Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 16 April 2026. – Jean-Marc Colombani v European External Action Service (EEAS).

1

By his appeal, Mr Jean-Marc Colombani seeks to have set aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 22 March 2023, Colombani v EEAS (T‑113/22, the judgment under appeal, EU:T:2023:154), by which the General Court dismissed his action under Article 270 TFEU seeking, first, annulment of the decision of 15 June 2021 by which the European External Action Service (EEAS) rejected in part his request for assistance submitted on 18 February 2021 (‘the decision rejecting in part the request for assistance’) under Article 24 of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union (‘the Staff Regulations’), as well as the amicable agreement concluded between the parties on 9 February 2021 (‘the amicable agreement’) and the alleged implied decision to promote him to grade AD 14 with retroactive effect from 1 January 2018, as brought to his attention by the transmission of his salary statement for May 2021, and, second, compensation for the material and non-material damage which he claims to have suffered as a result of the conduct of the EEAS.

2

Article 12a of the Staff Regulations provides:

‘1.   Officials shall refrain from any form of psychological or sexual harassment.

2.   An official who has been the victim of psychological or sexual harassment shall not suffer any prejudicial effects on the part of the institution. An official who has given evidence on psychological or sexual harassment shall not suffer any prejudicial effects on the part of the institution, provided the official has acted honestly.

3.   “Psychological harassment” means any improper conduct that takes place over a period, is repetitive or systematic and involves physical behaviour, spoken or written language, gestures or other acts that are intentional and that may undermine the personality, dignity or physical or psychological integrity of any person.

…’

3

Article 24 of the Staff Regulations reads as follows:

‘The [European] Union shall assist any official, in particular in proceedings against any person perpetrating threats, insulting or defamatory acts or utterances, or any attack to person or property to which he or a member of his family is subjected by reason of his position or duties.

It shall jointly and severally compensate the official for damage suffered in such cases, in so far as the official did not either intentionally or through grave negligence cause damage and has been unable to obtain compensation from the person who did cause it.’

4

The background to the dispute is set out in paragraphs 2 to 20 of the judgment under appeal in the following terms:

5

By application lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 3 March 2022, the appellant brought an action seeking, first, annulment of the decision rejecting in part the request for assistance and of the amicable agreement and the alleged implied decision to promote him to grade AD 14 with retroactive effect from 1 January 2018, as brought to his attention by the transmission of his salary statement for May 2021, and, second, compensation for the material and non-material damage which he claims to have suffered as a result of the conduct of the EEAS.

6

In support of his claim for annulment of the decision rejecting in part the request for assistance, the appellant raised five pleas in law. The fifth plea in law is not relevant for the purposes of the present appeal in so far as the examination of that plea by the General Court is not called into question by the appellant in his appeal. The first to fourth pleas in law alleged, first, maladministration, breach of the duty to have regard for the welfare of officials and infringement of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’) and of the Staff Regulations, second, prima facie evidence of the reality of the acts of harassment allegedly suffered by the appellant, third, misuse of powers and infringement of Article 47 of the Charter, and, fourth, misuse of powers and infringement of Article 227 TFEU and Article 44 of the Charter.

7

In paragraphs 54 and 65 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court rejected the first and second parts of the second plea in law, respectively, alleging errors of assessment of the facts attributable to both D and F, concluding that there were no such errors. It observed, in that regard, that the appointing authority was entitled to consider that the appellant had not adduced prima facie evidence of psychological harassment against him on the part of those two persons.

8

In paragraphs 70 and 72 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court rejected the first part of the first plea, alleging wrongful failure to implement interim protection measures with regard to the appellant, finding that the EEAS had not been obliged to open an administrative investigation in respect of D and F or to adopt further interim protection measures in the form of informal protection measures or financial assistance.

9

In paragraph 75 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court rejected as ineffective the second part of the first plea in law, alleging that the threats made to the appellant were unlawful. It held that the alleged threats, relating to the disclosure of information to the Belgian judicial authorities and to Members of Parliament, even if they were established, had no bearing on the decision rejecting in part the request for assistance in so far as it concerned D and F.

10

In paragraphs 89, 92 and 93 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court rejected the third part of the first plea in law, alleging a lack of impartiality and a conflict of interest on the part of the author of the decision rejecting in part the request for assistance. In that regard, it held that, even if doubts could exist as to the objective impartiality of the author of that decision, the review of that decision by the Executive Secretary-General of the EEAS had made it possible to correct that irregularity. Furthermore, even if the same decision had been signed by a person with no hierarchical link with F, it would have been ruled out that the processing of the request for assistance would have led to a result other than its rejection in so far as it was directed against F.

11

Lastly, in paragraph 107 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court rejected the third and fourth pleas in law, alleging misuse of powers, as ineffective and, in any event, as unfounded.

12

Since all the pleas in law raised by the appellant in support of his application for annulment of the decision rejecting in part the request for assistance were rejected, the General Court rejected both that claim and the claim for compensation.

13

The appellant claims that the Court of Justice should:

14

The EEAS contends that the Court should:

15

The appellant’s appeal concerns both the decision by which the General Court rejected his claim for annulment and the decision by which it rejected his claim for compensation.

16

In support of his appeal, the appellant raises four grounds of appeal alleging, in essence, first, an error of law in the examination of the subject matter of his request for assistance and a breach of the concept of ‘harassment’; second, errors of law in the assessment of the facts attributable to D and F; third, infringement of Article 24 of the Staff Regulations; and, fourth, failure to take into account the existence of a decision rejecting the request submitted and an error of law committed in the analysis of Articles 17 and 19 of the Staff Regulations.

17

The EEAS contends, as a preliminary point, that the appeal is inadmissible in its entirety, asserting that the appellant is asking the Court for a new assessment of the facts, without putting forward a genuine legal criticism of the judgment under appeal.

18

It is, however, necessary to examine each of the specific grounds of inadmissibility thus relied on in the context of the assessment of the pleas and complaints to which they relate.

19

By his first ground of appeal, the appellant submits, in essence, that the General Court’s reasoning in the context of the examination of his second plea in law, alleging the existence of prima facie evidence of the truth of the acts of harassment allegedly suffered by the appellant, is based on an incorrect premiss and, therefore, is vitiated by an error of law.

20

According to the appellant, in order to assess whether there was prima facie evidence of psychological harassment attributable to D and F, the General Court failed to take into consideration, in paragraphs 31, 34, 38 and 39 of the judgment under appeal, that collective and passive conduct may also constitute such harassment, thereby reducing the scope of Article 24 of the Staff Regulations to harassment stricto sensu. Consequently, he claims that in paragraphs 47, 53, 59, 60 and 61 of that judgment, the General Court erred in finding that that harassment could result only from individual, personal and active conduct on the part of the alleged harasser.

21

In that regard, the appellant adds that the General Court stated that the EEAS had rejected his request for assistance on account of the absence of harassment attributable to D and F. However, the appellant asserts that that request for assistance also related to passivity on the part of F, who tolerated a manifestly unlawful intention to discriminate expressed by C. That passivity on the part of F contributed de facto to the maintenance and aggravation of the alleged harassment. On account of the multiple persons involved and their relationship of subordination with the instigator of that harassment, C, the appellant submits, in essence, that that harassment was collective in nature.

22

In those circumstances, relying on paragraphs 126 and 127 of the judgment of 30 March 2022, KF v EIB (T‑299/20, EU:T:2022:171), the appellant complains that the General Court failed to take account of the fact that harassment may be carried out by ‘… several persons, belonging to the same institution, who act in a coordinated manner or, at the very least, in the same way’. Such an interpretation of the concept of ‘harassment’ presupposes that the EEAS conducts ‘a global assessment … of the various acts’ of the persons concerned, which the appellant ‘alleged were such as to prove the existence of psychological harassment’, under pain of altering the subject matter of the complaint. Therefore, according to the appellant, the General Court could not confine itself to an individual analysis of the conduct without taking account of the context.

23

Furthermore, by referring to several instances of passive conduct on the part of both D and F, the appellant complains, in essence, that the General Court misinterpreted the concept of ‘harassment’ by limiting it to active conduct, and required the appellant actively to demonstrate conduct which was, however, passive. The appellant submits that, contrary to the findings made by the General Court in paragraphs 47 and 60 of the judgment under appeal, it was not for him to demonstrate active, direct, specific and individual conduct on the part of his superiors in his marginalisation.

24

The EEAS contends that the first ground of appeal is inadmissible in so far as the appellant does not put forward any legal arguments in support of his claim that the General Court reduced the scope of Article 24 of the Staff Regulations, and that it is, in any event, unfounded.

25

In the first place, as regards the admissibility of the line of argument put forward by the appellant in support of his first ground of appeal, it should be noted that, by that line of argument, the appellant asks the Court to rule, inter alia, on the concept of ‘psychological harassment’, which is a point of law. Accordingly, the first ground of appeal is admissible.

26

In the second place, it should be noted that the General Court was called upon to rule on the concept of ‘harassment’, within the meaning of Article 12a(3) of the Staff Regulations, in an application for annulment of the decision rejecting in part the request for assistance under Article 24 of the Staff Regulations.

27

In that context, it should be noted that it is apparent from the case-law of the Court of Justice that where there is sufficient prima facie evidence of the allegations made in a request for assistance, the administration is required to open an administrative investigation in order to ascertain the facts and, having done so, to be able to take such measures of assistance as may be appropriate (see, to that effect, judgment of 7 December 2023, HV and HW v ECDC, C‑615/22 P, EU:C:2023:961, paragraph 46 and the case-law cited).

28

It follows that, where the allegations in a request for assistance concern psychological harassment, it is for the applicant for assistance to adduce prima facie evidence thereof, in the light of the definition of the concept of ‘psychological harassment’ in Article 12a(3) of the Staff Regulations.

29

In that regard, it should be recalled that that concept, within the meaning of that provision, is defined as ‘improper conduct’, which, first, takes the form of physical behaviour, spoken or written language, gestures or other acts, which takes place ‘over a period’ and is ‘repetitive or systematic’, suggesting that psychological harassment must be understood as a process that occurs over time and presupposes the existence of repetitive or continual behaviour which is ‘intentional’, as opposed to ‘accidental’. Second, in order to fall within that concept, such physical behaviour, spoken or written language, gestures or other acts must have the effect of undermining the personality, dignity or physical or psychological integrity of a person (judgments of 12 November 2020, Pethke v EUIPO, C‑382/19 P, EU:C:2020:917, paragraph 96, and of 2 June 2022, EM v Parliament, C‑299/21 P, EU:C:2022:429, paragraph 102).

30

It is thus apparent from the very wording of Article 12a(3) of the Staff Regulations that, as the Advocate General observed in point 20 of his Opinion, the concept of ‘psychological harassment’ is defined broadly and generically. In those circumstances, it is capable of encompassing any form of conduct or act which satisfies the two conditions referred to in the preceding paragraph of this judgment.

31

Accordingly, first, it cannot be ruled out that ‘psychological harassment’, within the meaning of that provision, may be committed collectively by several persons where their actions amount to one and the same conduct of harassment and each of them contributes to it by his individual and personal conduct. However, a person who considers himself or herself to be the victim of collective psychological harassment must adduce prima facie evidence, as is apparent from paragraphs 27 and 28 of the present judgment, not only of the individual and personal conduct of each of the alleged harassers, but also of the existence of some concertation between them. In the absence of coordinated conduct between the alleged harassers, the failure of a person to intervene to prevent abusive conduct on the part of another person of which he or she is aware does not, in principle, constitute psychological harassment on his or her part.

32

Second, it must be held that the concept of ‘conduct’, within the meaning of Article 12a(3) of the Staff Regulations, is capable of covering not only active conduct, but also passive conduct, such as marginalising or excluding an official or another member of staff in his or her place and in the employment relationship, or even a failure to act. In that regard, as the Advocate General observed, in essence, in point 31 of his Opinion, ‘passive’ psychological harassment must constitute ‘improper conduct’ and, on that basis, include a component requiring the intervention of its perpetrator, such as the refusal to communicate with someone, or ignoring or isolating them. ‘Passive’ conduct may therefore constitute ‘psychological harassment’, in so far as it reflects intentional individual behaviour, as opposed to ‘accidental’, occurring over time and having the effect of undermining the personality, dignity or physical or psychological integrity of a person.

33

In the present case, the appellant submits that the General Court erred in law by restricting the concept of ‘harassment’ solely to conduct, first, ‘individual’ and ‘personal’ and, second, ‘active’.

34

That line of argument cannot succeed.

35

It must be observed that, in paragraphs 47, 53 and 59 to 61 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court held, in essence, that the appellant had to adduce, in support of his request for assistance, prima facie evidence of individual and personal behaviour on the part of the person concerned by that request. In so doing, as the Advocate General observes in points 46 and 47 of his Opinion, the General Court did not rule out the possibility of passive and/or collective harassment as such. It merely rejected the existence, in the present case, of prima facie evidence of such harassment in the absence of any demonstration of the individual and personal involvement of D and F in that conduct.

36

It follows that, contrary to the appellant’s claims, the General Court did not err in law in the interpretation or in the application of the concept of ‘harassment’ or, consequently, in the examination of the subject matter of the request for assistance submitted by the appellant under Article 24 of the Staff Regulations.

37

Furthermore, the appellant’s arguments relating to the burden of proof must also fail. It is apparent from paragraphs 27 and 28 of the present judgment that it is for the person requesting assistance to adduce prima facie evidence. In the present case, the General Court stated, in paragraphs 46 to 53 of the judgment under appeal, that the evidence adduced by the appellant was not such as to call into question the plausibility of the assessments made by the administration and that the appellant had not adduced prima facie evidence to demonstrate that he had been subjected to harassment. Therefore, the General Court cannot be criticised either for having reversed the burden of proof or for having imposed on the appellant a disproportionate burden of proof.

38

More specifically, it follows in particular from paragraph 45 of the judgment under appeal that the General Court required the appellant not to adduce negative evidence, but to adduce at least prima facie evidence. In the absence of any prima facie evidence, the appellant cannot validly rely solely on inaction on the part of the administration and thus require a reversal of the burden of proof.

39

The first ground of appeal must therefore be rejected as unfounded.

40

The second ground of appeal is divided into two parts.

41

By the first part of his second ground of appeal, the appellant essentially criticises the General Court for having rejected the first part of his second plea in law, alleging an error of assessment of the facts attributable to D, on the ground that it, first, adopted an overly restrictive concept of ‘psychological harassment’, as is apparent from the first ground of appeal, and, second, made errors of law in the assessment of those facts.

42

In that connection, first, the appellant submits that the General Court distorted the content of I’s testimony referred to in paragraph 47 of the judgment under appeal, according to which D made, during an interview in 2017, ‘some positive comments on the quality of [the appellant’s] work’ and stated that the appellant ‘was treated normally’, but that he would ‘find it difficult to obtain a post as long as [he] continued to criticise [him]’. In that regard, the appellant claims that the addition of the object complement ‘him’ to the verb ‘to criticise’ changes the meaning of I’s testimony. According to the appellant, I testified to the retaliatory measures implemented and tolerated by the senior management following C’s policy of marginalising the appellant for having dared to act against the EEAS.

43

Second, the appellant criticises the General Court for not having taken into account his close professional relationship with C in the analysis of the argument concerning the proposal made to the appellant by D for the post of Deputy Head of EU Delegation to Vienna (Austria) responsible for the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). In that regard, the appellant submits that, in the circumstances of the present case, any objective person would have assessed that proposal as particularly vexatious. However, the General Court incorrectly required proof of the existence of a direct and close hierarchical link between the appellant and C in order to prove inappropriate conduct on the part of C towards the appellant. In addition, the General Court distorted the evidence by finding that D had informed the appellant that he was unaware of his ‘administrative difficulties’.

44

Third, the appellant claims an alleged contradiction in the factual findings made in paragraph 49 of the judgment under appeal. Although the General Court stated that the appellant refused a proposal for a post made to him by D, it does not accept that D could have influenced a recruitment procedure for such a post.

45

Fourth, the appellant maintains, as regards the accusations contained in the initial version of the evaluation report that the General Court analysed in paragraphs 50 and 51 of the judgment under appeal, that the removal of a disparaging element does not rule out its inexistence. In that regard, the appellant asserts that there is a contradiction between those remarks and the positive elements of the evaluation included in that initial version.

46

The EEAS submits that the first part of the second ground of appeal is manifestly inadmissible in so far as the appellant merely repeats the line of argument which he put forward before the General Court without submitting any criticism concerning the reasoning followed by the General Court in the judgment under appeal and disputes the manner in which the General Court assessed the evidence submitted to it, which falls outside the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice on appeal. In any event, that first part is unfounded.

47

First, with regard to the alleged distortion of the content of I’s testimony referred to in paragraph 47 of the judgment under appeal, it must be recalled that while a distortion of the evidence may consist in an interpretation of a document contrary to its content, it is not sufficient, in order to establish such a distortion, to show that that document could have been interpreted differently from the interpretation adopted by the General Court. To that end, it is necessary to establish that the General Court manifestly exceeded the limits of a reasonable assessment of the said document, in particular by reading it in a manner contrary to its wording (judgments of 25 February 2021, Dalli v Commission, C‑615/19 P, EU:C:2021:133, paragraph 139; of 23 March 2023, PV v Commission, C‑640/20 P, EU:C:2023:232, paragraph 134; and of 12 December 2024, DD v FRA, C‑130/22 P, EU:C:2024:1018, paragraph 48).

48

In the present case, by merely asserting that, by adding the object complement ‘him’ to the verb ‘to criticise’, the General Court changed the meaning of I’s testimony, the appellant has failed to demonstrate that the General Court manifestly exceeded the limits of a reasonable assessment of that testimony.

49

Accordingly, the argument alleging distortion of the content of that testimony must be rejected as unfounded.

50

As regards, second, the alleged distortion by the General Court concerning the proposal for the post of Deputy Head of EU Delegation to Vienna responsible for the OSCE, it should be noted that the appellant has not put forward any argument capable of establishing that the General Court manifestly exceeded the limits of a reasonable assessment of the evidence resulting from the documents in the file. The appellant merely sets out a possible alternative interpretation of the facts and evidence adduced before the General Court. Under the guise of a distortion of the evidence, the appellant is, in actual fact, seeking to obtain a new assessment of the facts and evidence adduced at first instance.

51

It is apparent from Article 256 TFEU and the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union that an appeal lies on points of law only. Accordingly, the General Court has exclusive jurisdiction to find and appraise the relevant facts and to assess the evidence adduced before it. The appraisal of those facts and the assessment of that evidence do not, save where the facts or evidence are distorted, constitute a point of law which is subject, as such, to review by the Court of Justice on appeal (judgments of 21 September 2023, ChinaChamber of Commerce for Import and Export of Machinery and Electronic Products and Others v Commission, C‑478/21 P, EU:C:2023:685, paragraph 157, and of 18 December 2025, Hamoudi v Frontex, C‑136/24 P, EU:C:2025:977, paragraph 59 and the case-law cited).

52

Consequently, the line of argument referred to in paragraph 50 of the present judgment must be rejected as inadmissible.

53

Third, as regards the arguments relating to the alleged contradiction in the findings of fact made in paragraph 49 of the judgment under appeal and to the accusations contained in the initial version of the evaluation report which the General Court analysed in paragraphs 50 and 51 of that judgment, it should be noted that, by those arguments, the appellant is in fact seeking, under the guise of claims of contradictions, to challenge the factual assessments and the findings made by the General Court as regards the evidence adduced before it. In the context of his line of argument, the appellant has neither alleged nor, a fortiori, demonstrated any distortion of that evidence.

54

Consequently, in the light of the case-law referred to in paragraph 51 of the present judgment, that line of argument must be rejected as inadmissible.

55

The first part of the second ground of appeal must, therefore, be rejected in its entirety.

56

By the second part of his second ground of appeal, the appellant essentially criticises the General Court for having rejected the second part of his second plea in law, alleging an error of assessment of the facts attributable to F, on the ground that it, first, adopted an overly restrictive concept of ‘psychological harassment’, as is apparent from the first ground of appeal, and, second, made errors of law in the assessment of those facts.

57

First, the appellant criticises the assessment in paragraph 57 of the judgment under appeal, maintaining that the evidence in the file showed an EEAS practice of presenting a negative and false version of the appellant, of his administrative history and of discrediting every one of his actions. In his view, that evidence in the file should have been regarded by the General Court as sufficient to justify the opening of an administrative investigation.

58

Second, the appellant complains that, in paragraph 62 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court failed to take into consideration the role and duties of F, responsible for administration, in particular of resources, and of recruitment and selection procedures.

59

Third, the appellant submits that in paragraph 63 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court distorted the content of his application concerning the argument highlighting an alleged attempt by F to force him to leave his employment for another.

60

Fourth, the appellant essentially criticises the General Court for having examined, in paragraph 64 of the judgment under appeal, the letter sent to the appellant’s representative on 23 March 2020 in isolation and not in the overall context of the case.

61

The EEAS submits that the second part of the second ground of appeal is manifestly inadmissible and, in any event, manifestly unfounded.

62

As regards the second part of the second ground of appeal, it should be noted that by the latter, the appellant seeks, in actual fact, to obtain a new assessment of the facts, without demonstrating or even alleging distortion of those facts, which, according to the case-law referred to in paragraph 51 of the present judgment, falls outside the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice in the context of an appeal.

63

The second part of the second ground of appeal must therefore be rejected as inadmissible and consequently the second ground of appeal must be rejected in its entirety.

64

The third ground of appeal is divided into three parts.

65

By the first part of his third ground of appeal, the appellant criticises the General Court for having rejected the first part of his first plea in law, alleging wrongful failure to implement interim protection measures with respect to him. The appellant claims, in essence, that the General Court, first, erred in law in considering that the EEAS had not acted in breach of its duty to have regard for his welfare and, second, undermined the unity of the case-law concerning the presumption of innocence. In that regard, the appellant puts forward the argument that, in paragraphs 37 and 69 to 72 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court restricted the scope of his complaint, which did not concern only D and F.

66

More specifically, the appellant claims that, in taking the view that the EEAS was justified in not adopting any interim measure in respect of the appellant, the General Court prejudged the results and consequences of the investigation regarding the persons concerned. He maintains that the consideration that the adoption of an interim measure would have undermined the presumption of innocence of those persons would nullify the very objective of the rule which seeks to legitimise the adoption of interim measures, even imposed on the complainant or on the person concerned by an investigation, in order precisely to avoid prejudging the outcome of that investigation and undermining its useful execution. According to the appellant, the case-law is unanimous on the fact that such a measure does not, in itself, infringe the presumption of innocence or constitute a penalty.

67

The EEAS contends that the first part of the third ground of appeal is unfounded.

68

In so far as the appellant alleges that the General Court erred in law in finding that the EEAS had not acted in breach of its duty to have regard for the welfare of officials, it should be noted that that duty constitutes, in accordance with settled case-law, a concept reflecting the balance of reciprocal rights and obligations established by the Staff Regulations in the relationship between the administration and civil servants, bearing in mind that that balance implies, in particular, that when the administration takes a decision concerning the situation of an official, it should take into consideration all the factors which may affect its decision and that when doing so it should take into account not only the interests of the service but also those of the official concerned (judgments of 12 November 2020, Fleig v EEAS, C‑446/19 P, EU:C:2020:918, paragraph 67, and of 15 April 2021, FV v Council, C‑875/19 P, EU:C:2021:283, paragraph 98).

69

In the light of the requirement to strike such a balance, the General Court was entitled to hold, in paragraphs 69 and 70 of the judgment under appeal, that, in the absence of prima facie evidence of the existence of psychological harassment allegedly committed by D and F, the EEAS was under no obligation to open an administrative investigation in respect of those persons or to adopt further interim protection measures in the form of informal protection measures or financial assistance. As has been pointed out in paragraph 27 of the present judgment, it is only where the administration is faced with prima facie evidence that it must take appropriate measures.

70

Furthermore, as regards the appellant’s argument that the General Court prejudged the results and consequences of the investigation in respect of the persons concerned, it should be noted that that argument is based on a misreading of paragraph 71 of the judgment under appeal. More specifically, in that paragraph, the General Court concluded, first, that the appellant’s argument based on Commission Decision C(2006) 1624/3 of 26 April 2006 on [the European Commission policy on] protecting the dignity of the person and preventing psychological harassment and sexual harassment was ineffective, given that the protective measures identified therein had no bearing on the decision whether or not to open an administrative investigation following a request for assistance. Second, it also stated that Decision C(2006) 1624/3 does not call into question, as such, the requirements established by the case-law concerning the processing of a request for assistance, in particular as regards the requirement of prima facie evidence and respect for the presumption of innocence of the perpetrators of alleged psychological harassment.

71

As regards the appellant’s claim concerning the General Court’s undermining of the unity of the case-law concerning the presumption of innocence, it must be held, first, that the appellant does not refer to any case-law which has been infringed by the General Court and, second, that it does not in any way follow from paragraphs 70 and 71 of the judgment under appeal that the General Court considered that an interim measure would, in itself, infringe the presumption of innocence or constitute a penalty.

72

In the light of the foregoing considerations, the first part of the third ground of appeal must be rejected as unfounded.

73

By the second part of his third ground of appeal, the appellant criticises the General Court for having rejected the second part of his first plea in law, alleging that the threats made to the appellant were unlawful.

74

In that regard, the appellant states that, in paragraph 75 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court held that his arguments concerning the unlawfulness of the threats made by the EEAS were ineffective. Given that the decision rejecting in part the request for assistance was adopted under Article 24 of the Staff Regulations, the appellant maintains that his request for assistance was considered sufficiently serious to justify the opening of a lengthy administrative investigation in respect of C and E. In those circumstances, the appellant submits that it was therefore particularly inappropriate to remind him that he was exposed to disciplinary proceedings, on the ground that he could have acted in breach of his duty of loyalty by disclosing allegedly professional information. In addition, in the appellant’s view, the General Court distorted the concept of ‘threat’ in so far as it held, in paragraph 76 of the judgment under appeal, that the elements in the decision rejecting in part the request for assistance noted by the appellant did not constitute threats.

75

The EEAS contends that the second part of the third ground of appeal is unfounded.

76

As regards the second part of the third ground of appeal, it must be held that it is worded in a manner that is obscure and lacking a coherent structure, with the result that its content does not make it possible to understand the appellant’s legal reasoning in that second part.

77

It must be recalled that it follows from the second subparagraph of Article 256(1) TFEU, the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and Article 168(1)(d) and Article 169(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice that an appeal must indicate precisely the contested elements of the judgment which the appellant seeks to have set aside and also the legal arguments specifically advanced in support of the appeal, failing which the appeal or the ground of appeal concerned is to be inadmissible (judgments of 15 April 2021, FV v Council, C‑875/19 P, EU:C:2021:283, paragraph 26, and of 25 January 2022, Commission v European Food and Others, C‑638/19 P, EU:C:2022:50, paragraph 75).

78

In particular, a ground of appeal supported by an argument that is not sufficiently clear and precise to enable the Court to exercise its powers of judicial review, in particular because essential elements on which the ground of appeal relies are not indicated sufficiently coherently and intelligibly in the text of the appeal, which is worded in a vague and ambiguous manner in that regard, does not satisfy those requirements and must be declared inadmissible. The Court has also held that an appeal lacking any coherent structure which simply makes general statements and contains no specific indications as to the points of the decision under appeal which may be vitiated by an error of law must be dismissed as clearly inadmissible (judgments of 4 October 2018, Staelen v European Ombudsman, C‑45/18 P, EU:C:2018:814, paragraph 15, and of 15 April 2021, FV v Council, C‑875/19 P, EU:C:2021:283, paragraph 27).

79

Accordingly, in the light of the case-law cited in paragraphs 77 and 78 of the present judgment, the second part of the third ground of appeal must be rejected as inadmissible.

80

By the third part of his third ground of appeal, the appellant complains that the General Court rejected the third part of his first plea in law, alleging a lack of impartiality and a conflict of interest on the part of the author of the decision rejecting in part the request for assistance. In that regard, the appellant submits, in essence, that, in so far as his right to be heard was not respected during the complaint procedure, which, moreover, was closed four months after his complaint was lodged, the conduct of that procedure did not make it possible to regularise the definitive loss of his right to have the preliminary analysis of his request for assistance carried out by a competent appointing authority and at an appropriate time.

81

In those circumstances, the appellant criticises the General Court for having held, in paragraphs 85 to 89 of the judgment under appeal, that that complaint procedure had made it possible to correct the irregularity linked to that lack of impartiality and that conflict of interest. Furthermore, the appellant adds that the Secretary-General of the EEAS, acting as appointing authority, never took the time to reply to him because he did not consider himself to be responsible for dealing with his complaint.

82

The EEAS considers, inter alia, that the appellant did not claim at first instance that he was deprived of his right to be heard by the appointing authority in good time. The third part of the third ground of appeal is therefore inadmissible on the ground that it is a new plea in law, raised for the first time on appeal and, in any event, unfounded.

83

It should be noted that the appellant has not asserted infringement of his right to be heard before the General Court. An argument put forward for the first time in an appeal must be rejected as inadmissible.

84

Under the second sentence of Article 170(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the subject matter of the proceedings before the General Court may not be changed in the appeal.

85

Furthermore, in accordance with settled case-law, to allow a party to put forward for the first time before the Court of Justice a plea and arguments which it did not raise before the General Court would be to authorise it to bring before the Court of Justice, whose jurisdiction in appeals is limited, a case of wider ambit than that which came before the General Court. In an appeal, the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice is confined to review of the findings of law on the pleas and arguments debated before the General Court (see judgments of 1 June 1994, Commission v Brazzelli Lualdi and Others, C‑136/92 P, EU:C:1994:211, paragraph 59; of 11 September 2019, HX v Council, C‑540/18 P, EU:C:2019:707, paragraph 37; and of 27 February 2025, OA v Parliament, C‑32/24 P, EU:C:2025:118, paragraph 22).

86

It follows that the third part of the third ground of appeal must be rejected as inadmissible.

87

Accordingly, the third ground of appeal must be rejected in its entirety.

88

By his fourth ground of appeal, the appellant complains that the General Court rejected the third and fourth pleas in law, alleging misuse of powers. He disputes, in essence, the findings of the General Court in paragraphs 99 to 103 of the judgment under appeal. As regards, in particular, the prohibition on referring the matter to the Belgian judicial authorities or that on seeking the assistance of a Member of Parliament, which, in his view, result from the decision rejecting in part the request for assistance, the appellant submits, in essence, that those prohibitions are not alleged, but at least implicit in the absence of tacit authorisation.

89

The EEAS disputes the admissibility of that ground of appeal on the ground that the line of argument put forward in support of it is extremely confused, with the result that it does not enable it to understand what is alleged against the General Court.

90

It must be held that the line of argument put forward by the appellant in support of his fourth ground of appeal does not satisfy the requirements set out in paragraphs 77 and 78 of the present judgment. That ground of appeal is worded in an obscure and ambiguous manner and its content does not allow the appellant’s legal reasoning to be followed in order for the Court to be able to carry out a review of legality on that basis. Furthermore, that line of argument refers, to a large extent, to the assessment of the facts, which, save where those facts have been distorted, cannot be subject to review by the Court of Justice on appeal.

91

Accordingly, the fourth ground of appeal must be rejected as inadmissible.

92

Since none of the four grounds of appeal raised by the appellant has been upheld, the appeal must be dismissed in its entirety.

93

In accordance with Article 184(2) of the Rules of Procedure, where the appeal is unfounded, the Court is to make a decision as to the costs. Under Article 138(1) of those rules, which applies to appeal proceedings by virtue of Article 184(1) thereof, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.

94

Since the EEAS has applied for costs against the appellant, and the latter has been unsuccessful, the appellant must be ordered to pay the costs.

On those grounds, the Court (Second Chamber) hereby: