Provisional text
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (Second Chamber)
12 November 2026 (*)
( Action for annulment – Regulation (EU) 2023/851 – Strengthening of the performance standards in respect of CO2 emissions for new passenger cars and new light commercial vehicles – Article 1(1)(a) and (b) – Amendment to Regulation (EU) 2019/631 – Legal basis for Regulation 2023/851 – Determination – Account taken of the effects of the regulation – Article 192(1) TFEU – Point (c) of the first subparagraph of Article 192(2) TFEU – Measures significantly affecting a Member State’s choice between different energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply – Well-being of the peoples of the European Union – Promotion of social justice, sustainable economic development, economic, social and territorial cohesion, and solidarity among Member States – Promotion of a high level of employment and the fight against social exclusion – Non-discrimination on grounds of property – Principle of proportionality – Regularity of the impact assessment report for Regulation 2023/851 )
In Case C‑444/23,
ACTION for annulment under Article 263 TFEU, brought on 17 July 2023,
Republic of Poland, represented by B. Majczyna, acting as Agent,
applicant,
v
European Parliament, represented by W.D. Kuzmienko and L. Taïeb, acting as Agents,
Council of the European Union, represented initially by R. Boucquey, A. Maceroni, M. Moore and A. Sikora-Kalėda, acting as Agents, and subsequently by R. Boucquey, A. Maceroni, M. Moore, acting as Agents, and lastly by A. Maceroni and M. Moore and K. Pleśniak, acting as Agents,
defendants,
supported by:
European Commission, represented by B. De Meester, D. Milanowska, M. Owsiany-Hornung and K. Talabér-Ritz, acting as Agents,
intervener,
THE COURT (Second Chamber),
composed of K. Jürimäe, President of Chamber, K. Lenaerts, President of the Court, acting as a Judge of the Second Chamber, Z. Csehi, M. Gavalec (Rapporteur) and F. Schalin, Judges,
Advocate General: T. Ćapeta,
Registrar: V. Di Bucci,
having regard to the written procedure,
having decided, after hearing the Advocate General, to proceed to judgment without an Opinion,
gives the following
Judgment
1 By its application, the Republic of Poland asks the Court to annul Regulation (EU) 2023/851 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 April 2023 amending Regulation (EU) 2019/631 as regards strengthening the CO2 emission performance standards for new passenger cars and new light commercial vehicles in line with the Union’s increased climate ambition (OJ 2023 L 110, p. 5; ‘the contested regulation’).
Legal context
International law
2 On 9 May 1992, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 1771, p. 107; ‘the UNFCCC’) was adopted in New York (United States), of which Article 3, entitled ‘Principles’, provides in paragraph 1:
‘The parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country parties should take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof.’
3 The Paris Agreement adopted on 12 December 2015 under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (OJ 2016 L 282, p. 4; ‘the Paris Agreement’) was approved on behalf of the European Union by Council Decision (EU) 2016/1841of 5 October 2016 (OJ 2016 L 282, p. 1).
4 Article 2(2) of that agreement provides:
‘This Agreement will be implemented to reflect equity and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances.’
European Union law
The EU Treaty
5 Article 3 TEU provides, in paragraphs 1 and 3:
‘1. The [European] Union’s aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples.
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3. The Union shall establish an internal market. It shall work for the sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic growth and price stability, a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress, and a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment. It shall promote scientific and technological advance.
It shall combat social exclusion and discrimination, and shall promote social justice and protection, equality between women and men, solidarity between generations and protection of the rights of the child.
It shall promote economic, social and territorial cohesion, and solidarity among Member States.
…’
6 Article 5 TEU provides, in paragraph 4:
‘Under the principle of proportionality, the content and form of Union action shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties.
The institutions of the Union shall apply the principle of proportionality as laid down in the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.’
7 Article 6(1) TEU provides:
‘The Union recognises the rights, freedoms and principles set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 7 December 2000, as adapted at Strasbourg, on 12 December 2007 [(“the Charter”)], which shall have the same legal value as the Treaties.
…’
The FEU Treaty
8 Article 9 TFEU provides:
‘In defining and implementing its policies and activities, the Union shall take into account requirements linked to the promotion of a high level of employment, the guarantee of adequate social protection, the fight against social exclusion, and a high level of education, training and protection of human health.’
9 Article 11 TFEU is worded as follows:
‘Environmental protection requirements must be integrated into the definition and implementation of the Union’s policies and activities, in particular with a view to promoting sustainable development.’
10 Article 191(2) and (3) TFEU provides:
‘2. Union policy on the environment shall aim at a high level of protection taking into account the diversity of situations in the various regions of the Union. It shall be based on the precautionary principle and on the principles that preventive action should be taken, that environmental damage should as a priority be rectified at source and that the polluter should pay.
In this context, harmonisation measures answering environmental protection requirements shall include, where appropriate, a safeguard clause allowing Member States to take provisional measures, for non-economic environmental reasons, subject to a procedure of inspection by the Union.
3. In preparing its policy on the environment, the Union shall take account of:
– available scientific and technical data,
– environmental conditions in the various regions of the Union,
– the potential benefits and costs of action or lack of action,
– the economic and social development of the Union as a whole and the balanced development of its regions.’
11 Article 192(1) TFEU and Article 192(2)(c) TFEU provide:
‘1. The European Parliament and the Council [of the European Union], acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure and after consulting the [European] Economic and Social Committee and the [European] Committee of the Regions, shall decide what action is to be taken by the Union in order to achieve the objectives referred to in Article 191.
2. By way of derogation from the decision-making procedure provided for in paragraph 1 and without prejudice to Article 114, the Council acting unanimously in accordance with a special legislative procedure and after consulting the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, shall adopt:
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(c) measures significantly affecting a Member State’s choice between different energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply.’
The Charter
12 Article 21 of the Charter provides, in paragraph 1:
‘Any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation shall be prohibited.’
Regulation (EU) 2018/1999
13 Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on the Governance of the Energy Union and Climate Action, amending Regulations (EC) No 663/2009 and (EC) No 715/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council, Directives 94/22/EC, 98/70/EC, 2009/31/EC, 2009/73/EC, 2010/31/EU, 2012/27/EU and 2013/30/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, Council Directives 2009/119/EC and (EU) 2015/652 and repealing Regulation (EU) No 525/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ 2018 L 328, p. 1), as amended by Regulation (EU) 2021/1119 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 2021 (OJ 2021 L 243, p. 1), includes, in the version applicable in the present case, Articles 4 and 5, entitled, respectively, ‘National objectives, targets and contributions for the five dimensions of the Energy Union’ and ‘Member States’ contribution setting process in the area of renewable energy’.
Directive (EU) 2018/2001
14 Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources (OJ 2018 L 328, p.82) includes Article 3, entitled ‘Binding overall Union target for 2030’, paragraphs 1 and 5 of which provide:
‘1. Member States shall collectively ensure that the share of energy from renewable sources in the Union’s gross final consumption of energy in 2030 is at least 32%. …
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5. The Commission shall support the high ambition of Member States through an enabling framework comprising the enhanced use of Union funds, including additional funds to facilitate a just transition of carbon intensive regions towards increased shares of renewable energy, in particular financial instruments …’
Regulation (EU) 2019/631
15 Recitals 3, 4, 17, 27 and 51 of Regulation (EU) 2019/631 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 setting CO2 emission performance standards for new passenger cars and for new light commercial vehicles, and repealing Regulations (EC) No 443/2009 and (EU) No 510/2011 (OJ 2019 L 111, p. 13) as amended by Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2021/1961 of 5 August 2021 (OJ 2021 L 400, p. 14) (‘Regulation 2019/631’) state:
‘(3) The Paris Agreement … sets out, inter alia, a long-term goal in line with the objective to keep the global average temperature increase well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to keep it to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels. The latest scientific findings reported by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in its special report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways unequivocally confirm the negative impacts of climate change. That special report concludes that emissions reductions in all sectors are crucial to limit global warming.
(4) In order to contribute to the objectives of the Paris Agreement, the transformation of the entire transport sector towards zero emissions … to achieve the transition to net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050. Emissions of air pollutants from transport that significantly harm our health and the environment need also to be drastically reduced without delay. Emissions from conventional combustion engine vehicles will need to be further reduced after 2020. Zero- and low-emission vehicles will need to be deployed and gain significant market share by 2030. Further CO2 emissions reductions for passenger cars and light commercial vehicles will be necessary beyond 2030.
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(17) Emissions reduction targets for the Union-wide fleets of new passenger cars and light commercial vehicles should, therefore, be set for 2025 and for 2030, taking into account the vehicle fleet renewal time and the need for the road transport sector to contribute to the 2030 climate and energy targets. That stepwise approach also provides a clear and early signal for the automotive industry not to delay the market introduction of energy efficient technologies and zero- and low-emission vehicles.
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(27) This Regulation aims to achieve its objectives by, inter alia, creating incentives for the automotive industry to invest in new technologies. This Regulation actively promotes eco-innovation …
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(51) In 2024, a review of the progress achieved under Regulation (EU) 2018/842 [of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2018 on binding annual greenhouse gas emission reductions by Member States from 2021 to 2030 contributing to climate action to meet commitments under the Paris Agreement and amending Regulation (EU) No 525/2013 (OJ 2018 L 156, p. 26)] and Directive 2003/87/EC [of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC (OJ 2003 L 275, p. 32)] will take place. It is therefore appropriate to review comprehensively the effectiveness of this Regulation in 2023 to allow a coordinated and coherent assessment of the measures implemented under all those instruments. In that review of 2023, the Commission should also identify a clear pathway for further CO2 emissions reductions for passenger cars and light commercial vehicles beyond 2030 in order to significantly contribute to achieving the long-term goal of the Paris Agreement. Where appropriate, the report on that review should be accompanied by a proposal to amend this Regulation.’
16 Article 1 of Regulation 2019/631, entitled ‘Subject matter and objectives’, provides in paragraphs 4 and 5:
‘4. From 1 January 2025, the following EU fleet-wide targets shall apply:
(a) for the average emissions of the new passenger car fleet, an EU fleet-wide target equal to a 15% reduction of the target in 2021 determined in accordance with point 6.1.1 of Part A of Annex I;
(b) for the average emissions of the new light commercial vehicles fleet, an EU fleet-wide target equal to a 15% reduction of the target in 2021 determined in accordance with point 6.1.1 of Part B of Annex I.
5. From 1 January 2030, the following EU fleet-wide targets shall apply:
(a) for the average emissions of the new passenger car fleet, an EU fleet-wide target equal to a 37.5% reduction of the target in 2021 determined in accordance with point 6.1.2 of Part A of Annex I;
(b) for the average emissions of the new light commercial vehicles fleet, an EU fleet-wide target equal to a 31% reduction of the target in 2021 determined in accordance with point 6.1.2 of Part B of Annex I.’
European Climate Law
17 Regulation (EU) 2021/1119 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 2021 establishing the framework for achieving climate neutrality and amending Regulations (EC) No 401/2009 and (EU) 2018/1999 (‘European Climate Law’) (OJ 2021 L 243, p. 1), includes Article 2, entitled ‘Climate-neutrality objective’, paragraph 1 of which is worded as follows:
‘Union-wide greenhouse gas emissions and removals regulated in Union law shall be balanced within the Union at the latest by 2050, thus reducing emissions to net zero by that date, and the Union shall aim to achieve negative emissions thereafter.’
18 Article 4 of that law, entitled ‘Intermediate Union climate targets’, provides in paragraph 1:
‘In order to reach the climate-neutrality objective set out in Article 2(1), the binding Union 2030 climate target shall be a domestic reduction of net greenhouse gas emissions (emissions after deduction of removals) by at least 55% compared to 1990 levels by 2030.
When implementing the target referred to in the first subparagraph, the relevant Union institutions and the Member States shall prioritise swift and predictable emission reductions and, at the same time, enhance removals by natural sinks.
…’
The contested regulation
19 Recitals 1 to 3, 7, 9, 10, 12 to 15, 17, 20 to 22 of the contested regulation state:
‘(1) The Paris Agreement … entered into force on 4 November 2016. The Parties to the Paris Agreement have agreed to hold the increase in the global average temperature well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels. That commitment has been reinforced with the adoption under the UNFCCC of the Glasgow Climate Pact on 13 November 2021, in which the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC, serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement, recognises that the impacts of climate change will be much lower at a temperature increase of 1.5 °C, compared with 2 °C, and resolves to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C.
(2) Tackling climate- and environmental-related challenges and reaching the objectives of the Paris Agreement are at the core of the communication of the Commission of 11 December 2019 on “The European Green Deal” (the “European Green Deal”). …
(3) The European Green Deal combines a comprehensive set of mutually reinforcing measures and initiatives aimed at achieving climate neutrality in the Union by 2050, and sets out a new growth strategy focused on transforming the Union into a fair and prosperous society, with a modern, resource-efficient and competitive economy, with vibrant industries that remain world-leaders in their respective segments and global innovation drivers, while securing high-paid quality jobs in the Union. It also aims to protect, conserve and enhance the Union’s natural capital, and protect the health and well-being of citizens from environment-related risks and impacts. … [T]he transition will affect regions of the Union differently, especially structurally disadvantaged, peripheral and outermost regions. It must therefore be ensured that the transition is just and inclusive, leaving no one behind.
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(7) The digital and green transitions should also address the importance of the social dimension to ensure that mobility is affordable for and accessible to all, especially commuters without access to quality public transport or other mobility solutions. More ambitious CO2 standards for passenger cars and light commercial vehicles are expected to accelerate the uptake of zero-emission vehicles, increase their affordability and also accelerate the decarbonisation of the second-hand market in all segments, with greater benefits for low- and middle-income consumers. When adopting those standards it is also important to take into account the significant economic and social consequences of the digital and green transitions and the need to safeguard employment and preserve the competitiveness of Union industry.
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(9) In order to achieve a reduction in net greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55% compared to 1990 levels by 2030, it is necessary to strengthen the reduction requirements set out in Regulation [2019/631] for both passenger cars and light commercial vehicles. A clear pathway also needs to be set for further reductions beyond 2030 to contribute to achieving the climate-neutrality objective by 2050. Without ambitious action on greenhouse gas emissions reductions in road transport, higher emissions reductions would be needed in other sectors, including sectors where decarbonisation is more challenging.
(10) The strengthened CO2 emissions reduction requirements should encourage an increasing share of zero-emission vehicles to be deployed on the Union market while providing benefits to consumers and citizens in terms of air quality, strengthening energy security and efficiency, and the associated energy savings, as well as ensuring that innovation in the automotive value chain can be maintained. Within the global context, the Union automotive value chain must be a leading actor in the ongoing transition towards zero-emission mobility. The strengthened CO2 emissions reduction standards are technology neutral in reaching the fleet-wide targets that they set. Different technologies are and remain available to reach the zero-emission fleet-wide target. Zero-emission vehicles currently include battery electric vehicles, fuel-cell and other hydrogen powered vehicles, and technological innovations are continuing. …
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(12) Against that background, new strengthened CO2 emissions reduction targets should be set for both new passenger cars and new light commercial vehicles from 2030 onwards. Those targets should be set at a level that will deliver a strong signal to accelerate the uptake of zero-emission vehicles on the Union market and to stimulate innovation in zero-emission technologies in a cost-efficient way.
(13) Technological innovation is a prerequisite for decarbonising mobility in the Union, and should therefore be supported. Significant funding is already available for innovation in the mobility ecosystem through different Union funding instruments, in particular Horizon Europe – the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation, established by Regulation (EU) 2021/695 of the European Parliament and of the Council [of 28 April 2021 establishing Horizon Europe – the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation, laying down its rules for participation and dissemination, and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1290/2013 and (EU) No 1291/2013 (OJ 2021 L 170, p. 1)], InvestEU, established by Regulation (EU) 2021/523 of the European Parliament and of the Council [of 24 March 2021 establishing the InvestEU Programme and amending Regulation (EU) 2015/1017 (OJ 2021 L 107, p. 30)], the European Regional Development Fund, the Cohesion Fund, the innovation fund, established by Directive [2003/87] and the Recovery and Resilience Facility, established by Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council [of 12 February 2021 establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility (OJ 2021 L 57, p. 17)]. The Union and Member States should continue their efforts to support public and private investment in European automotive research and innovation, including through initiatives that promote synergies in the automotive sector, such as the European Battery Alliance. Together with clear regulatory signals, those efforts will support and encourage investment decisions from manufacturers, maintain European technological leadership in that sector, help to develop industrial excellence in the technologies of the future in the Union and ensure the long-term sustainability and competitiveness of its industrial base.
(14) The targets in the revised CO2 performance standards should be accompanied by a Union strategy to address the challenges posed by the scale-up of the manufacturing of zero-emission vehicles and associated technologies, while considering the specificities of each Member State, as well as the need for up- and re-skilling of workers in the sector and the economic diversification and reconversion of activities, while maintaining automotive employment levels in the Union. Particular attention should be given to the impact that this transition will have on micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) along the automotive supply chain and to affected regions and communities which might be more vulnerable due to the presence of an intensive automotive industry. Where appropriate, financial support should be considered at Union and Member State level to crowd in private investment, including via the European Social Fund Plus, established by Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 of the European Parliament and of the Council [of 24 June 2021 establishing the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1296/2013 (OJ 2021 L 231, p. 21)], the Just Transition Fund, established by Regulation (EU) 2021/1056 of the European Parliament and of the Council [of 24 June 2021 establishing the Just Transition Fund (OJ 2021 L 231, p. 1)], the innovation fund, the European Regional Development Fund, the Cohesion Fund, the Recovery and Resilience Facility and other instruments of the multiannual financial framework set out in Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 [of 17 December 2020 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027 (OJ 2020 L 433 I, p. 11)] and the European Union Recovery Instrument, established by Council Regulation (EU) 2020/2094 [of 14 December 2020 establishing a European Union Recovery Instrument to support the recovery in the aftermath of the COVID-19 crisis (OJ 2020 L 433 I, p. 23)], in line with State aid rules and other available financial instruments, such as from the European Investment Bank.
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(15) In order to identify any funding gaps in ensuring a just transition in the automotive supply chain, and with particular attention for SMEs and the regions that are most affected by the transition towards a climate-neutral economy, the Commission should, by 31 December 2025, at the date of submission of the first progress report, and building on ongoing initiatives, such as the transition pathway for the mobility ecosystem and the Automotive Regions Alliance of the Committee of the Regions, in cooperation with Member States, regions and local authorities and all relevant stakeholders, present a report with an analysis identifying such funding gaps. That report should be accompanied, where appropriate, by proposals for adequate financial measures to address the needs identified.
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(17) In order to protect the environment and the health of citizens in all Member States it is important to also decarbonise the existing fleet. The market for second-hand vehicles creates the risk of shifting CO2 emissions, as well as air pollution, to less economically developed regions in the Union. To speed up the reduction of emissions from the existing fleet and to accelerate the transition to zero-emission transport, it is of the utmost importance to encourage the conversion of internal combustion engine vehicles to battery or fuel-cell electric drive, including by assessing how to facilitate the deployment of such solutions in Member States.
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(20) The EU fleet-wide targets are to be complemented by the necessary roll-out of recharging and refuelling infrastructure to be set out in the Regulation on alternative fuels infrastructure and in a recast of Directive 2010/31/EU [of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 2010 on the energy performance of buildings (OJ 2010 L 153, p. 13)]. In that context, it is vital that investment in the necessary infrastructure deployment is continued and increased. In parallel, it is of utmost importance to ensure a swift deployment of renewable energy, as provided for in Directive [2018/2001].
(21) Manufacturers should be provided with sufficient flexibility in adapting their fleets over time in order to manage the transition towards zero-emission vehicles in a cost-efficient manner in a way which supports their competitiveness and prepares the ground for further innovations. It is therefore appropriate to maintain the approach of decreasing target levels in five-year steps.
(22) With the stricter EU fleet-wide targets from 2030 onwards, manufacturers will have to deploy significantly more zero-emission vehicles on the Union market. …’
20 Article 1 of the contested regulation provides, in paragraphs 1 and 12:
‘Regulation [2019/631] amended as follows:
(1) Article 1 is amended as follows:
(a) paragraph 5 is amended as follows:
(i) in point (a), the figure “37.5%” is replaced by “55%”;
(ii) in point (b), the figure “31%” is replaced by “50%”;
(b) the following paragraph is inserted:
“5a. From 1 January 2035, the following EU fleet-wide targets shall apply:
(a) for the average emissions of the new passenger car fleet, an EU fleet-wide target equal to a 100% reduction of the target in 2021 determined in accordance with Part A, point 6.1.3, of Annex I;
(b) for the average emissions of the new light commercial vehicles fleet, an EU fleet-wide target equal to a 100% reduction of the target in 2021 determined in accordance with Part B, point 6.1.3, of Annex I.”;
…
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(12) the following Article is inserted:
“Article 14a
Progress report
1. By 31 December 2025, and every two years thereafter, the Commission shall submit a report to the European Parliament and to the Council on the progress towards zero-emission road mobility. The report shall in particular monitor and assess the need for possible additional measures to facilitate a just transition, including through financial means.
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3. At the date of submission of the first progress report referred to in paragraph 1, the Commission shall also, in cooperation with Member States and all relevant stakeholders, submit a report to the European Parliament and to the Council which includes an analysis to identify any funding gaps in ensuring a just transition in the automotive supply chain, with particular attention for SMEs and the regions that are most affected by the transition. The report shall, where appropriate, be accompanied by proposals for adequate financial measures to address the needs identified.”’
Regulation (EU) 2023/1804
21 Article 1(1) of Regulation (EU) 2023/1804 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 September 2023 on the deployment of alternative fuels infrastructure, and repealing Directive 2014/94/EU (OJ 2023 L 234, p. 1) provides:
‘This Regulation establishes mandatory national targets leading to the deployment of sufficient alternative fuels infrastructure in the Union for road vehicles, trains, vessels and stationary aircraft. …’
22 Article 3 of that regulation, entitled ‘Targets for recharging infrastructure dedicated to light-duty electric vehicles’, provides in paragraphs 1 and 4:
‘1. Member States shall ensure that, in their territory, publicly accessible recharging stations dedicated to light-duty electric vehicles are deployed in a way that is commensurate with the uptake of light-duty electric vehicles and that they provide sufficient power output for those vehicles.
To that end, Member States shall ensure that, at the end of each year, starting from 2024, the following power output targets are met cumulatively:
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4. Member States shall ensure a minimum coverage of publicly accessible recharging points dedicated to light-duty electric vehicles on the road network in their territory.
To that end, Member States shall ensure that:
(a) along the [trans-European transport network core road network] publicly accessible recharging pools dedicated to light-duty electric vehicles and meeting the following requirements are deployed in each direction of travel with a maximum distance of 60 km between them:
…’
The Agreement on ‘better law-making’
23 Point 12 of the Interinstitutional Agreement between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on Better Law-Making of 13 April 2016 (OJ 2016 L 123, p. 1; ‘the Agreement on better law-making’), which appears in Chapter III thereof, entitled ‘Tools for better law-making’, states:
‘The three Institutions agree on the positive contribution of impact assessments in improving the quality of Union legislation.
Impact assessments are a tool to help the three Institutions reach well-informed decisions and not a substitute for political decisions within the democratic decision-making process. Impact assessments must not lead to undue delays in the law-making process or prejudice the co-legislators’ capacity to propose amendments.
Impact assessments should cover the existence, scale and consequences of a problem and the question whether or not Union action is needed. They should map out alternative solutions and, where possible, potential short and long-term costs and benefits, assessing the economic, environmental and social impacts in an integrated and balanced way and using both qualitative and quantitative analyses. The principles of subsidiarity and proportionality should be fully respected, as should fundamental rights. Impact assessments should also address, whenever possible, the “cost of non-Europe” and the impact on competitiveness and the administrative burdens of the different options, having particular regard to [small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)] (“Think Small First”), digital aspects and territorial impact. Impact assessments should be based on accurate, objective and complete information and should be proportionate as regards their scope and focus.’
Forms of order sought and procedure before the Court of Justice
24 The Republic of Poland claims that the Court should:
– annul the contested regulation in its entirety;
– in the alternative, annul Article 1(1)(b) of that regulation; and
– order the Parliament and the Council to pay the costs.
25 The Parliament contends that the Court should:
– dismiss the action; and
– order the Republic of Poland to pay the costs.
26 The Council claims that the Court should:
– dismiss the action in its entirety as unfounded; and
– order the Republic of Poland to pay the costs.
27 By decision of the President of the Court of 15 November 2023, the Commission was granted leave to intervene in support of the forms of order sought by the Parliament and the Council.
The action
28 In support of its action, the Republic of Poland raises four pleas in law, alleging an infringement of, first, point (c) of the first subparagraph of Article 192(2) TFEU; second, Article 3(1) and (3) TEU, Article 9 TFEU and Article 6(1) TEU, read in the light of Article 21 of the Charter; third, the principle of proportionality enshrined in Article 5(4) TEU, interpreted together with Article 191(2) TFEU; and fourth, the obligation to carry out an impact assessment for the contested regulation and also Article 191(3) TFEU.
First plea in law: infringement of point (c) of the first subparagraph of Article 192(2) TFEU
Arguments of the parties
29 By its first plea in law, the Republic of Poland submits that the contested regulation should have been adopted not on the basis of Article 192(1) TFEU, but on the basis of point (c) of the first subparagraph of Article 192(2) TFEU, under which, by way of an exception to the decision-making procedure provided for in Article 192(1) TFEU, the Council must act unanimously when adopting measures significantly affecting a Member State’s choice between different energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply.
30 In the first place, it submits that that regulation significantly affects the freedom of the Member States to determine the structure of their energy supply, with the result that it should have been based on point (c) of the first subparagraph of Article 192(2) TFEU, in accordance with the lex specialis principle, failing which that provision would remain a dead letter. If it were otherwise, it would be sufficient for the EU legislature to claim that an act does not have the objective of influencing a Member State’s choice between different energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply in order for point (c) of the first subparagraph of Article 192(2) TFEU not to apply. Taken together with the other outcomes of the ‘Fit for 55’ legislative package, the impact of the contested regulation on the structure of its energy supply is not incidental or negligible.
31 In addition, it is apparent, in particular, from recitals 10, 12, 17 and 20 to 22 of that regulation that the setting of strengthened CO2 emission reduction standards is primarily intended to enable an increasing number of zero-emission vehicles to be introduced into the EU market, as well as to accelerate the reduction of emissions generated by the existing vehicle fleet and the transition to non-emission transport.
32 Article 1(1)(b) of that regulation is disruptive in that it condemns, de facto, combustion engine technology. Whereas Article 1(4) and (5) of Regulation 2019/631 provided for a gradual reduction in the CO2 emissions targets from 15% for 2025 to 37.5% for 2030 for the fleet of new passenger cars and from 15% for 2025 to 31% for the fleet of light commercial vehicles for 2030, the contested regulation completely prohibits CO2 emissions for those two types of vehicles from 2035.
33 Since that regulation thus provides for the use only of non-emitting energy sources to fuel vehicles, the direct consequence of that regulation is an increase in electricity consumption, which the Commission Staff Working Document of 14 July 2021, entitled ‘Impact Assessment, Part 1 accompanying the document Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2019/631 as regards strengthening the CO2 emission performance standards for new passenger cars and new light commercial vehicles in line with the Union’s increased climate ambition’ (‘the impact assessment’), corroborates by pointing out that the electricity consumption of passenger cars and light commercial vehicles in the total electricity consumption of the whole European Union, which was zero in 2015, should reach more than 10% in 2040 (Figure 12, p. 44, of that assessment). Such an additional demand for electricity would make it necessary to increase its production or import it, in order to replace energy obtained from combustion engines.
34 The Republic of Poland disputes the argument that energy demand will decrease as a result of the efficiency gains in electric motors. It is true that the impact assessment indicates that energy consumption should be reduced as a result of the renewal of the fleet of vehicles. However, that would apply only to the most well-off persons. It cannot reasonably be assumed that such a development will arise in Poland, at least not to the same extent as in wealthier Member States.
35 Moreover, the contested regulation does not fall within the framework previously established by Regulation 2019/631, which had been adopted on the basis of Article 192(1) TFEU. To consider that an act amending an EU legal act must necessarily have the same legal basis as the act it amends would imply that the amendments made to that act could be based on the initial legal basis, irrespective of the aim and content of the changes introduced. The European Union would then have an unlimited general regulatory competence applicable for any purpose, which would be contrary to the principle of conferral of powers. The Republic of Poland also observes that elements of the ‘Fit for 55’ package were adopted on various different legal bases.
36 Lastly, the Republic of Poland underlines that, while it is true that whether a legal basis chosen at the time of the adoption of an act is appropriate cannot depend on a subsequent analysis of any factual effects arising after the entry into force of that act, the EU legislature cannot, however, be relieved of its duty to examine precisely and exhaustively the effects of the proposed measures.
37 In the second place, the Republic of Poland submits that it is disproportionate to set a target of 100% reduction of CO2 emissions by 2035 in order to contribute to the achievement of the climate-neutrality objective for 2050. The reduction of those emissions should be progressive and proportionate. It is unlikely that by 2035 new innovative technologies will be introduced and sufficiently developed to replace the combustion engine.
38 In the third place, the Republic of Poland disputes the alleged impossibility of reducing CO2 emissions in the transport sector less and reducing those in other sectors more.
39 The Parliament and the Council, supported by the Commission, contend that the first plea in law should be rejected as unfounded.
Findings of the Court
40 By its first plea, the Republic of Poland submits that the contested regulation should have been based on point (c) of the first subparagraph of Article 192(2) TFEU and that, in essence, it infringes the principle of proportionality.
41 As regards the argument that the contested regulation should have been based on point (c) of the first subparagraph of Article 192(2) TFEU, it should be recalled that the choice of Article 192(2) TFEU as the legal basis for a measure is based on the same factors as those consistently taken into account by the Court in its case-law (judgment of 21 June 2018, Poland v Parliament and Council, C‑5/16, EU:C:2018:483, paragraphs 37 to 39).
42 The Court has repeatedly held, first, that the choice of the legal basis for a measure may not depend simply on an institution’s conviction as to the aim pursued but must rest on objective factors which are amenable to judicial review, such as the aim and content of the measure itself (see, to that effect, judgments of 26 March 1987, Commission v Council, 45/86, EU:C:1987:163, paragraph 11; of 29 April 2004, Commission v Council, C‑338/01, EU:C:2004:253, paragraph 54; and of 16 February 2022, Poland v Parliament and Council, C‑157/21, EU:C:2022:98, paragraph 121).
43 In that regard, if the choice of the legal basis for a legislative measure depended on the assessment of its likely impact, which, by its nature, is speculative, only an ex post analysis would make it possible to ascertain the real and specific effects of such a measure. That assessment cannot therefore in any way constitute an objective factor amenable to judicial review (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 June 2018, Poland v Parliament and Council, C‑5/16, EU:C:2018:483, paragraph 41).
44 Furthermore, it is settled case-law that the legality of an EU act cannot depend on retrospective considerations of its efficacy (judgments of 7 February 1973, Schroeder, 40/72, EU:C:1973:14, paragraph 14; of 5 October 1994, Crispoltoni and Others, C‑133/93, C‑300/93 and C‑362/93, EU:C:1994:364, paragraph 43; and of 12 July 2001, Jippes and Others, C‑189/01, EU:C:2001:420, paragraph 84).
45 It follows that the assessment of the expected effect of an EU act on the energy policy of a Member State may be taken into consideration only in the context of the assessment of the aim or content of that act (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 June 2018, Poland v Parliament and Council, C‑5/16, EU:C:2018:483, paragraph 42).
46 Second, the choice of the legal basis for a measure may also be based on its context, provided that that context is capable of shedding light on the objective pursued by that measure (see, to that effect, judgments of 27 February 2014, United Kingdom v Council, C‑656/11, EU:C:2014:97, paragraph 50; of 3 December 2019, Czech Republic v Parliament and Council, C‑482/17, EU:C:2019:1035, paragraph 32; of 8 December 2020, Hungary v Parliament and Council, C‑620/18, EU:C:2020:1001, paragraph 39; and of 16 February 2022, Poland v Parliament and Council, C‑157/21, EU:C:2022:98, paragraph 122).
47 On that point, a distinction must be drawn between an act analogous to a pre-existing act and an act which amends a pre-existing act. According to the case-law, a legal basis for a measure must be determined autonomously, having regard to its own aim and content, and not to the legal basis used for the adoption of other EU measures that might, in certain cases, display similar characteristics (judgments of 10 January 2006, Commission v Parliament and Council, C‑178/03, EU:C:2006:4, paragraph 55, and of 21 June 2018, Poland v Parliament and Council, C‑5/16, EU:C:2018:483, paragraph 49). By contrast, in the case of a measure amending existing rules, it is important to take into account, for the purposes of identifying the legal basis for that measure, the existing rules which it amends and, in particular, their objective and content (judgments of 3 December 2019, Czech Republic v Parliament and Council, C‑482/17, EU:C:2019:1035, paragraph 42, and of 8 December 2020, Hungary v Parliament and Council, C‑620/18, EU:C:2020:1001, paragraph 40).
48 Third, if examination of an EU measure reveals that it pursues several purposes or that it comprises several components and if one of those purposes or components is identifiable as the main or predominant purpose or component, whereas the others are merely incidental or are only extremely limited in scope, the legal basis for adopting that measure must be determined in accordance with that main purpose or component (see, to that effect, judgments of 23 February 1999, Parliament v Council, C‑42/97, EU:C:1999:81, paragraphs 39 and 40; of 8 December 2020, Hungary v Parliament and Council, C‑620/18, EU:C:2020:1001, paragraph 38; and of 21 March 2024, Landeshauptstadt Wiesbaden, C‑61/22, EU:C:2024:251, paragraph 47).
49 Fourth, a broad interpretation of the first subparagraph of Article 192(2) TFEU would risk having the effect of turning recourse to the special legislative procedure into the general rule, whereas the FEU Treaty intended it to be an exception. In accordance with the principle that exceptions must be interpreted strictly, point (c) of the first subparagraph of Article 192(2) TFEU can form the legal basis of an EU measure only if it follows from the aim and content of that measure that the primary outcome sought by that measure is significantly to affect a Member State’s choice between different energy sources and the general structure of the energy supply of that Member State (judgment of 21 June 2018, Poland v Parliament and Council, C‑5/16, EU:C:2018:483, paragraphs 44 to 46).
50 In the present case, the contested regulation amends Regulation 2019/631, in particular by inserting new provisions, with the result that the latter regulation constitutes the legal context of the contested regulation. Accordingly, it is necessary, in accordance with the case-law referred to in paragraph 47 of the present judgment, to identify the legal basis on which the contested regulation had to be adopted, taking into account both the context constituted by Regulation 2019/631 and the legislation resulting from the amendments made to that regulation by the contested regulation.
51 Recitals 1 to 3, 9, 12 and 13 of that regulation show that that regulation pursues the same objective as Regulation 2019/631, namely to reduce net greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 compared to levels achieved in 1990 in the transport sector covered by those regulations in order to achieve net zero greenhouse gas emissions within the European Union by 2050, and with a view to achieving the objectives of the Paris Agreement.
52 In line with recitals 3 and 4 of Regulation 2019/631, recitals 1 to 3 of the contested regulation state that, in order to hold the increase in the average global temperature well below 2 °C compared to pre-industrial levels and to continue the action taken to limit that increase to 1.5 °C compared to pre-industrial levels, the European Union has put in place a comprehensive set of measures and initiatives, of which Regulation 2019/631 forms part, the aim of which is to achieve a level of net zero greenhouse gas emissions in the European Union by 2050.
53 In particular, recital 1 of the contested regulation observes that the commitment made by the European Union under the Paris Agreement to combat climate change, which had justified the adoption of Regulation 2019/631, as recital 3 of that regulation states, ‘has been reinforced with the adoption under the UNFCCC of the Glasgow Climate Pact on 13 November 2021’.
54 Recital 9 of the contested regulation also emphasises the need to strengthen the reduction requirements laid down in Regulation 2019/631 for passenger cars and light commercial vehicles in order to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55% by 2030 compared to 1990 levels. That recital states, in addition, that ‘a clear pathway also needs to be set for further reductions beyond 2030 to contribute to achieving the climate-neutrality objective by 2050.’
55 In stating that ‘new strengthened CO2 emissions reduction targets should be set for both new passenger cars and new light commercial vehicles from 2030 onwards [and that those] targets should be set at a level that will deliver a strong signal to accelerate the uptake of zero-emission vehicles on the Union market and to stimulate innovation in zero-emission technologies in a cost-efficient way’, recital 12 of the contested regulation is also in line with Regulation 2019/631. Recital 17 of Regulation 2019/631 already stated that the ‘stepwise approach [it adopted] also [provided] a clear and early signal for the automotive industry not to delay the market introduction of energy efficient technologies and zero- and low-emission vehicles’.
56 In addition, in the same way as that regulation sought to actively encourage eco-innovation, as stated in recital 27 thereof, recital 13 of the contested regulation states that ‘technological innovation is a prerequisite for decarbonising mobility in the Union, and should therefore be supported.’
57 Furthermore, recital 51 of Regulation 2019/631 stated that the effectiveness of that regulation would be reviewed comprehensively in 2023, which was to allow the Commission to ‘identify a clear pathway for further CO2 emissions reductions for passenger cars and light commercial vehicles beyond 2030 in order to significantly contribute to achieving the long-term goal of the Paris Agreement’ and that, ‘where appropriate, the report on that review [had to] be accompanied by a proposal to amend [that] Regulation.’ Thus, from the time that Regulation 2019/631 was adopted, the EU legislature had envisaged the possibility of amending it with a view to improving its effectiveness.
58 Indeed, that is the ambition of the contested regulation. It is part of a context which is new due, first, to the rapid acceleration of climate change and, second, to the adoption of the European Climate Law, Article 4(1) of which establishes the binding target for the reduction in the European Union of net greenhouse gas emissions of at least 55% by 2030 compared to 1990 levels, and Article 2(1) of which provides for those emissions to be zero in the European Union by 2050 at the latest.
59 In that context, the contested regulation repeatedly emphasises, in particular in recitals 7 and 12 thereof, the need to reduce emissions from new passenger cars and new commercial vehicles. From that point of view and in line with the objectives of Regulation 2019/631, Article 1(1)(a) of the contested regulation amends Article 1(5) of Regulation 2019/631 by increasing, from 1 January 2030, from 37.5% to 55% the target for the reduction of average emissions from the fleet of new passenger cars and from 31% to 50% the target of reducing the average emissions of the fleet of new light commercial vehicles. Article 1(1)(b) of the contested regulation inserts subparagraph 5a into Article 1 of Regulation 2019/631, under which, from 1 January 2035, the average emissions of the fleet of new passenger cars and those of the fleet of new commercial vehicles must be reduced by 100%.
60 It is thus apparent that the contested regulation seeks to achieve the objectives of the Paris Agreement and is in line with Regulation 2019/631 by seeking to address the climate and environmental challenges facing the European Union.
61 The EU legislature cannot be deprived of the possibility of adapting Regulation 2019/631 to any change in circumstances or any development of knowledge, having regard to its task of safeguarding the general interests recognised by the Treaties, which include the protection of the environment (see, to that effect, judgments of 10 December 2002, British American Tobacco (Investments) and Imperial Tobacco, C‑491/01, EU:C:2002:741, paragraph 77; of 3 December 2019, Czech Republic v Parliament and Council, C‑482/17, EU:C:2019:1035, paragraphs 55 and 56; and of 4 October 2024, Lithuania and Others v Parliament and Council (Mobility package), C‑541/20 to C‑555/20, EU:C:2024:818, paragraphs 266 and 1426).
62 Furthermore, as has been recalled in paragraph 49 of the present judgment, in accordance with the principle that exceptions must be interpreted strictly, point (c) of the first subparagraph of Article 192(2) TFEU can form the legal basis of an EU measure only if it follows from its aim and content that the primary outcome sought by that measure consists of significantly affecting a Member State’s choice between different energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply.
63 In that regard, it should be noted that the provisions of the contested regulation, in themselves and primarily, are not intended to lay down measures significantly affecting a Member State’s choice between different energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply. At most, they have indirect and incidental effects on the general structure of the energy supply of the Member States (see, by analogy, judgment of 23 February 1999, Parliament v Council, C‑42/97, EU:C:1999:81, paragraph 63).
64 It follows that the contested regulation cannot be based on point (c) of the first subparagraph of Article 192(2) TFEU.
65 As regards the argument that the EU legislature did not examine in a sufficiently precise and exhaustive manner the effects of the proposed measures by adopting the contested regulation, it is sufficient to recall that, in accordance with the case-law referred to in paragraph 45 of the present judgment, the assessment of the expected effect of an EU act on the energy policy of a Member State may be taken into consideration only in the context of the assessment of the aim or content of that act. That argument cannot therefore be assessed independently.
66 Lastly, it must be held that the arguments alleging that the contested regulation infringes the principle of proportionality are ineffective in the context of the present plea because a breach of that principle cannot call into question the choice of the legal basis of that regulation.
67 In the light of the foregoing considerations, the Republic of Poland’s first plea in law must be rejected as being, in part, ineffective and, in part, unfounded.
Second plea in law: infringement of Article 3(1) and (3) TEU, Article 9 TFEU and Article 6(1) TEU, read in the light of Article 21(1) of the Charter
Arguments of the parties
68 By its second plea, the Republic of Poland submits that, by setting, in point (b) of Article 1(1) of the contested regulation, the CO2 emission targets for new passenger cars and new light commercial vehicles, the EU legislature infringed its obligation, laid down in Article 3(1) and (3) TEU, to promote the well-being of the peoples of the European Union and social justice, to work towards sustainable economic development and to promote economic, social and territorial cohesion as well as solidarity between the Member States. The Republic of Poland also alleges that the EU legislature infringed its obligation to take into account the requirements relating to the promotion of a high level of employment, the fight against social exclusion and the prohibition of any discrimination based on property, which flow from Article 9 TFEU and Article 21(1) of the Charter respectively.
69 By requiring the complete elimination of CO2 emissions in respect of new vehicles, that regulation introduces, moreover within an extremely short period of time, radical changes entailing a serious risk of market disruption and even bankruptcy of many undertakings. That measure also received criticism from the automotive industry, which considers that measure to be premature. Similarly, Mr Thierry Breton, then European Commissioner for the Internal Market, stressed that the infrastructure for charging zero-CO2 emission vehicles was inadequate and that there was a risk of the loss of 600 000 jobs linked to the entry into force of the prohibition on registering new combustion engine cars in the European Union after 2035. Recital 9 of the contested regulation is, moreover, irrelevant, since the objectives it mentions are purely declaratory. Thus, that regulation does not give concrete expression to the objective that innovation in the motor vehicle value chain must be maintained.
70 Nor does that regulation promote a high level of employment in the European Union. The negative effects on the automotive industry will particularly affect manufacturers of components intended for combustion engines and other related parts. In Poland, the automotive industry represents 400 000 direct jobs, 8% of gross domestic product (GDP) and 13.5% of the value of exports from that country. The announcement of the closure, after 2025, of the Bielsko-Biała (Poland) engine plant, owned by the Stellantis Group, shows that the negative effects of the introduction of enhanced CO2 emission reduction standards are very real. It follows that the contested regulation will reduce the prosperity of the peoples of the European Union.
71 The Republic of Poland also relies on the report Making The Transition to Zero-emission Mobility, Enabling factors for alternatively-powered cars and vans in the European Union (Progress Report 2022, p. 15), prepared by the European Automobile Manufacturers’ Association, which establishes that the penetration of electric vehicles on the market is largely correlated to a country’s GDP per capita. Thus, if 18% of new cars registered throughout the European Union during 2021 were made up of electric vehicles (ECV), the share of that market would be even less than 4% in nine Member States with an average GDP of less than EUR 27 000 per capita. In addition, 72% of all sales of electric cars are concentrated in only four western European Member States with a GDP of more than EUR 45 000 per capita. There is thus a clear gap between Central and Eastern Europe and Western Europe at the level of affordability of electric vehicles.
72 In that regard, it is incorrect to state, as does the impact assessment (Part 1, pages 54 and 55), that the problem of persons with low incomes having access to zero-CO2 emission vehicles will be resolved, albeit with a certain delay, as a result of those persons having access to the second-hand market for those vehicles. In fact, the value of such vehicles decreases relatively little over time, with the result that it will even be difficult to purchase second-hand vehicles of that type at an affordable price. In addition, due to the small number of new vehicles purchased, an adequate supply of second-hand vehicles of that type will continue to be lacking in the future. Furthermore, electric vehicles’ batteries will inevitably deteriorate with use. The replacement of a battery represents a significant cost, estimated at more than half of the value of a new vehicle, which may exceed the value of a second-hand vehicle.
73 The Republic of Poland observes furthermore that the main obstacle to the development of ‘electromobility’ is the lack of infrastructure for charging electric vehicles. There are only 482 000 public charging stations in Europe, 71% of which are concentrated in four Member States, namely Germany, France, Italy and the Netherlands, as well as in the United Kingdom. By way of example, the territory of Romania, which is approximately six times larger than the Netherlands, holds only 0.4% of all those stations (more than 1 100). Eleven Member States do not even have two charging stations for 100 km of road, while six Member States do not have stations every 100 km. Even the adoption of Regulation 2023/1804 did not require Member States to extend their networks of charging stations for electric vehicles to an extent that makes it possible to replace combustion engine vehicles by 2035.
74 The contested regulation thus entails, for the Republic of Poland, a commitment to exceptionally high investments in the construction of the infrastructure required for charging electric vehicles, without, however, providing for additional EU funding for that purpose, which can only increase the current disparities between Member States. In that regard, in accordance with Article 1(12) and recital 15 of that regulation, the Commission is not required to examine whether there are funding gaps until after 31 December 2025 and cannot therefore remedy them before that date. Such an approach is irrational, since it is necessary first of all to ensure the resources making it possible to achieve the objective of the regulation’s provisions and only then to impose the obligation of attaining it. Moreover, the prospect of obtaining financial support through the available EU financial instruments is too vague.
75 Since the contested regulation exposes the automotive industry to a risk of collapse, even though it represents a substantial part of Poland’s economy, as it is for the European Union as a whole, that regulation does not promote a high level of employment, does not ensure the social protection of the least prosperous, does not combat social exclusion and does not encourage solidarity between Member States.
76 In that regard, the reference, made in recital 7 of the contested regulation, to taking into account the social dimension in order to ensure affordable and accessible mobility for all, the significant economic and social consequences of the digital and green transitions, and the need to preserve employment and the competitiveness of EU industry, is devoid of substance.
77 The Parliament and the Council, supported by the Commission, contend that the second plea in law must be rejected as unfounded.
Findings of the Court
78 By its second plea, the Republic of Poland submits that the contested regulation infringes, first, Article 3(1) and (3) TEU, by not promoting the well-being of the peoples of the European Union and social justice, second, Article 9 TFEU, by failing to take into account the requirements linked to the promotion of a high level of employment and the fight against social exclusion, and, third, Article 21(1) of the Charter, by discriminating on the basis of property.
79 In the first place, as regards the argument alleging infringement of Article 3(1) and (3) TEU, it should be noted that Article 3 TEU sets out various essential objectives pursued by the European Union, without establishing a hierarchy between them. Accordingly, the implementation of those objectives, which include, in the same way as the well-being of peoples, inter alia, the sustainable development of Europe, the protection of the environment and the promotion of scientific and technical progress, must be the result of the policies and activities of the European Union and of the Member States. That provision cannot therefore, unlike the specific provisions of the FEU Treaty which give concrete expression to the general objectives which it lists and govern the matter in question, form part of the parameters for assessing the conformity with primary law of an act of secondary legislation (see, to that effect, judgments of 29 January 1985, Cullet and Chambre syndicale des réparateurs automobiles et détaillants de produits pétroliers, 231/83, EU:C:1985:29, paragraph 10; of 23 November 1999, Portugal v Council, C‑149/96, EU:C:1999:574, paragraph 86; and of 4 October 2024, Lithuania and Others v Parliament and Council (Mobility package), C‑541/20 to C‑555/20, EU:C:2024:818, paragraphs 423 and 424).
80 Accordingly, since Article 3 TEU cannot be relied on, in itself, in support of the application for annulment directed against an EU act, the argument alleging infringement of Article 3(1) and (3) TEU by the contested regulation must be rejected as being unfounded.
81 In the second place, the argument alleging infringement of Article 9 TFEU, on the ground that the contested regulation does not take into account the requirements linked to the promotion of a high level of employment and the fight against social exclusion, cannot be accepted, since that regulation, as clarified by several of its recitals and by the impact assessment which preceded its adoption, is specifically intended to ensure compliance with those two requirements.
82 First, recital 7 of that regulation states that ‘the digital and green transitions should address the importance of the social dimension to ensure that mobility is affordable for and accessible to all’, that ‘more ambitious CO2 standards for passenger cars and light commercial vehicles are expected to accelerate the uptake of zero-emission vehicles, increase their affordability … with greater benefits for low- and middle-income consumers’, and that ‘when adopting those standards it is also important to take into account the significant economic and social consequences of the digital and green transitions and the need to safeguard employment and preserve the competitiveness of Union industry.’
83 Second, recital 14 of the contested regulation states, in essence, that the CO2 emission reduction targets must be accompanied by an EU strategy making it possible, inter alia, to address ‘the need for up- and re-skilling of workers in the sector and the economic diversification and reconversion of activities, while maintaining automotive employment levels in the Union’, that ‘particular attention should be given to the impact that this transition will have on [SMEs] along the automotive supply chain and to affected regions and communities which might be more vulnerable due to the presence of an intensive automotive industry’ and that, ‘where appropriate, financial support should be considered at Union and Member State level to crowd in private investment’.
84 Third, recital 13 of the contested regulation stresses that significant funding is already available for innovation in the mobility ecosystem through different EU funding instruments. From that perspective, Article 14a(3) of Regulation 2019/631, as amended by Article 1(12) of the contested regulation, read in conjunction with recital 15 of that regulation, calls on the Commission to propose, by 31 December 2025 at the latest, adequate financial measures to address any funding gap that it would by then have identified, if that funding proves insufficient to ensure a just transition in the automotive supply chain.
85 In addition, as stated in recital 3 of the contested regulation, the European Green Deal, which includes the ‘Fit for 55’ legislative package, is a comprehensive set of mutually reinforcing measures and initiatives aimed at achieving climate neutrality in the European Union by 2050. In order to support the most vulnerable populations during that transitional period, the EU legislature adopted, inter alia, in the context of that legislative package and almost concomitantly with that regulation, Regulation (EU) 2023/955 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 May 2023 establishing a Social Climate Fund and amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 (OJ 2023 L 130, p. 1). Similarly, Article 3 of Regulation 2023/1804, to which recital 20 of the contested regulation implicitly refers, imposes on Member States targets for the deployment of electric recharging infrastructure reserved for light electric vehicles.
86 Fourth, in Section 6.2.1.2 of the Impact Assessment, dedicated to the ‘social impacts’ of the contested regulation, the Commission examined the affordability of zero-CO2 emission vehicles depending on consumer income. The developments relating to the total cost of ownership, set out in that section, indicate that, as a result of the use of such vehicles and in all the scenarios envisaged, it is the low-income groups that will achieve the largest savings in relation to their annual income. Those persons could benefit from savings on the cost of fuel without having to pay a high price for purchasing those vehicles, since, as the second or third purchasers of vehicles, they will be able to purchase them at an affordable price (impact assessment, Part 1, pages 54 and 55).
87 It also follows from Section 6.2.1.1.3 of the impact assessment that the savings made by the first and second purchasers on fuel expenditure during the use of the vehicles will exceed the higher initial investment costs for the purchase of more efficient new and second-hand vehicles with zero CO2 emissions, respectively (Part 1, pages 36 and 37).
88 In so far as the zero-emission vehicle sector grows exponentially (impact assessment, Part 1, page 40), the accelerated transition brought about by the contested regulation will lead to a greater availability of such vehicles on the second-hand market. Against that background, it must be observed that recital 12 of that regulation indicates the intention to stimulate innovation in zero-emission technologies.
89 Furthermore, the impact assessment (Part 1, page 36) shows that the setting of higher CO2 emission reduction targets for new passenger cars and new light commercial vehicles will lead to greater societal benefits.
90 Moreover, Section 6.2.1.1.8 of the impact assessment on the ‘macro-economic impacts, including employment’ shows that strengthening the CO2 emission reduction targets will lead to an increase not only in economic production, but also in the number of jobs at EU level, albeit to a limited extent compared to the baseline scenario. The creation of additional jobs should, in particular, be observed by suppliers in the motor vehicle sector and in the energy sector. Job losses in the motor vehicle sector would mainly be due to reduced demand for combustion engine vehicles. However, those losses will be limited. In addition, jobs in the electronics and electrical equipment sector will increase as a result of the additional demand for batteries and components for electric motors. From that perspective, the impact assessment emphasises that, in order to make full use of the employment opportunities offered by the transition to ‘zero-emission’ mobility, it is essential to stimulate investment in those areas and subsectors with high growth potential. In addition, a form of compensation will take place. According to that analysis, the evolution of the automotive value chain will lead to changes in the allocation of employment at sectoral level. Employment transitions will occur at different levels: within the same undertaking, in the motor vehicle sector and also outside that sector (Part 1, pages 46 to 48).
91 In that context, the impact assessment notes that it is essential to ensure that adequate policies and programmes are put in place for the reskilling of workers in order to facilitate transitions. That is notably the purpose of the Just Transition Fund and of the ESF+. The latter will, in particular, contribute significantly to the green and digital transitions by stimulating investment in training possibilities in order for workers to be able to thrive in a climate-neutral society, which is more digital and more inclusive.
92 The impact assessment (Part 1, page 49) also notes that new employment opportunities will be likely to emerge in sectors that are traditionally not part of the automotive value chain, such as electronics, software and services.
93 Therefore, contrary to the submissions made by the Republic of Poland, the EU legislature took sufficient account of the social consequences of the transition to zero-emission vehicles, in particular the need to ensure the re-skilling and upskilling of workers in the motor vehicle sector, while maintaining employment levels within the European Union.
94 That is all the more so since, although Article 9 TFEU requires the European Union to take social requirements into account when defining and implementing its policies and activities, Article 11 TFEU provides that environmental protection requirements must be integrated into the definition and implementation of EU policies and activities, in particular with a view to promoting sustainable development. It follows that, by adopting the contested regulation, the EU legislature was obliged, amongst other things, to reconcile social policy requirements with those relating to environmental protection.
95 In the third place, the argument that the contested regulation infringes Article 21(1) of the Charter in so far as it discriminates on the basis of property must be rejected on the basis of the considerations set out in paragraphs 84 to 92 of the present judgment.
96 In the light of the foregoing considerations, the Republic of Poland’s second plea in law must be rejected as unfounded.
Third plea in law: breach of the principle of proportionality, enshrined in Article 5(4) TEU, interpreted together with Article 191(2) TFEU
Arguments of the parties
97 By its third plea, the Republic of Poland submits that the contested regulation is incompatible with the principle of proportionality, read in conjunction with Article 191(2) TFEU, in that the measures put in place by that regulation, first, are not appropriate to achieve the objectives it pursues and, second, entail social and economic costs which are manifestly excessive in relation to those objectives.
98 Although Article 191(2) TFEU, as interpreted by the Court in the judgment of 21 December 2016, Associazione Italia Nostra Onlus (C‑444/15, EU:C:2016:978, paragraph 44), requires EU policy on the environment to aim for a high level of protection, that level of protection does not necessarily have to be the highest possible.
99 That provision therefore precludes the EU legislature from laying down obligations the compliance with which would make it possible to achieve a highly ambitious level in terms of reducing greenhouse gas emissions, but at a cost which is disproportionate from a social and economic point of view.
100 That is the case with the contested regulation, since the transition to zero-emission mobility which it promotes is liable to produce seriously detrimental consequences for the European Union’s automotive industry, social exclusion, and also to exclude disadvantaged people from mobility and to increase inequality in citizens’ standard of living.
101 Furthermore, by failing to take into account the differences between Member States in terms of the affordability of electric vehicles and the ability to provide adequate recharging infrastructure for those vehicles, the contested regulation also infringes Article 191(2) TFEU.
102 Moreover, the environmental benefit resulting from the reduction of CO2 emissions is only illusory, since their reduction in the transport sector will be offset by their increase in the energy sector, since, by 2035, conventional fuels have not been replaced by zero-emission energy sources.
103 A more proportionate measure would have consisted of incentives to choose vehicles other than combustion engine vehicles and, if legislation limiting the number of such vehicles were to apply, it should have done so either by gradually reducing the greenhouse gas emissions of those vehicles or by gradually reducing their number, instead of arbitrarily deciding that after 2035 vehicles of that type may no longer be registered.
104 Lastly, since road transport generates only 20% of greenhouse gas emissions from the European Union and its share of global emissions is already low, it is not reasonable for the European Union to bear disproportionate costs which aggravate the operating conditions of its automotive industry and the standard of living of its citizens, when third countries are making much less effort. A more rational and proportionate approach by the European Union would be to create incentives for third countries which emit greater amounts of greenhouse gases to adopt adequate reduction measures.
105 The Parliament and the Council, supported by the Commission, contend that the third plea in law must be rejected as unfounded.
Findings of the Court
106 By its third plea, the Republic of Poland submits, first, that the contested regulation infringes Article 191(2) TFEU on the ground that, in essence, the EU legislature sought to achieve an excessively high level of environmental protection. Second, that regulation infringes the principle of proportionality, since, on the one hand, the environmental benefit resulting from the reduction of CO2 emissions is illusory and, on the other hand, that regulation should have required greater efforts from third countries which emit more greenhouse gases than the European Union.
107 In the first place, it should be recalled that Article 191(2) TFEU provides that EU policy on the environment is to aim at a ‘high level of protection’, taking into account the diversity of situations in the various regions of the Union.
108 In paragraph 44 of the judgment of 21 December 2016, Associazione Italia Nostra Onlus (C‑444/15, EU:C:2016:978), the Court held that, while it is common ground that that provision requires EU policy on the environment to aim for a high level of protection, such a level of protection, in order to be compatible with that provision, does not necessarily have to be the highest that is technically possible, since Article 193 TFEU authorises Member States to maintain or introduce more stringent protective measures.
109 It follows clearly from that formulation that, although Article 191(2) TFEU allows the EU legislature to opt for a level of environmental protection which does not necessarily have to be the highest that is technically possible, that provision in no way prohibits it from setting an objective corresponding to such a level of environmental protection.
110 In those circumstances, the allegation that the EU legislature infringed Article 191(2) TFEU cannot be upheld.
111 In the second place, as regards the breach of the principle of proportionality, it should be recalled that, under the first subparagraph of Article 5(4) TEU, under that principle, the content and form of EU action must not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties.
112 That principle requires that measures implemented through provisions of EU law should be appropriate for attaining the legitimate objectives pursued by the legislation concerned and must not go beyond what is necessary for attaining them. Thus, when there is a choice between several appropriate measures, recourse must be had to the least onerous, and the disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued (judgments of 13 November 1990, Fedesa and Others, C‑331/88, EU:C:1990:391, paragraph 13; of 13 March 2019, Poland v Parliament and Council, C‑128/17, EU:C:2019:194, paragraph 94; and of 3 December 2019, Czech Republic v Parliament and Council, C‑482/17, EU:C:2019:1035, paragraph 76).
113 With regard to judicial review of compliance with that principle, the Court has accepted that, in the exercise of the powers conferred on it, the EU legislature must be allowed a broad discretion in areas in which its action involves political, economic or social choices and in which it is called upon to undertake complex assessments and evaluations, a fortiori where they are of an evolving nature. That broad discretion of the EU legislature applies to the determination of the nature and scope of the measures which it adopts and, to some extent, to the establishment of the basic facts (see, to that effect, judgments of 8 July 2010, Afton Chemical, C‑343/09, EU:C:2010:419, paragraphs 28, 33 and 46; of 21 June 2018, Poland v Parliament and Council, C‑5/16, EU:C:2018:483, paragraphs 150, 151 and 170; and of 4 October 2024, Lithuania and Others v Parliament and Council (Mobility package), C‑541/20 to C‑555/20, EU:C:2024:818, paragraphs 219 and 242).
114 Consequently, the legality of a measure adopted in one of those areas can be affected only if the measure is manifestly inappropriate having regard to the objective which the EU legislature is seeking to pursue. Therefore, the question is not whether a measure adopted in such an area was the only or the best possible measure, since the EU judicature cannot substitute its assessment of scientific and technical facts for that of the EU legislature on which the Treaties have placed that task (see, to that effect, judgments of 12 July 2001, Jippes and Others, C‑189/01, EU:C:2001:420, paragraphs 82 and 83, and of 4 October 2024, Lithuania and Others v Parliament and Council (Mobility package), C‑541/20 to C‑555/20, EU:C:2024:818, paragraph 242).
115 Even where it has broad discretion, however, the EU legislature is required to base its choice on objective criteria and examine whether the aims pursued by the measure chosen are such as to justify even substantial negative economic consequences for certain operators. The EU institutions which have adopted the act in question must therefore be able to show before the Court that in adopting that act they actually exercised their discretion, which presupposes that consideration was taken of all the relevant factors and circumstances of the situation the act was intended to regulate. It follows that those institutions must at the very least be able to produce and set out clearly and unequivocally the basic facts which had to be taken into account as the basis of the contested measures of that act and on which the exercise of their discretion depended. In that regard, the validity of an EU measure must be assessed in the light of the information available to the EU legislature at the time of the adoption of the legislation in question and cannot depend on retrospective considerations concerning its efficacy (see, to that effect, judgments of 7 February 1973, Schroeder, 40/72, EU:C:1973:14, paragraph 14; of 12 July 2001, Jippes and Others, C‑189/01, EU:C:2001:420, paragraph 84; and of 21 June 2018, Poland v Parliament and Council, C‑5/16, EU:C:2018:483, paragraphs 152 and 153).
116 Furthermore, the EU legislature does not have to take into consideration the particular situation of a Member State where the EU measure concerned has an impact in all Member States and requires that a balance between the different interests involved is ensured, taking account of the objectives of that measure. Therefore, the attempt to strike such a balance, taking into account not the particular situation of a single Member State, but that of all the Member States of the European Union, cannot, in itself, be regarded as being contrary to the principle of proportionality (judgments of 18 June 2015, Estonia v Parliament and Council, C‑508/13, EU:C:2015:403, paragraph 39; of 21 June 2018, Poland v Parliament and Council, C‑5/16, EU:C:2018:483, paragraph 167; and of 4 October 2024, Lithuania and Others v Parliament and Council (Mobility package), C‑541/20 to C‑555/20, EU:C:2024:818, paragraph 246).
117 In the present case, the Republic of Poland submits, first, that the strengthening of the CO2 emission reduction standards introduced by the contested regulation would significantly exceed the expected benefits of those standards, having regard to the seriously detrimental consequences that they would entail for the EU automotive industry, as well as to the risks of social exclusion, exclusion of access to mobility for the most disadvantaged people and increased inequalities that they would create in citizens’ standard of living.
118 As regards particularly complex economic and technical choices made in an evolving context, the EU legislature undoubtedly had, as has been recalled in paragraph 113 of the present judgment, a broad discretion when adopting the contested regulation. The legality of that regulation can be affected only if the measures adopted by that legislature are manifestly inappropriate having regard to the objective which it intended to pursue. Therefore, the question is not whether a measure adopted in such an area was the only or the best possible measure, since the EU judicature cannot substitute its assessment of scientific and technical facts for that of the EU legislature to which that task is conferred by the Treaties.
119 In order to assess whether the measures adopted by the EU legislature in that regulation may be regarded as being proportionate, it should be noted, first of all, that it follows from the amendments made to Regulation 2019/631 by Article 1(1) of the contested regulation that the achievement of the target of reducing CO2 emissions by 100% by 2035 for the fleet of new passenger cars and the fleet of new light commercial vehicles remains incremental and gradual. However, the pace of reduction of CO2 emissions had to be increased, taking into account the strengthened climate ambitions of the European Union. The fact that the EU legislature did not increase the target to be met by 2025 also constitutes a proportionate choice.
120 Next, it must be held that the Republic of Poland has in no way substantiated the alleged significant negative effects of the contested regulation on the European automotive industry.
121 In any event, it is apparent from Section 6.2.1.1.4 of the impact assessment, entitled ‘Costs for automotive manufacturers’ (Part 1, p. 37 et seq.), in particular from Table 5 in that section, that the impact of the additional investments in terms of direct and indirect manufacturing costs required by that regulation will be relatively limited compared with what Regulation 2019/631 already required. Under the most ambitious reduction option, the total budget of those costs for the period covering the years 2021 to 2030 are to increase by 0.6% and by 4% for the period from 2031 to 2040. The impact assessment (Part 1, p. 38) also emphasises that the challenge of the transition in terms of investment was already mentioned in the European Green Deal, according to which further greenhouse gas emission reductions required massive public investment and increased efforts to steer private capital towards climate and environmental actions, and that such an initial investment is an opportunity to move Europe towards sustainable and inclusive growth.
122 In addition, while it is true that, under the most ambitious option for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, the electricity consumption of new passenger cars and new light commercial vehicles could represent 11% of the total energy consumption in 2040, it is apparent from Section 6.2.1.1.6 of the impact assessment, entitled ‘Energy system impacts’, that that estimate is counterbalanced by the fact that the renewal of the vehicle fleet and, therefore, its electrification could lead to an overall reduction in energy consumption of around 43% by that date (impact assessment, Part 1, pp. 42 and 43).
123 It should be added that, as the Parliament and the Council submit, other provisions of EU energy policy, such as Article 3 of Directive 2018/2001, and Articles 4 and 5 of Regulation 2018/1999, as amended by the European Climate Law, already lead to increase the share of energy from renewable energy sources in all Member States. It follows that it is intended that the share of energy produced from fossil fuels in the European Union will gradually decrease in the future.
124 Moreover, as has been pointed out in paragraphs 86 to 92 of the present judgment, the impact assessment sets out the positive effects of the contested regulation, in particular for the benefit of consumers and in terms of employment. It also points out that that regulation is expected to have an impact that is positive overall, albeit modest, on the European Union’s GDP (impact assessment, Part 1, p. 46).
125 Second, it is also necessary to reject as ineffective the Republic of Poland’s argument that, since road transport generates only 20% of greenhouse gas emissions in the European Union, and that, since the European Union’s share of global emissions is already low, the European Union should have provided incentives for third countries which emit more greenhouse gases to adopt appropriate reduction measures. As the Council submits in its response, in essence, it is difficult to understand how incentives or lack of incentives by the European Union addressed to third States to encourage the adoption of appropriate reduction measures could have an impact on the legality of the contested regulation.
126 In any event, as the Parliament and the Council have argued, neither primary law nor the case-law of the Court permits the inference that the European Union must align its environmental policy with the lowest standards generally applied. Such a race to the bottom in the European Union’s environmental policy would be contrary to Article 191(2) TFEU, which requires the Union to aim for a high level of protection in the matter.
127 In addition, the Republic of Poland’s line of argument, which is based on the principle of reciprocity, conflicts with Article 2(2) of the Paris Agreement, which clearly requires that that agreement ‘will be implemented to reflect equity and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances’. Article 3(1) of the UNFCCC states, in that regard, that ‘the developed country parties should take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof’.
128 The Paris Agreement thus introduces a certain asymmetry of obligations between its various parties. As is apparent from the written pleadings of the Parliament and the Council, the European Union seeks to place itself at the forefront of the fight against climate change. In that regard, it is, moreover, the first region of the world to have set itself a climate-neutrality objective in a legally binding act, namely the European Climate Law, with a view to encouraging its partners to follow that path.
129 Lastly, as the Parliament and the Council submit, the Republic of Poland’s strategy, consisting of waiting for other countries to decide to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions and merely encouraging them in that direction, not only prevents the European Union from being a pioneer in climate action, but could also lead to global inertia in that field.
130 In the light of the foregoing considerations, the third plea in law must be rejected as unfounded.
Fourth plea in law: infringement, first, of the obligation to carry out a proper impact assessment for the contested regulation and, second, of Article 191(3) TFEU
Arguments of the parties
131 By its fourth plea in law, the Republic of Poland submits that, in view of the scale of the economic and social impact of the contested regulation on the economy of and companies within the Member States, the impact assessment was inadequate, which constitutes an infringement not only of Article 191(3) TFEU, but also of the requirements set out in point 12 of the Agreement on Better Law-Making.
132 The Republic of Poland submits that, in the present case, several factors illustrate the inadequacy of the impact assessment.
133 First, it related only to the European Union as a whole, since no examination was carried out from the point of view of the situation of the various Member States and regions of the European Union, which meant that the Member States were unable to assess the impact of the contested regulation.
134 Second, the impact assessment does not contain any indication as to how the strengthening of CO2 emission reduction standards will affect citizens’ mobility, in particular persons living with disabilities, whether at the level of the European Union as a whole or at the level of the various Member States or regions.
135 Third, the needs for available natural resources necessary to develop ‘electromobility’, in particular those necessary for the production of electric vehicle batteries, were not assessed.
136 Fourth, the feasibility of the necessary transformation of the energy sector, with the aim of meeting the demand for electric energy intended to fuel electric vehicles, was not examined either.
137 Fifth, the impact assessment does not address the effect of the inflow of used and excessively polluting combustion engine vehicles into the second-hand market of the least-wealthy Member States which the introduction of strengthened CO2 emission reduction standards is very likely to bring about. However, that influx could impede the fulfilment of the Member States’ obligations under Directive (EU) 2016/2284 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2016 on the reduction of national emissions of certain atmospheric pollutants, amending Directive 2003/35/EC and repealing Directive 2001/81/EC (OJ 2016 L 344, p. 1), Directive 2008/50/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2008 on ambient air quality and cleaner air for Europe (OJ 2008 L 152, p. 1) and Regulation 2018/842.
138 Sixth, the impact assessment does not assess the impact of the increased effort to reduce CO2 emissions on EU car manufacturers, on their position on the combustion engine vehicle market and on that of alternative propulsion vehicles, either at global or EU level. The way in which the situation of manufacturers of combustion and alternative propulsion vehicles established outside the European Union will affect the global and EU automobile markets was also not examined.
139 Seventh, the impact assessment does not take into account the support granted to non-European manufacturers by their governments, or the impact that that support may have on the competitiveness of EU car manufacturers.
140 Eighth, the impact assessment does not include any assessment of the effects of the presence or absence of charging infrastructure for electric vehicles on the ability to achieve the objectives pursued by the contested regulation.
141 Ninth, the impact assessment does not explain how the absence, in that regulation, of arrangements to guarantee the financing of the measures necessary to achieve its objectives will affect their attainment in the various Member States.
142 The Parliament and the Council, supported by the Commission, contend that the fourth plea in law should be rejected as unfounded.
Findings of the Court
143 By its fourth plea in law, the Republic of Poland submits, in essence, that the contested regulation infringes Article 191(3) TFEU and point 12 of the Agreement on Better Law-Making in that that regulation is based on an insufficiently detailed impact assessment.
144 As a preliminary point, there is no need to examine the allegation of an infringement of point 12 of the Agreement on Better Law-Making which is entirely unsubstantiated and, contrary to the requirement laid down in Article 120(c) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, the application does not contain a summary of that plea.
145 As regards the alleged infringement of Article 191(3) TFEU, it should be noted, first of all, that, as has been pointed out in paragraph 116 of the present judgment, since the contested regulation lays down EU fleet-wide targets for new passenger cars and new light commercial vehicles, the EU legislature was not required to take into consideration the particular situation of the Republic of Poland.
146 Furthermore, the Republic of Poland has not set out the reasons why the impact assessment should have assessed the impact of that regulation on the mobility capacity of persons living with disabilities, or how that regulation would make it difficult to comply with other instruments of EU law also intended to protect the environment. Moreover, the impact assessment addresses the issue of integrating the increased ambition of reducing CO2 emissions by that regulation into the general framework of the ‘Fit for 55’ legislative package, which is a comprehensive set of mutually reinforcing measures and initiatives the objective of which is to achieve climate neutrality in the European Union by 2050, as is clear in particular from Sections 6.2.1.1.6 and 6.2.1.1.7 of that assessment (Part 1, pp. 42 and 44).
147 In particular, as regards the availability of natural resources, the impact assessment (Part 2, Annex 7) refers, in essence, to the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning batteries and waste batteries, repealing Directive 2006/66/EC and amending Regulation (EU) … 2019/1020, which was adopted as Regulation (EU) 2023/1542 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2023 concerning batteries and waste batteries, amending Directive 2008/98/EC and Regulation (EU) 2019/1020 and repealing Directive 2006/66/EC (OJ 2023 L 191, p. 1). Regulation 2023/1542 sets high recycling and recovery targets for the recovery of critical secondary raw materials, such as lithium and cobalt, and is indissociable from the contested regulation.
148 Moreover, even before the adoption of the contested regulation, the Commission had submitted, on 16 March 2023, a proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework for ensuring a secure and sustainable supply of critical raw materials and amending Regulations (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1724 and (EU) 2019/1020, the aim of which was to increase the potential for the extraction, processing and recycling of critical raw materials in the European Union.
149 It should also be pointed out that the contested regulation clearly states that it must be accompanied by the deployment of recharging infrastructure. From that perspective, the EU legislature adopted, almost concomitantly with the contested regulation, Regulation 2023/1804, Articles 1 and 3 of which lay down binding national targets leading to the deployment of sufficient alternative fuel infrastructure in the European Union and require the Member States to achieve them in stages by 2030.
150 Furthermore, Article 191(3) TFEU cannot be interpreted as meaning that the EU legislature is under an obligation to take account of all the factors relied on by the Republic of Poland, as recalled in paragraphs 133 to 141 of the present judgment. Since the elements listed in that provision are formulated in general terms, the EU legislature has discretion as to the specific factors which it considers appropriate to examine and the level of detail of the analysis it intends to consider.
151 Indeed, Article 191 TFEU lays down a series of objectives, principles and criteria which the EU legislature must observe when implementing environmental policy. In particular, it is apparent from Article 191(3) TFEU that, in preparing its policy on the environment, the European Union is required to take account of available scientific and technical data, environmental conditions in the various regions of the European Union, the potential benefits and costs of action or lack of action as well as the economic and social development of the European Union as a whole and the balanced development of its regions. However, in view of the need to strike a balance between certain of those objectives and principles, and in view of the complexity of the implementation of those criteria, review by the Court must necessarily be limited to the question whether the EU legislature committed a manifest error of assessment as regards the conditions for the application of Article 191 TFEU (judgments of 14 July 1998, Safety Hi-Tech, C‑284/95, EU:C:1998:352, paragraphs 36 and 37, and of 13 March 2019, Poland v Parliament and Council, C‑128/17, EU:C:2019:194, paragraphs 134 and 135).
152 It follows that while Article 191(3) TFEU obliges the EU legislature to ‘take account of’ certain aspects, the assessment it carries out in that regard is subject only to a review of whether there was a manifest error of assessment. The long list of factors which the Republic of Poland considers relevant, for its own reasons and on the basis of its own assessment, does not, in itself, demonstrate any manifest error of assessment on the part of the EU legislature having regard to the aspects listed in that provision of the Treaty.
153 On the contrary, the impact assessment takes into account the factors cited by the Republic of Poland. That is so in particular in Section 1.2 of the impact assessment, which covers the interaction between CO2 emission standards for passenger cars and light commercial vehicles, on the one hand, and other policies aimed at enhancing the European Union’s climate ambition in the road transport sector, on the other; Section 6.2.1.1.7 on investment in alternative fuels infrastructure; Sections 6.2.1.1.2 and 6.2.1.1.3 on savings from the point of view of society and final users; Section 6.2.1.1.6 on energy system impacts; or Section 6.2.1.2 on social impacts.
154 Similarly, as is apparent from paragraphs 86 to 88, 90 to 93 and 124 of the present judgment and contrary to the Republic of Poland’s submissions, the impact assessment examines questions relating to the affordability of zero-emission vehicles, GDP and the impact of possible options on employment.
155 Finally, the impact assessment demonstrates that the EU legislature did take into account the problem of the position of the EU automotive industry worldwide. That assessment states, on several occasions and in particular in Section 2, entitled ‘Problem definition’, and in Section 6.2.1.1.5 thereof, entitled ‘Innovation and competitiveness’ (see, in particular, Part 1, pp. 14, 15, 40 and 41), that the only way for the European Union to remain a leader and competitive in the world market is to increase in its territory the production of such vehicles and the batteries necessary for them, as well as research and development in that area. Furthermore, contrary to the Republic of Poland’s submissions, according to the impact assessment, the automotive industry itself acknowledges that the EU legislative framework will help it to maintain and develop its market share in the European Union and worldwide.
156 In the light of the foregoing considerations, the fourth plea in law must be rejected as unfounded and, consequently, the action must be dismissed in its entirety.
Costs
157 Under Article 138(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the Parliament and the Council have applied for costs to be awarded against the Republic of Poland, and since the latter has been unsuccessful, the Republic of Poland must be ordered to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the Parliament and the Council.
158 In accordance with Article 140(1) of those rules, pursuant to which the institutions which have intervened in the proceedings are to bear their own costs, the Commission shall bear its own costs.
On those grounds, the Court (Second Chamber) hereby:
1. Dismisses the action;
2. Orders the Republic of Poland to bear its own costs and to pay the costs incurred by the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union;
3. Orders the European Commission to bear its own costs.
[Signatures]
* Language of the case: Polish.