19The applicants maintain, in their application, that the contested regulation is of direct and individual concern to them inasmuch as they have been manufacturing and marketing for many years ‘tourons’ by the names of ‘Jijona’ and ‘Alicante’. In that connection, they produce sales invoices for those products, dating from 1963 in the case of Biscuiterie-confiserie LOR and from 1974 in the case of Confiserie du Tech. In their reply, they conclude that, contrary to the Commission's contention, they find themselves, as a result, in a situation similar to that of the applicant in the case which gave rise to the judgment of the Court of Justice in Case C-309/89 Codorniu v Council [1994] ECR I-1853.
20While not formally raising an objection of inadmissibility, the Commission submits that the action is inadmissible on the ground that the conditions laid down in the fourth paragraph of Article 173 of the EC Treaty are not satisfied.
21First of all, according to the Commission, the contested regulation, like basic Regulation No 2081/92, is an act of general application within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 189 of the Treaty. It is not addressed to specific operators but to all producers of ‘tourons’ who are likely to be eligible to register names, as well as to all those who, although having used those names, do not meet the conditions laid down by the Community legislation. Since what is concerned is a legislative measure, the action is therefore inadmissible, in accordance with settled case-law (Case 307/81 Alusuisse v Council and Commission [1982] ECR 3463 and Joined Cases 250/86 and 11/87 RAR v Council and Commission [1989] ECR 2045, summary publication).
22Secondly, the approach adopted by the Court in its judgment in Codorniu, cited above, cannot be applied to the facts in the present case. In Codorniu, the Court took the view that the applicant company was individually concerned by the provision at issue, contained in a regulation, because that provision had the effect of preventing it from using the graphic trade mark which it had registered in accordance with national law and which it had been using both before and after such registration. In the present case, on the other hand, the applicants are not in such a distinctive situation; they rely merely on the fact that they have been using for several years the names ‘Jijona’ and ‘Alicante’ for the ‘tourons’ they manufacture. That is not at all sufficient, in itself, to show that they are individually concerned by the contested regulation. In that connection, the Commission points out that Regulation No 1107/96 provides protection for registered names by reserving use of them to producers from the area which such names describe and by excluding all other producers. The applicants are thus concerned to the same extent as every other economic operator who is, actually or potentially, in the same situation as theirs.
23The Spanish Government also contends that the action is inadmissible. In its submission the contested regulation is of a legislative nature and, in any event, the applicants are not individually concerned in the sense defined by the Court of Justice in its judgment in Codorniu, cited above, in that they are not, and have never been, holders of any registration conferring on them the right to use the names ‘Jijona’ or ‘Alicante’.
24Under Article 113 of the Rules of Procedure, the Court, giving its decision in accordance with Article 114(3) and (4), may at any time, of its own motion, consider whether there exists any absolute bar to proceeding with an action, including, according to settled case-law, the conditions governing the admissibility of an action which are laid down in Article 173 of the Treaty (judgments of the Court of Justice in Case 169/84 Co faz v Commission [1986] ECR 391, paragraph 2, and Case C-313/90 CIRFS and Others v Commission [1993] ECR I-1125, paragraph 23; judgment of the Court of First Instance in Case T-239/94 EISA v Commission [1997] ECR II-1839, paragraph 26, and order of the Court of First Instance in Case T-100/94 Michailidis and Others v Commission [1998] ECR II-3115, paragraph 49).
25In the present case, the Court finds that it has sufficient information from the documents on the file to enable it to rule on the admissibility of the action without opening the oral procedure.
26Under the fourth paragraph of Article 173 of the Treaty, the admissibility of an action brought by a natural or legal person for annulment of a regulation is subject to the condition that the regulation at issue be in reality a decision which is of direct and individual concern to the applicant. According to settled case-law, the criterion for distinguishing between a regulation and a decision must be sought in the general application or otherwise of the act in question (orders of the Court of Justice in Case C-10/95 P Asocarne v Council [1995] ECR I-4149, paragraph 28, and in Case C-87/95 P CNPAAP v Council [1996] ECR I-2003, paragraph 33). A measure is of general application if it applies to objectively determined situations and produces its legal effects with respect to categories of persons envisaged in the abstract (see, for example, Case T-482/93 Weber v Commission [1996] ECR II-609, paragraph 55).
27In the present case, the contested regulation protects the names ‘Jijona’ and ‘Turrón de Alicante’, among others, as geographical indications as provided for by Regulation No 2081/92, ‘geographical indication’ being defined in Article 2(2)(b) thereof as the name of a region, a specific place or, in exceptional cases, a country, used to describe an agricultural product or a foodstuff originating in that region, specific place or country, and which possesses a specific quality, reputation or other characteristics attributable to that geographical origin and the production and/or processing and/or preparation of which take place in the defined geographical area. As the Commission rightly points out, far from being addressed to specific economic operators, such as the applicants, the contested regulation confers on any undertaking whose products fulfil the prescribed geographical and qualitative requirements the right to market them under one of the aforementioned names, and denies that right to any undertaking whose products do not fulfil those conditions, which are identical for all producers.
28That regulation therefore clearly constitutes a measure of general application within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 189 of the Treaty. It applies to objectively determined situations and produces its legal effects with respect to categories of persons envisaged in the abstract, namely any undertaking which manufactures a product having objectively defined characteristics.
29Accordingly, Regulation No 1107/96 is, by nature and by virtue of its sphere of application, of a legislative nature and does not constitute a decision within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of Article 189 of the Treaty, a point which the applicants do not in any event dispute.
30None the less, it is conceivable that a provision which is, by nature and by virtue of its sphere of application, of a legislative nature could be of individual concern to natural or legal persons where it affects them by reason of certain attributes which are peculiar to them or by reason of factual circumstances which differentiate them from all other persons and by virtue of these factors distinguishes them individually just as in the case of the addressee of a decision (Codorniu v Council, cited above, paragraphs 19 and 20, and Weber v Commission, cited above, paragraph 56).
31In that connection, the applicants claim that they have been using the names ‘Jijona’ and ‘Alicante’ in France for many years when marketing the ‘tourons’ they manufacture, and that they are therefore in a situation similar to that of the applicant in Codorniu, cited above.
32However, it should be borne in mind that, in Codorniu, the applicant undertaking was prevented by a legislative provision regulating the use of a designation from using the graphic trade mark which it had registered and used a long time before the adoption of the regulation at issue, so that it was distinguished from any other trader. It follows from that judgment, as interpreted by the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance, that a legislative provision may be of individual concern to an economic operator in so far as it adversely affects that operator's specific rights (orders of the Court of Justice in Asocarne v Council, cited above, paragraph 43, and CNPAAP v Council, cited above, paragraph 36; judgment of the Court of First Instance in Weber v Commission, cited above, paragraph 67, and order in Michailidis v Commission, cited above, paragraph 66).
33However, in the present case, the applicants have neither shown nor indeed claimed that the use of the geographical names in respect of which they claim rights stems from a similar specific right which they acquired at national or Community level before the adoption of the contested regulation and which has been adversely affected by that regulation in the sense defined in the case-law cited above.
34The Court observes, moreover, that, as the applicants themselves pointed out in their pleadings, many other major manufacturers of ‘tourons’ used the names ‘Jijona’ and ‘Alicante’ for products which also did not originate in the geographical areas which those names indicate. Accordingly, the mere fact that they used the geographical names in question cannot, a fortiori, suffice to distinguish them from all the other economic operators affected by the contested regulation.
35It follows from the foregoing considerations that the contested regulation is not of individual concern to the applicants within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of Article 173 of the Treaty and that, accordingly, the application must be dismissed as inadmissible.