32The Commission raises an objection of inadmissibility on the ground that the contested act is not of direct concern to the applicant within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of Article 173 of the Treaty.
33The Commission first presents lengthy explanations describing the machinery of the rules and agreements in issue. It points out that the very nature of the arrangements made is such as to render the claim for annulment inadmissible.
34The Commission observes that the Memorandum of Understanding constitutes the basis of the agreement between the Community and the Russian Federation for the grant of the loan. The Memorandum of Understanding fixes the amount of the loan (ECU 349 million) and lists the conditions for approval of contracts.
35As regards the loan agreement, the Commission states that the implementation of the loan constitutes a private commercial act. It points out, first, that there is nothing to suggest that the facility for which it provides was to become available with effect from 15 January 1993, since clause 4 requires various conditions to be fulfilled prior to its becoming operational, and, second, that the loan agreement does not confer on it any role in the conclusion of the supply contracts, its involvement being limited to verifying that those contracts qualify for financing from the Community loan.
36As regards the actual documentary credit operation, the Commission observes that, even though an irrevocable credit creates a legally binding contract between the issuing bank and the debtor, such a contract nevertheless contains no covenant by the Community requiring the supplier's demand for payment to be met by the Community authorities. Moreover, like any unconfirmed credit, the documentary credit issued by the issuing bank merely creates a contingent liability on the part of that bank towards the supplier, since the latter's right to receive payment arises only when the company has submitted the documents showing that the acts required for payment have been performed, for example, by producing the documents proving shipment of the wheat. The Commission infers from this that the Community consequently assumes no liability towards the supplier or its bank, and observes that, although in practice the Community sends the supplier's bank a reimbursement undertaking when it receives a satisfactory disbursement request, that undertaking remains in any event subject to the essential data set out in the notice of confirmation and is, in particular, valid only in relation to the supplier's bank, to whom the Community merely guarantees that the issuing bank's obligation will be honoured in accordance with the documentary credit. The Commission points out that the right per se of a supplier to receive payment on the basis of an unconfirmed documentary credit exists only against the bank issuing the credit — in the present case, the VEB.
37As regards the supply contracts concluded with Exportkhleb, the Commission asserts that those contracts were signed before the Memorandum of Understanding and the loan agreement were concluded, and that the applicant had no control either over the loan agreement or over the date on which the issuing bank was to fulfil the conditions to be met in order for the loan to be made available.
38As regards the notice of confirmation, the Commission observes that that document is drawn up in accordance with the provisions of the loan agreement and cannot modify the contractual terms agreed between the applicant and Exportkhleb.
39Continuing with its opening remarks, the Commission notes the analogies between that system and the system governing the financing of development projects in the context of the Lomé Convention. As the Court of Justice stated in its judgment in Case 126/83 STS v Commission [1984] ECR2769, Article 120 of the Lomé Convention lays down the principle that States have sole responsibility for implementing projects and action programmes. Accordingly, they are responsible for preparing, negotiating and concluding the necessary contracts for the implementation of those operations. The Commission asserts that the position is the same as regards the system set up for the financing of imports of wheat, since the Memorandum of Understanding provides that the loan is to cover irrevocable documentary credits issued by the borrower pursuant to supply contracts. It maintains that it plays an even greater role within the Lomé system than in the context of the Russian loan, inasmuch as, in the latter case, it takes no part in the award of the contract.
40In the Commission's view, the contested letter of 1 April 1993 cannot be regarded as being of direct concern to the applicant within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of Article 173 of the Treaty. That letter was not, and could not have been, intended to modify the terms of the commercial contracts between the applicant and Exportkhleb. The Commission's role was solely to verify whether the financing conditions laid down by the documentation were fulfilled and, if so, to authorize disbursement of the Russian loan. It was not for the Commission to validate the commercial agreements. The consequence of the Commission's letter is merely that the loan can no longer be used to pay for deliveries of wheat under the revised terms of the contract.
41The Commission refers in that regard to the judgment of the Court of Justice in Case 126/83 STS v Commission, cited above, contending that that judgment raised comparable issues in the context of the Lomé Convention and that the decision on those issues is applicable by analogy to the present case.
42The Commission submits, finally, that, just as it is a third party to the sale contract between the Community undertaking and the competent Russian authority, the undertaking is a third party to the loan agreement. In those circumstances, the applicant cannot be directly concerned within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of Article 173 of the Treaty.
43The applicant draws attention, first, to the specific features of the system that has been set up, inasmuch as the funds lent are directly allocated for payment by the Community or its financial agent, Crédit Lyonnais, for the goods supplied pursuant to contracts approved by the Commission. The Russian borrower at no time has access to those funds, since the Russian loan in fact consists of a credit facility made available by the Community, recourse to which may be had by its financial agent. Approval of the sale contracts, the criteria, rules and conditions of which are defined in published Community provisions, creates a direct link with the vendor, since it confirms the latter's entitlement to the loan cover, which guarantees that he will be paid if the criteria laid down by the provisions are fulfilled; without that guarantee, he would not have entered into the contract. If the applicant is directly concerned by the approval of contracts, it is a fortiori concerned by a refusal to approve them.
44Next, the applicant contests the parallel drawn by the Commission with the judgments delivered by the Court of Justice in the context of the Lomé Convention. Thus, in STS v Commission, cited above, the applicant, in bringing proceedings against the Commission's decision approving the award of the contract to another tenderer, was in fact contesting the decision to accept that other tenderer's offer. In the present case, however, the decision of the Commission was not supplemental to the contract, which had already been concluded, but formed the very condition on which it was based. The action seeks only to contest a decision by the Commission refusing to approve the amended contract concluded between the applicant and Exportkhleb. Since the commercial contract is conditional on the issue of the credits by the Commission, the latter's refusal means that no legal nexus, and, by extension, no legal remedy, exists between the applicant and the Russian authorities. By contrast, a parallel should be drawn with Joined Cases 41/70, 42/70, 43/70 and 44/70 International Fruit Company and Others v Commission [1971] ECR411.
45Lastly, according to the applicant, it is apparent from the facts of the present case that it is directly concerned. As a direct result of the refusal to approve the amended contract, it has received only partial payment. There were numerous exchanges between the Commission and the applicant, which received, in particular, a copy of the notice of confirmation of 27 January 1993. Furthermore, in so far as performance of the initial contracts has proved problematic, that is solely because of the considerable delay in their being approved, which compromised the progress of the planned delivery programme and rendered the renegotiation of the contracts inevitable.
46The applicant, invoking legitimate expectations arising, in its submission, from letters sent by the Commission prior to its refusal to give its approval, claims that the requisite price alterations were ratified.
47According to the fourth paragraph of Article 173 of the Treaty, any natural or legal person may institute proceedings against a decision which, although in the form of a decision addressed to another person, is of direct and individual concern to the former.
48It is necessary, therefore, to determine whether the letter sent by the Commission to the VEB on 1 April 1993 is of direct and individual concern to the applicant.
49First of all, the Commission has not denied that the applicant is individually concerned. Having regard to the circumstances of the case, the Court considers that only the question whether the contested decision is of direct concern to the applicant need be examined.
50The Community rules and the agreements concluded between the Community and the Russian Federation provide for a division of powers between the Commission and the agent appointed by the Russian Federation to arrange the purchase of the wheat. It is for that agent — in the present case, Exportkhleb — to select the other contracting party by means of an invitation to tender and to negotiate and conclude the contract. The Commission's role is merely to verify that the conditions for Community financing are fulfilled and, where necessary, to acknowledge, for the purposes of the disbursement of the loan, that such contracts are in conformity with the provisions of Decision 91/658 and with the agreements concluded with the Russian Federation. It is not for the Commission, therefore, to assess the commercial contract with reference to any other criteria.
51It follows that the undertaking to which a contract is awarded has a legal relationship only with the party with whom it contracts, namely Exportkhleb, which is authorized by the Russian Federation to conclude contracts for the purchase of wheat. The Commission, for its part, has legal relations only with the borrower, namely the Russian Federation's financial agent, the VEB, which notifies it of the commercial contracts so that their conformity can be recognized, and which is the addressee of the Commission's decision in that regard.
52The action of the Commission does not therefore affect the legal validity of the commercial contract concluded between the applicant and Exportkhleb; nor does it modify the terms of the contract, particularly as regards the prices agreed by the parties. Thus, irrespective of the Commission's decision not to recognize the agreements as being in conformity with the applicable provisions, the amendment which the parties made on 23 February 1993 to their contract of 28 November 1992 remains validly concluded on the terms agreed between them.
53The fact that the Commission was in contact with the applicant or with Exportkhleb cannot affect that assessment of the legal rights and obligations which each of the parties involved has under the applicable legislation and contractual agreements. Moreover, as regards the admissibility of the application for annulment, the exchanges relied on by the applicant do not show that the Commission went beyond its proper role. Thus, the sole purpose of the alleged contacts between the Commission and the applicant in January 1993 was to have the parties include in their contract a condition which was indispensable for acceptance of conformity, but it was left to the parties alone to modify their contract if they wanted to secure the financing provided for. Furthermore, the fact that the Commission sent the applicant a copy of the notice of confirmation addressed to the VEB does not affect the legal significance of that notice.
54Whilst it is true that, on receiving from the Commission a decision finding that the contract is not in conformity with the applicable provisions, the VEB may not issue a documentary credit capable of being covered by the Community guarantee, nevertheless, as stated above, the decision affects neither the validity nor the terms of the contract concluded between the applicant and Exportkhleb. The Commission's decision does not take the place of a decision taken by the Russian national authorities, since the Commission may only examine the conformity of contracts for the purposes of Community financing.
55Moreover, in order to establish that the contested decision is of direct concern to it, the applicant cannot rely on the presence in the commercial contracts of a suspensory clause making the performance of the contract and payment of the price subject to acknowledgement by the Commission that the criteria for disbursement of the Community loan are fulfilled. Such a clause is a link which the contracting parties decide to make between the contract concluded by them and a contingent future event: their agreement will be binding only if the latter occurs. The admissibility of an application under the fourth paragraph of Article 173 of the Treaty cannot, however, be made to depend on the intention of the parties. The applicant's argument must therefore be rejected.
56Lastly, the Court considers that the applicant's claim for protection of a legitimate expectation that the amendment to the contracts would be validated by the Commission goes to the substance of the case and does not, therefore, affect its assessment of the admissibility of the action.
57In view of the foregoing, the Court considers that the Commission's decision of 1 April 1993, addressed to the VEB, is not of direct concern to the applicant, within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of Article 173 of the Treaty. Consequently, the application for annulment of that decision must be declared inadmissible.