13The defendant points out that Article 173 of the EC Treaty does not as a rule entitle natural or legal persons to appeal against measures having general application, such as Council regulations.
14The defendant states that it follows not only from the title of the contested act but also from its content that it has general application. In any event, Article 2 of Regulation No 2613/97 is not of individual concern to the applicants; nor is it of direct concern to them, since it leaves a discretion to the Member States until the end of the 2000/2001 marketing year.
15The applicants state that Article 2 of Regulation No 2613/97 entails a legal effect, namely a prohibition on aid from the 2001/2002 marketing year. That prohibition concerns them directly, since Article 2 does not require implementing measures on the part of the national authorities.
16They further submit that Italian sugar beet producers in southern Italy are especially affected by the contested provision. Those producers have a significant interest in the extension beyond the 2000/2001 marketing year of a system which, albeit subject to gradual reductions, allows aid to be granted to offset the disadvantages peculiar to the cultivation of sugar beet in southern Italy. The applicants point out that the only beet-producing areas in Europe affected by a national industrial restructuring scheme (the ‘piano bieticolo saccarifero’), the implementation of which requires that aid be continued, are the very areas in which they operate. In those circumstances, the contested provision is of individual concern to the applicants.
17Under the fourth paragraph of Article 173 of the Treaty the admissibility of an action for annulment brought by a natural or legal person against a regulation is subject to the condition that the contested regulation is in reality a decision which concerns the applicant directly and individually. It has also been held that the criterion for distinguishing between a regulation and a decision must be sought in the general application or otherwise of the measure in question (see, for example, order in Case C-168/93 Government of Gibraltar and Gibraltar Development Corporation v Council [1993] ECR I-4009, paragraph 11, and order in Case T-107/94 Kik v Council and Commission [1995] ECR II-1717, paragraph 35). An act has general application if it applies to objectively determined situations and entails legal effects for categories of persons regarded generally and in the abstract (Case 307/81 Alusuisse Italia v Council and Commission [1982] ECR 3463, paragraph 9, Case C-321/95 P Greenpeace Council and Others v Commission [1998] ECR I-1651, paragraphs 27 and 28, and order in Kik v Council and Commission, cited above, paragraph 35).
18Article 2 of Regulation No 2613/97 provides that the aid referred to in Article 1 of that regulation and those referred to in Article 46 of Regulation No 1785/81 are to be abolished with effect from the 2001/2002 marketing year. Such a measure applies to an objectively determined situation and entails legal effects for categories of persons regarded generally and in the abstract, namely the Member States and sugar beet producers. It is therefore a measure of general application.
19None the less, it has been held that in certain circumstances a provision in a measure of general scope may be of individual concern to certain of the economic operators concerned (Case C-358/89 Extramet Industrie v Council [1991] ECR I-2501, paragraph 13, and Case C-308/89 Codorniu v Council [1994] ECR I-1853, paragraph 19). In such a case a Community measure may be of a legislative nature and, at the same time, vis-à-vis some of the economic operators concerned, in the nature of a decision (Joined Cases T-481/93 and T-484/93 Vereniging van Exporteurs in Levende Varkens and Others v Commission [1995] ECR II-2941, paragraph 50). That is so where the provision in question affects natural or legal persons by reason of certain attributes which are peculiar to them or by reason of circumstances in which they are differentiated from all other persons (Cordorniu v Council, cited above, paragraph 20; Case T-12/93 Comité Central d'Entreprise de la Société Anonyme de Vittel and Others v Commission [1995] ECR II-1247, paragraph 36).
20In the light of that line of decisions, it is appropriate to determine whether in the present case the applicants are concerned by Article 2 of Regulation No 2613/97 by reason of certain attributes which are peculiar to them or by reason of circumstances in which, for the purposes of that provision, they are differentiated from all other persons.
21It is clear that even if the regulation is susceptible of affecting the applicants' situation, that circumstance is not sufficient to differentiate them from all other persons. The contested provision concerns them only by reason of their objective attribute as economic operators active in the sugar beet sector, in the same way as any economic operator engaged in the same business in the European Community.
22Admittedly, a comparison between the system currently applicable in southern Italy and that applicable in the other regions of Italy and in Spain (see paragraph 2 above) shows that the effects of Article 2 of Regulation No 2613/97 are likely to be felt more severely in southern Italy, since the gradual reduction in the amount of authorised aid is less pronounced than in the other regions. However, the fact that the contested provision may have different specific effects on the various persons to whom it applies is not inconsistent with its nature as a regulation (see, in that regard, order in Case C-409/96 P Sveriges Betodlares and Henrikson v Commission [1997] ECR I-7531, paragraph 37, and Case T-472/93 Campo Ebro and Others v Council [1995] ECR II-421, paragraph 36). Furthermore, in relation to the system of authorisation of aid established by Article 46(2) of Regulation No 1785/81 and the system of prohibition established by Article 2 of Regulation No 2613/97, the applicants are in any event in the same situation as any other Italian sugar beet producer operating in southern Italy (see, by analogy, orders in Case 34/88 Cooperative Agricole de l'Anjou et du Poitou and Others v Council [1988] ECR 6265, paragraph 15, Case C-10/95 P Asociación Española de Empresas de L Carne (Asocarne) v Council [1995] ECR I-4149, paragraph 42, and Joined Cases T-14/97 and T-15/97 Sofivo and Others v Council [1998] ECR II-2601, paragraph 37).
23It follows from all those considerations that Regulation No 2613/97 cannot be regarded as being of individual concern to the applicants. The applicants therefore do not meet the conditions of admissibility laid down in the fourth paragraph of Article 173 of the Treaty.
24It follows from all the foregoing that the present application must be dismissed as inadmissible without there being any need to determine the applications for leave to intervene.