12The Commission points out that the applicant has not indicated in its application whether it based its action for annulment on the second or the fourth paragraph of Article 173 of the Treaty. If the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 173 of the Treaty, the applicant — in the Commission's submission — does not have standing to bring proceedings, since it cannot in any way be treated as if it were a Member State. If the action is based on the fourth paragraph of Article 173 of the Treaty, the applicant does not satisfy the conditions governing admissibility laid down therein since the contested regulation, which clearly is of general application, is not of individual concern to it. The action must therefore be dismissed as inadmissible, whatever its legal basis may be.
13The applicant claims that it has standing to bring proceedings against the contested regulation on the basis of the second paragraph of Article 173 of the Treaty by virtue of an alleged ‘delegation of authority’ from the Italian Republic, which has entrusted it with responsibility for exercising its powers ‘relating to the implementation of Community acts’, inter alia in the context of agriculture, thus enabling it to ‘challenge such acts before the Community judicature’ where it considers that they adversely affect its interests.
14In the alternative, the applicant claims that its action should be deemed admissible at least on the basis of the fourth paragraph of Article 173 of the Treaty. The contested regulation is ‘in the nature of a decision’ in so far as the amount of the unit production aid that may be paid in advance, which is based on the estimated olive-oil production of each Member State concerned, is determined by reference to a ‘certain number of producers’. The applicant is individually concerned by the regulation by reason of the ‘agricultural economy’ of the Puglia region, where ‘olive growing is of fundamental importance and accounts for over a fifth of all farmland’, and which, in absolute terms, is the largest olive-oil producer in the Community, together with Andalusia. Its standing to bring proceedings is therefore based on the ‘territorial nature’ of its specific interest in challenging the contested regulation, which, by reducing the amount of aid that may be paid in advance, ‘adversely affects the regional economy’: that specific interest represents the ‘sum of the interests of producers’ of olive oil and distinguishes the applicant in such a way as to render it unnecessary to consider whether or not it is a direct olive-oil producer.
15Article 114 of the Rules of Procedure provides that, where a party applies to the Court of First Instance for a decision on admissibility not going to the substance of the case, the remainder of the proceedings concerning the plea of inadmissibility are to be oral, unless the Court otherwise decides. In the present case, the Court considers that it has sufficient information in the documents before it and that it is therefore appropriate to rule on the application without initiating an oral procedure and without taking the preliminary measures of inquiry suggested by the applicant.
16The applicant cannot, in its capacity as a regional body, rely on the second paragraph of Article 173 of the Treaty. It is clear from the general scheme of the Treaty that the term ‘Member State’, for the purposes of the provisions relating to proceedings before the Community courts, refers only to the government authorities of the Member States of the European Communities and cannot be extended to the governments of regions, irrespective of the powers they may have (order in Case C-95/97 Région Wallonne v Commission [1997] ECR I-1787, paragraph 6; order in Case C-180/97 Regione Toscana v Commission [1997] ECR I-5245, paragraph 6; judgment in Case T-214/95 Vlaams Gewest v Commission [1998] ECR II-717, paragraph 28; and order in Case T-238/97 Comunidad Autónoma de Cantabria v Council [1998] ECR II-2271, paragraph 42).
17On the other hand, since it possesses legal personality under Italian national law — which the Commission does not dispute —, the applicant may, in principle, bring an action for annulment under the fourth paragraph of Article 173 of the Treaty, which provides that any natural or legal person may institute proceedings against a decision addressed to that person or against a decision which, although in the form of a regulation or a decision addressed to another person, is of direct and individual concern to the former.
18In the contested regulation, the Commission fixed the estimated production of olive oil and the amount of the unit production aid that may be paid in advance for the 1996/97 marketing year. Contrary to the applicant's claims, the regulation in question is quite clearly addressed to all olive-oil producers established in the Community who are eligible for production aid, and there are therefore no grounds for regarding it as being ‘in the nature of a decision’.
19As regards whether the contested regulation is of direct and individual concern to the applicant within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of Article 173 of the Treaty, the applicant claims that the contested regulation is of individual concern to it because the reduction in the amount of aid that may be paid in advance to olive-oil producers has significant socio-economic consequences for the Puglia region, which, it submits, is the largest olive-oil producer in the Community, along with Andalusia.
20The Court finds that the contested regulation relates essentially to the amount of the unit production aid that may be paid in advance to olive-oil producers, as from October 1997, for the 1996/97 marketing year, subject to recovery of any difference between the amount paid in advance and the amount definitively established at the end of the marketing year. The contested regulation is therefore of concern to Community olive-oil producers.
21As the Court recently held in Comunidad Autónoma de Cantabria ν Council, cited above (paragraph 49), the general interest which a region, as a body responsible for the economic and social affairs within its jurisdiction, may have in obtaining a result that is favourable to the economic prosperity of the region, is not sufficient on its own to enable that body to be regarded as being concerned, or — a fortiori — individually concerned, for the purposes of the fourth paragraph of Article 173 of the Treaty, by the provisions of the contested regulation (see also, to the same effect, Case C-295/92 Landbouwschap ν Commission [1992] ECR I-5003, paragraph 12, and Joined Cases 197/80 to 200/80, 243/80, 245/80 and 247/80 Ludwigshafener Walzmühle Erling and Others v Council and Commission [1981] ECR 1041, paragraphs 8 and 9).
22It is not therefore sufficient, in order for an action brought by a regional authority of a Member State such as Regione Puglia to be held to be admissible, for that authority to rely on the fact that the application or the implementation of a Community act is capable of having a general effect on the socio-economic conditions in its region (see Comunidad Autónoma de Cantabria v Council, paragraph 50).
23It follows from all the foregoing considerations that the action must be dismissed as inadmissible in so far as it is directed against the Commission.