26The Commission considers that the action is manifestly inadmissible on the ground that it is out of time. The applicant is relying on the letter of 12 May 1995 to reopen the period for bringing proceedings laid down in Article 173 of the Treaty.
27First, the Commission claims that since the DAFSE's letters of 10 April and 6 August 1991 and, in any event, since the letter of 20 January 1993, the applicant had been aware of the amount of the contributions certified by the Member State and knew that it was required to reimburse the sum of ESC 17323265 to the Commission. In that regard, the Commission maintains that it did not adopt a formal decision addressed to the applicant and, moreover, was no longer competent to do so, since the Community's rights had been transferred to the DAFSE following the reimbursement to the ESF in May 1991 of the sums payable by the applicant. Even on the assumption that it adopted a decision to reduce the ESF assistance, that decision was incorporated in resolution No 3/93, which the applicant received by letter of 20 January 1993 from the DAFSE, which required the applicant to repay the sums in issue.
28Secondly, the Commission maintains in its answer to the question put by the Court that in any event the applicant duly received its letter of 6 October 1993 in which it informed the applicant of its decision of 2 December 1991 concerning the amount of final ESF assistance. Despite the absence of an acknowledgement of receipt of that letter, it is established that the applicant was actually aware of it at that time and not only when it received the letter of 12 May 1995. The applicant's letters of 30 October and 23 November 1993 make express reference to the Commission's letter of 6 October 1993.
29The Commission further states that it informed the applicant by letter of 8 December 1993 that the file had been closed since 2 December 1991, and again referred to its letter of 6 October 1993.
30Consequently, for the purpose of bringing proceedings for the annulment of the Commission's decision reducing the assistance, which took the form of the recovery order of 2 December 1991 giving concrete form to the accounting procedure closing the ESF file in question (Case C-199/91 Foyer Culturel du Sart-Tilman v Commission [1993] ECR I-2667, paragraph 21), time began to run on 6 October 1993, when the applicant acquired precise knowledge of the content of the measure in question and of the reasons on which it was based (Case 236/86 Dillinger Hüttenwerke v Commission [1988] ECR 3761, paragraph 14, and Joined Cases T-432/93, T-433/93 and T-434/93 Socttrte and Others v Commission [1995] ECR II-503, paragraph 49).
31The applicant contends that the contested decision was not notified to it until 15 May 1995, in a letter of 12 May 1995 from the member of the Commission responsible for social affairs and employment, and that the present action was therefore brought within the two-month period provided for in the fifth paragraph of Article 173 of the Treaty.
32The applicant argues that the measures taken by the DAFSE were merely preparatory to the contested decision. Thus the letter of 10 April 1991 from the DAFSE stated that the demand for repayment of the sums improperly received was sent without prejudice to a subsequent decision of the Commission. The Commission adopted such a decision reducing the assistance on 2 December 1991 but did not notify it to the applicant until 15 May 1995. The other communications from the DAFSE to which the Commission refers, in particular resolution No 3/93 enclosed with the letter of 20 January 1993, make no reference to any decision of the Commission.
33The applicant maintains that it has no record of the letter of 6 October 1993 to which the Commission refers. Although the applicant does not dispute that the letter was actually sent, it points out that the address to which it was sent was not that of its registered office. Moreover, since the letter related to two files it may have been placed in the other file.
34In any event, the content of the Commission's letters of 6 October and 8 December 1993 is irrelevant. First, the correspondence and the approval of eligible expenditure to which it refers should be seen in a purely accounting context, that of a simple account-closing operation expressed in the form of a recovery order containing neither citations nor grounds which does not constitute a decision within the meaning of Article 189 of the Treaty. Furthermore, the letter of 6 October 1993 contains only general information on the measure adopted by the D AFSE and gives no reason to assume that the Commission had already adopted the final decision approving the amount of the final payment claim. Since it contains no details of the decision adopted, that letter thus cannot be regarded as notification of the decision within the meaning of Article 191 of the Treaty. Accordingly, it was only by the letter of 12 May 1995 that the applicant was first apprised of the fact that the Commission had adopted a final decision approving the ESF assistance.
35First, the Commission essentially argues that the decision reducing the assistance granted by the ESF was in reality adopted by the DAFSE, since the rights of the Community were transferred to the DAFSE when, on 15 May 1991, it reimbursed to the Commission the balance payable by the applicant.
36That argument cannot be accepted. Pursuant to Article 6(1) of Regulation No 2950/83 the Commission alone is entitled to reduce ESF assistance. Accordingly, although the DAFSE, like any other national authority with competence for the financing of ESF activities, may, in a final payment claim submitted in accordance with Article 5(4) of the regulation, propose a reduction in ESF financial assistance, only the Commission has the power to reduce such assistance. It follows that it is the Commission which assumes, vis-à-vis the recipient, the legal responsibility for the decision by which its assistance was reduced, irrespective of whether that reduction was or was not proposed by the national authority concerned (Case T-85/94 (122) Commission v Branco [1995] ECR II-2993, paragraphs 23 and 24, and Case T-271/94 Branco v Commission [1996] ECR II-749, paragraph 39). The transfer of rights referred to in Article 6(2) of Regulation No 2950/83 does not affect in any way the power to reduce ESF assistance but only the rights of the Community to the refund of advances improperly paid, so that the transfer of rights necessarily presupposes a prior Commission decision reducing the assistance (Branco v Commission, paragraphs 42 and 43).
37In those circumstances, in the absence of any reference to a Commission decision to the effect that the amount of ESF assistance initially granted had been definitively reduced, the mere fact that the applicant was informed by letters from the DAFSE of the amounts which the DAFSE regarded as eligible for ESF assistance cannot in itself cause time to begin to run for the purpose of instituting proceedings as provided for in the fifth paragraph of Article 173 of the Treaty.
38It is therefore necessary to consider whether the Commission actually adopted a decision to reduce the ESF assistance in the file in question and, if so, to determine on what date that decision was brought to the applicant's knowledge.
39As the Commission has accepted, it was by the recovery order of 2 December 1991, referring to the applicant by name in the context of the file in question, that it sought to effect a definitive reduction of the ESF assistance initially granted and that it required the applicant to reimburse part of the advance paid, in accordance with the DAFSE's proposal. Such a recovery order produced legal effects such as to affect the applicant's legal position and thus constituted a decision which may be the subject of an action for annulment under Article 173 of the Treaty (Foyer Culturel de Sart-Tilman v Commission, cited above, paragraph 21, and Case T-450/93 Lisrestal v Commission [1994] ECR II-1177, paragraph 45).
40There is no reference in the letter sent to the applicant by the DAFSE on 20 January 1993, in resolution No 3/93 enclosed therewith or, a fortiori, in the DAFSE's letters of 10 April and 6 August 1991 (see paragraphs 7 and 8 above), which preceded the decision of 2 December 1991, to any decision of the Commission to reduce the ESF assistance. The applicant cannot therefore be regarded as having actually been informed on one of those dates of the existence of such a decision.
41However, following the question put by the Court requesting it to adduce any evidence of when the applicant acquired knowledge of the decision of 2 December 1991, and in particular any acknowledgement of receipt of the letter of 6 October 1993, the Commission produced two letters of 30 October and 23 November 1993 sent to it by the applicant, each of which made express reference, in the following terms, to the letter of 6 October 1993 as part of the correspondence exchanged with the Commission:‘Correspondence already exchanged with the Commission
...
Commission's letter No 20179, sent to the INEF on 6 October 1993’.
42Such an express reference, stating both the sender and the addressee and also the date and reference number of the letter in question, shows that, contrary to its allegations, the applicant was necessarily aware of the letter at the latest on 30 October 1993, the date of the first of the two letters (see Joined Cases T-452/93 and T-453/93 P evasa and Inpesca v Commission [1994] ECR II-229, paragraph 36). The applicant's argument that it had no knowledge of the letter of 6 October 1993, on the ground that it was not sent to its registered office or might have been placed in another file, is therefore irrelevant, since it is contradicted by the actual correspondence which it sent to the Commission.
43The Commission has, furthermore, produced a letter to the applicant dated 8 December 1993, in which the staff of DG V referred expressly to their letter of 6 October 1993 and set out, in virtually identical terms, the position which had been adopted by the Commission. The applicant has not denied having received such a letter.
44None the less, the applicant claims that the letter of 6 October 1993 cannot be regarded as proper notification of the contested decision, since it does not contain a detailed statement of the grounds of that decision.
45That argument cannot be accepted. It is settled law that, where the act in dispute is not published or notified, the period within which proceedings are to be instituted cannot start to run until the third party has precise knowledge of the content and grounds of the act in question, provided however that he asks, within a reasonable period from the date at which he becomes aware of its existence, for the full text of the act in question (see Dillinger Hüttenwerke v Commission, cited above, paragraph 14; Case C-102/92 Ferriere Acciaierie Sarde v Commission [1993] ECR I-801, paragraph 18; Case T-468/93 Frinii v Commission [1994] ECR II-33, paragraph 33; Socurte and Others v Commission, cited above, paragraph 49; and Case T-109/94 Windpark Groothusen v Commission [1995] ECR II-3007, paragraph 26).
46Even on the assumption that the letter of 6 October 1993 did not sufficiently inform the applicant of the grounds of the contested decision, that letter, which unequivocally states the Commission's final position as to the amount of ESF assistance definitively granted for the file in question, at least informed the applicant of the existence of the Commission's decision of 2 December 1991. The applicant cannot therefore claim that it was not informed of the existence of the decision until the Commission's letter of 12 May 1995, when that letter is merely a covering letter for the letter of 6 October 1993 and does not contain any additional information.
47In those circumstances, in accordance with the case-law referred to above, it was for the applicant, within a reasonable period of receiving the letter of 6 October 1993, to request the Commission or, as the case may be, the D AFSE for the full text of the decision concerned.
48However, the applicant does not claim to have made any such approach to the Commission or the DAFSE. It must be pointed out that, even if it is accepted that the applicant's letter of 6 April 1995 might constitute a request for the full text of the decision, that request was made almost 18 months after receipt of the letter of 6 October 1993 and therefore outside any reasonable period.
49It follows that the applicant has no grounds for claiming that the action is not out of time.
50The application must therefore be dismissed as inadmissible.