, in the case of the Union and its Member States, in the [Charter].’

6

Article 596 of the TCA is worded as follows:

‘The objective of this Title is to ensure that the extradition system between the Member States, on the one side, and the United Kingdom, on the other side, is based on a mechanism of surrender pursuant to an arrest warrant in accordance with the terms of this Title.’

7

Articles 600 and 601 of the TCA respectively list the grounds for mandatory non-execution of the arrest warrant.

8

Article 604(c) of the TCA provides:

‘The execution of the arrest warrant by the executing judicial authority may be subject to the following guarantees:

…

9

Article 606(1) of the TCA lists the information which the execution of an arrest warrant issued on the basis of that agreement:

10

Under Article 611(1) of the TCA:

‘If the arrested person indicates that he or she consents to surrender, that consent and, if appropriate, the express renunciation of entitlement to the speciality rule referred to in Article 625(2) [(“the speciality rule”)] must be given before the executing judicial authority, in accordance with the domestic law of the executing State.’

11

Article 625 of the TCA provides:

‘1.   The United Kingdom and the [European] Union, acting on behalf of any of its Member States, may each notify the Specialised Committee on Law Enforcement and Judicial Cooperation that, in relations with other States to which the same notification applies, consent is presumed to have been given for the prosecution, sentencing or detention of a person with a view to the carrying out of a custodial sentence or detention order for an offence committed prior to the person’s surrender, other than that for which that person was surrendered, unless in a particular case the executing judicial authority states otherwise in its decision on surrender.

2.   Except in the cases referred to in paragraphs 1 and 3, a person surrendered may not be prosecuted, sentenced or otherwise deprived of liberty for an offence committed prior to that person’s surrender other than that for which the person was surrendered.

3.   Paragraph 2 of this Article does not apply in the following cases:

…

…

4.   A request for consent shall be submitted to the executing judicial authority, accompanied by the information referred to in Article 606(1) and a translation as referred to in Article 606(2). Consent shall be given where the offence for which it is requested is itself subject to surrender in accordance with the provisions of this Title. Consent shall be refused on the grounds referred to in Article 600 and otherwise may be refused only on the grounds referred to in Article 601, or Article 602(2) and Article 603(2). The decision shall be taken no later than 30 days after receipt of the request. For the situations laid down in Article 604 the issuing State must give the guarantees provided for therein.’

12

The execution in Ireland of arrest warrants issued on the basis of the TCA is governed by the European Arrest Warrant Act 2003.

13

Section 22 of that act provides:

‘(1)   In this section, except where the context otherwise requires, “offence” means, in relation to a person to whom a relevant arrest warrant applies, an offence (other than an offence specified in the relevant arrest warrant in respect of which the person’s surrender is ordered under this Act) under the law of the issuing state committed before the person’s surrender, but shall not include an offence consisting, in whole, of acts or omission of which the offence specified in the European arrest warrant consists in whole or in part.

(2)   Subject to this section, the High Court [(Ireland)] shall refuse to surrender a person under this Act if it is satisfied that –

14

LQ, NT and RM are the subject of criminal prosecutions in the United Kingdom for fraud that they are alleged to have committed in their capacity as joint owners and directors of a company.

15

In March 2021, the Reading Crown Court (United Kingdom) ordered the freezing of the assets of that company and of LQ, NT and RM. On 5 August 2021, that court held that LQ, NT and RM had not complied with those measures and, consequently, sentenced each of them to six months’ deprivation of liberty for contempt of court.

16

On 6 December 2022, the judicial authority sitting at the Portsmouth Magistrates’ Court (United Kingdom) issued three arrest warrants, on the basis of the TCA, seeking the surrender of LQ, NT and RM, with a view to bringing criminal prosecutions against them for fraud offences. That judicial authority stated, in those arrest warrants, that the finding of the Reading Crown Court that LQ, NT and RM had infringed the order to freeze assets and were guilty of contempt of court was not a criminal conviction, since the breach of the order to freeze assets did not amount to a criminal offence under UK law. Therefore, according to that judicial authority, the arrest warrants must be regarded as being issued solely for the purposes of the prosecutions.

17

LQ, NT and RM were subsequently arrested and brought before the High Court (Ireland). By a judgment of 8 April 2024, that court dismissed the objection raised by LQ, NT and RM alleging a risk that the rule of speciality would be infringed in the event of their surrender to the United Kingdom and, by orders of the same day, it ordered that they be surrendered to the United Kingdom.

18

On 5 June 2024, LQ, NT and RM were permitted to bring an appeal before the Supreme Court (Ireland), which is the referring court.

19

LQ, NT and RM submit, before that court, that their surrender to the United Kingdom must be refused. They submit, in that regard, that such a surrender would expose each of them to serving six months’ imprisonment for an offence that is not the object of the arrest warrants issued against them, with the result that that surrender would involve a breach of the speciality rule, set out in Section 22(2) of the European Arrest Warrant Act 2003 and Article 625 of the TCA.

20

Thus, LQ, NT and RM submit that the concept of an ‘offence’ referred to in Article 625 must be given an autonomous interpretation based on, notably, the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights relating to the concept of a ‘criminal charge’. By contrast, the Irish authorities consider, like the High Court, that the concept of an ‘offence’, within the meaning of that Article 625, covers only those offences that are regarded, under the law of the issuing State, as being of a criminal nature.

21

The referring court asks whether Article 625(2) of the TCA prohibits the surrender to the United Kingdom of LQ, NT and RM on the ground that they risk being deprived of their liberty for an offence committed before that surrender other than that which was the ground for their surrender. In that regard, it wonders, in particular, what criteria should be used to define an ‘offence’, within the meaning of that provision.

22

That court states, in addition, that, in the context of proceedings relating to the asset-freezing orders, LQ, NT and RM benefited from all the procedural rights laid down in Articles 6 and 13 ECHR.

23

In those circumstances, the Supreme Court decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:

24

By its questions, which should be examined together, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 625 of the TCA must be interpreted as meaning that the fact that a person who is the subject of an arrest warrant, issued on the basis of that agreement for the purpose of conducting a criminal prosecution, has been sentenced, in the issuing State, to a six-month term of imprisonment for another offence, which is regarded as being a civil offence under the law of that State and which is not therefore covered by that arrest warrant, requires or permits an executing judicial authority to refuse to execute that arrest warrant.

25

It should first of all be noted that it is clear from the Court’s case-law that a judicial authority is required, in principle, to act upon an arrest warrant issued by the United Kingdom on the basis of the TCA and may refuse to execute such an arrest warrant only for reasons arising from that agreement (see, to that effect, judgment of 29 July 2024, Alchaster, C‑202/24, EU:C:2024:649, paragraphs 46 and 48).

26

In order to determine whether Article 625 of the TCA establishes such a reason, it is appropriate, in accordance with the requirements of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, of 23 May 1969 (United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 1155, p. 331), which reflect the rules of customary international law, to interpret that Article 625 in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the Treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose, taking into account any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties to the TCA (see, by analogy, judgments of 25 February 2010, Brita, C‑386/08, EU:C:2010:91, paragraphs 42 and 43, and of 21 January 2025, Conti 11. Container Schiffahrt II, C‑188/23, EU:C:2025:26, paragraph 47).

27

As regards, in the first place, the terms of Article 625 of the TCA, it must be observed that there is nothing in those terms to indicate that an executing judicial authority is obliged or has the power to refuse to execute an arrest warrant if there is information before it showing that, in the event of surrender, the speciality rule will not be complied with by the authorities of the issuing State.

28

Likewise, there is nothing in the terms of Article 625 of the TCA to indicate that the executing judicial authority is required, before ruling on the surrender of the requested person, to check whether the authorities of the issuing State are required to comply with the speciality rule or whether those authorities in fact comply, in practice, with that rule.

29

First, Article 625(1) of the TCA merely provides for a power, for a party to that agreement, to give a notification by which it is to be presumed to have consented to a derogation from the speciality rule. Moreover, that provision relates to a situation in which the surrender has already been made, since it expressly concerns an offence ‘other than that for which [the requested] person was surrendered’.

30

Therefore, although that Article 625(1) envisages the possibility for the executing judicial authority to take a position on the speciality rule in the ‘decision on surrender’, the purpose of taking such a position is not to refuse the surrender with a view to preventing a breach of the speciality rule, but to decide that that rule is to be applied, exceptionally, in a given case, by rejecting a preliminary decision of the executing State to consent, generally, to a derogation from that rule.

31

Secondly, Article 625(2) and (3) of the TCA sets out rules which are addressed not to the executing judicial authority but to the authorities of the issuing State. Article 625(2) expressly refers to the case of ‘a person surrendered’. Additionally, those rules only relate to repressive measures that may or may not be adopted in respect of the requested person after his or her surrender.

32

The executing judicial authority is referred to in Article 625(3)(e) and (g) of the TCA only incidentally, in that that authority could accept a requested person’s renunciation of entitlement to the speciality rule, in accordance with Article 611(1) of that agreement, or that authority could, after the surrender of that person, itself consent to a derogation from that rule, pursuant to Article 625(4) of the agreement.

33

Thirdly, while Article 625(4) of the TCA sets out the rules applicable essentially to the executing judicial authority, those rules relate exclusively to the conditions under which that authority must consent to it being possible for a person, who has previously been surrendered, to be prosecuted, sentenced or otherwise deprived of liberty for an offence committed prior to that person’s surrender other than that for which that person was surrendered, as envisaged by Article 625(3)(g) of the TCA.

34

In that regard, it should first of all be noted that that Article 625(3)(g) expressly provides that consent is given by ‘the executing judicial authority which surrendered the person’.

35

It follows, next, from the first sentence of Article 625(4) of the TCA that the request for consent submitted to the executing judicial authority is, as a rule, separate from the arrest warrant, with the result that it is not covered by the surrender procedure. That sentence states that that request must be ‘accompanied by the information referred to in Article 606(1) [of the TCA]’, namely the information that the arrest warrant must include, and that requirement would be devoid of purpose if that request were formulated in the framework of an arrest warrant.

36

Finally, the Court has held, in the context of Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States (OJ 2002 L 190, p. 1), that such consent is necessary only from the time when the criminal proceedings conducted in the issuing State for an offence other than that for which the person was surrendered gives rise to a measure involving the deprivation of liberty (see, to that effect, judgment of 1 December 2008, Leymann and Pustovarov, C‑388/08 PPU, EU:C:2008:669, paragraphs 73 and 74).

37

It follows from the elements referred to in paragraphs 34 to 36 of the present judgment that the consent referred to in Article 625(3)(g) and (4) of the TCA is, in principle, sought after the surrender of the requested person, which is an indication that compliance with the speciality rule is not intended to be examined by the executing judicial authority prior to the surrender and that it cannot therefore constitute a ground for refusing that surrender.

38

As regards, in the second place, the context of Article 625 of the TCA, Articles 600 and 601 of that agreement, which set out the cases in which the execution of an arrest warrant issued on the basis of that agreement must or may be refused (judgment of 29 July 2024, Alchaster, C‑202/24, EU:C:2024:649, paragraph 44), do not provide any grounds for refusing to execute the arrest warrant on the basis of a breach of the speciality rule by the authorities of the issuing State or, more generally, on the basis of the infringement of the rules of that agreement by those authorities. Articles 600 and 601 of the TCA do not contain, moreover, any reference or referral back to Article 625 of the TCA.

39

As regards, in the third place, the objectives of the TCA, it should be recalled that Article 1 of that agreement provides that it establishes the basis for a broad relationship between the European Union and the United Kingdom, within an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness characterised by close and peaceful relations based on cooperation, respectful of the parties’ autonomy and sovereignty.

40

To that end, the TCA seeks, inter alia, as is apparent from recital 23 of that agreement, to enhance the security of the European Union and of the United Kingdom by allowing cooperation relating to the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences and to the execution of criminal penalties, including the safeguarding against and prevention of threats to public security (judgment of 29 July 2024, Alchaster, C‑202/24, EU:C:2024:649, paragraph 40).

41

In the context of that cooperation, Title VII of Part Three of the TCA has the objective, in accordance with Article 596 of that agreement, of ensuring that the extradition system between the Member States, on the one side, and the United Kingdom, on the other side, is based on a mechanism of surrender pursuant to an arrest warrant in accordance with the terms of that title (judgment of 29 July 2024, Alchaster, C‑202/24, EU:C:2024:649, paragraph 43).

42

The efficiency of that surrender mechanism would be impeded if the executing judicial authority were to be called upon, generally, to ascertain, prior to ruling on the execution of an arrest warrant issued on the basis of the TCA, whether the provisions of that agreement relating to that mechanism are, in practice, fully complied with in the issuing State.

43

It follows from all the foregoing that Article 625 of the TCA cannot be interpreted as establishing a ground for refusal to execute an arrest warrant issued on the basis of that agreement.

44

That being said, Article 524(2) of the TCA states that no provision of Part Three of that agreement modifies the obligation to respect fundamental rights and legal principles as reflected, in particular, in the ECHR and, in the case of the European Union and its Member States, in the Charter.

45

The obligation to comply with the Charter, recalled in Article 524(2), is binding on the Member States when they decide on the surrender of a person to the United Kingdom, given that a decision on such a surrender constitutes an implementation of EU law within the meaning of Article 51(1) of the Charter. The executing judicial authorities of the Member States are therefore required, when adopting that decision, to ensure respect for the fundamental rights afforded by the Charter to the person who is the subject of an arrest warrant issued on the basis of the TCA, without the fact that the Charter is not applicable to the United Kingdom being relevant in that regard (judgment of 29 July 2024, Alchaster, C‑202/24, EU:C:2024:649, paragraph 49).

46

In particular, in accordance with Article 524(2) and Article 604(c) of the TCA, the executing judicial authority called upon to rule on an arrest warrant issued on the basis of that agreement cannot order the surrender of the requested person if it considers, following a specific and precise examination of that person’s situation, that there are valid reasons for believing that that person would run a real risk to the protection of his or her fundamental rights if he or she were surrendered to the United Kingdom (see, to that effect, judgment of 29 July 2024, Alchaster, C‑202/24, EU:C:2024:649, paragraph 78).

47

Therefore, where the person who is the subject of an arrest warrant issued on the basis of the TCA claims before that executing judicial authority that there is a risk of a breach of one or more of his or her fundamental rights if that person is surrendered to the United Kingdom, that executing judicial authority cannot, without disregarding the obligation to respect the fundamental rights enshrined in Article 524(2) of that agreement, order that surrender without having specifically determined, following an appropriate examination, whether there are valid reasons to believe that that person is exposed to a real risk of such a breach (see, to that effect, judgment of 29 July 2024, Alchaster, C‑202/24, EU:C:2024:649, paragraph 79).

48

In that regard, it should be observed that the speciality rule is not mentioned in the Charter and cannot be regarded as flowing directly from one of the rights guaranteed by the Charter or by a general principle of EU law.

49

In addition, it is not apparent from the TCA that its authors intended to confer on the requirement to comply with the speciality rule an equivalent value to that of a fundamental right for the purpose, inter alia, of applying Article 524(2) and Article 604(c) of that agreement.

50

It follows from Article 625 of that agreement that the authors thereof anticipated that the executing Member State could, before the surrender, and must, in principle, after the surrender, consent to a derogation from the speciality rule, without such a derogation having to be justified or it being required that the requested person consents to that derogation.

51

Accordingly, first, Article 625(1) of the TCA provides, as was noted in paragraph 29 of the present judgment, that the United Kingdom and the European Union, acting on behalf of any of its Member States, may each notify the Specialised Committee on Law Enforcement and Judicial Cooperation that, in relations with other States to which the same notification applies, consent is presumed to have been given for the prosecution, sentencing or detention of a person with a view to the carrying out of a custodial sentence or detention order for an offence committed prior to the person’s surrender, other than that for which that person was surrendered, unless in a particular case the executing judicial authority states otherwise in its decision on surrender.

52

The implementation of such a power therefore permits, in practice, the United Kingdom or each of the Member States to exclude, generally, from entitlement to the speciality rule persons whom they surrender pursuant to the TCA.

53

Second, it follows from Article 625(4) of the TCA that the executing judicial authority is required to consent, after the surrender of the requested person, to a derogation from the speciality rule in situations in which it would be obliged to carry out that surrender in the event of an arrest warrant being issued which referred to the offence at issue.

54

It follows from the foregoing that the requirement to comply with the speciality rule does not constitute a fundamental right and that the possible risk of a breach of that rule does not suffice, in itself, to justify the application of Article 524(2) and of Article 604(c) of the TCA.

55

Nevertheless, the existence of such a risk may be relevant, alongside other elements, for the purpose of assessing whether there is a real risk to the protection of fundamental rights within the meaning of that latter provision.

56

Accordingly, in the first place, Article 524(2) and Article 604(c) of the TCA require a refusal to execute an arrest warrant issued on the basis of that agreement in a situation in which the foreseeable infringement of the speciality rule leads to a real risk of a subsequent breach of the fundamental rights of the requested person, for example where the penalty that will be applied in infringement of that rule has been imposed on that person in breach of his or her rights of the defence and of his or her right to effective judicial protection.

57

However, the referring court does not disclose any risk of that order and has, on the contrary, explicitly stated that the proceedings leading to the conviction of the requested persons for contempt of court had been conducted in full compliance with their fundamental rights, with the result that it is not for the Court to examine, in the present case, that hypothesis of the application of Article 524(2) and of Article 604(c) of the TCA.

58

In the second place, it should be noted that amongst the fundamental rights, the real risk of the breach of which requires, pursuant to Article 524(2) and Article 604(c) of the TCA, the refusal to execute an arrest warrant issued on the basis of that agreement is the right enshrined in Article 47(1) of the Charter, which provides that everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by EU law are violated has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal (see, by analogy, judgment of 31 January 2023, Puig Gordiand Others, C‑158/21, EU:C:2023:57, paragraph 97).

59

Although the requirement to comply with the speciality rule does not constitute a fundamental right, the fact remains that that rule establishes, within the limits of its scope, a procedural guarantee offered to the requested person, which that person must be able to enjoy, unless he or she has waived it, under the conditions laid down in Article 611 of the TCA, or the executing State has consented to a derogation from that rule. Article 625 of that agreement therefore establishes a ‘[right] guaranteed by the law of the Union’ within the meaning of Article 47(1) of the Charter.

60

It follows that Article 47(1) of the Charter would be infringed if the requested person did not have, in the issuing State, any legal remedy enabling him or her to protect that right, by relying, after his or her surrender, on an alleged breach of the speciality rule, with a view to precluding him or her from being prosecuted, sentenced or deprived of his or her liberty in a situation where Article 625 of the TCA excludes such prosecution, sentencing or deprivation of liberty.

61

Moreover, in the context of the logic inherent in the surrender mechanism established by the TCA, the lack of jurisdiction of the executing judicial authority to apply the speciality rule itself is precisely the corollary of the requirement for the courts of the issuing State to ensure compliance with that rule.

62

It should be noted that, in the present case, it is apparent from the information provided by Ireland at the hearing that a person surrendered to the United Kingdom has, before the courts of that country, effective legal remedies enabling him or her to rely on an alleged breach of the speciality rule and to obtain a review by a court of the merits of the complaint raised in that regard.

63

The existence of such legal remedies, which it will be for the referring court to verify, would be sufficient to rule out the existence of a real risk of an infringement of Article 47(1) of the Charter in the event of surrender and, therefore, the application of Article 524(2) and Article 604(c) of the TCA.

64

In the event of doubt in that regard, the executing judicial authority may, in any event, refuse to act on an arrest warrant issued on the basis of the TCA only after first requesting from the issuing judicial authority information concerning the legal remedies available in the United Kingdom and, second, requiring the grant of additional guarantees (see, by analogy, judgment of 29 July 2024, Alchaster, C‑202/24, EU:C:2024:649, paragraphs 89 to 91).

65

Consequently, the answer to the questions referred is that Article 625 of the TCA must be interpreted as meaning that the fact that a person who is the subject of an arrest warrant, issued on the basis of that agreement for the purposes of conducting a criminal prosecution, has been sentenced, in the issuing State, to a six-month term of imprisonment for another offence, which is regarded as being a civil offence under the law of that State and which is not therefore covered by that arrest warrant, does not permit, in itself, an executing judicial authority to refuse to execute that arrest warrant.

66

Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the referring court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs of those parties, are not recoverable.

On those grounds, the Court (Third Chamber) hereby rules:

Article 625 of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, of the one part, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, of the other part

must be interpreted as meaning that the fact that a person who is the subject of an arrest warrant, issued on the basis of that agreement for the purposes of conducting a criminal prosecution, has been sentenced, in the issuing State, to a six-month term of imprisonment for another offence, which is regarded as being a civil offence under the law of that State and which is not therefore covered by that arrest warrant, does not permit, in itself, an executing judicial authority to refuse to execute that arrest warrant.