EuGH · C-801/24

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (Fourth Chamber) 11 June 2026 ( *1 ) (Appeal – Restrictive measures taken in view of the military aggression against Ukraine – Decision 2014/145/CFSP – Article 2(1)(f) – Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 – Article 3(1)(f) – Freezing of funds and economic resources – Concept of ‘supporting, materially or financially, … the Government of the Russian Federation’ – Obligation to state reasons – Interpretation – Right to property – Limitations – Principle of proportionality – Account to be taken of the situation and economic interests of the appellant’s customers) In Case C‑801/24 P, APPEAL under Article 56 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, brought on 20 November 2024, NKO AO National Settlement Depository (NSD), established in Moscow (Russia), represented by E. Épron and A. Genko, avocats, appellant, the other parties to the proceedings being: Council of the European Union, represented by L. Berger and E. Nadbath, acting as Agents, defendant at first instance, European Commission, represented by M. Carpus-Carcea, L. Mantl and G. von Rintelen, acting as Agents, intervener at first instance, THE COURT (Fourth Chamber), composed of I. Jarukaitis, President of the Chamber, M. Condinanzi, N. Jääskinen, R. Frendo (Rapporteur) and A. Kornezov, Judges, Advocate General: L. Medina, Registrar: A. Calot Escobar, having regard to the written procedure, after hearing the Opinion of the Advocate General at the sitting on 15 January 2026, gives the following Judgment 1 By its appeal, NKO AO National Settlement Depository (NSD) seeks the setting aside of the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 11 September 2024, NSD v Council (T‑494/22, the judgment under appeal, EU:T:2024:607), by which the General Court dismissed its action seeking annulment: – of Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/883 of 3 June 2022 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2022 L 153, p. 92) and of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/878 of 3 June 2022 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2022 L 153, p. 15) (together, ‘the initial acts at issue’); – of Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/572 of 13 March 2023 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2023 L 75 I, p. 134) and of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/571 of 13 March 2023 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2023 L 75 I, p. 1) (together, ‘the first maintaining acts at issue’); and – of Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/1767 of 13 September 2023 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2023 L 226, p. 104) and of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1765 of 13 September 2023 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2023 L 226, p. 3) (together, ‘the second maintaining acts at issue’), in so far as all those acts (‘the acts at issue’) concern it. I. Legal context and background to the dispute 2 The factual and legal context of the dispute is set out in paragraphs 2 to 20 of the judgment under appeal and can be specified in summary as follows. 3 The appellant is a company incorporated under Russian law, which is a licensed depository providing securities record-keeping and custody services as the central depository in Russia and which also provides financial services, in particular as a non-bank credit institution licensed to provide bank settlement services. 4 The present case arises in the context of restrictive measures adopted by the European Union since 2014 in response to actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. 5 On 17 March 2014, under Article 29 TEU, the Council of the European Union adopted Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 78, p. 16). 6 On the same date, on the basis of Article 215(2) TFEU, the Council adopted Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 78, p. 6). 7 Following the invasion of Ukraine by the armed forces of the Russian Federation on 24 February 2022, on 25 February 2022, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2022/329 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2022 L 50, p. 1) and Regulation (EU) 2022/330 amending Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2022 L 51, p. 1). A. Decision 2022/329 8 Recitals 5 and 9 to 11 of Decision 2022/329 state: ‘(5) On 24 January 2022, … the Council reiterated that any further military aggression by Russia against Ukraine would have massive consequences and severe costs, including a wide array of sectoral and individual restrictive measures that would be adopted in coordination with partners. … (9) On 24 February 2022, the President of the Russian Federation announced a military operation in Ukraine and Russian armed forces began an attack on Ukraine. That attack is a blatant violation of the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. (10) On 24 February 2022, the High Representative [of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy] issued a declaration on behalf of the [European] Union condemning in the strongest possible terms the unprovoked invasion of Ukraine by armed forces of the Russian Federation and the involvement of Belarus in this aggression against Ukraine. The High Representative indicated that the Union’s response will include both sectoral and individual restrictive measures. (11) In view of the gravity of the situation, the Council considers that the criteria of designation should be amended to include persons and entities supporting and benefitting from the Government of the Russian Federation as well as persons and entities providing a substantial source of revenue to it, and natural or legal persons associated with listed persons or entities.’ B. Decision 2014/145 9 Article 2(1)(f) of Decision 2014/145, as amended by Decision 2022/329 (‘Decision 2014/145’), reads as follows: ‘All funds and economic resources belonging to, or owned, held or controlled by: … (f) natural or legal persons, entities or bodies supporting, materially or financially, or benefitting from the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine [‘the (f) criterion’]; … … and natural or legal persons, entities or bodies associated with them, as listed in the Annex, shall be frozen.’ 10 Article 2(5) of Decision 2014/145 provides, in essence, that the freezing of the funds and economic resources of a natural or legal person, entity or body does not prevent that person, entity or body from making a payment due under a contract entered into before the date on which that person, entity or body was included on the list in the annex to that decision, provided that the Member State concerned has determined that the payment was not received, directly or indirectly, by a natural or legal person, entity or body included on that list. 11 Under the third paragraph of Article 6 of that decision, the decision is to be kept under constant review and is to be renewed, or amended as appropriate, if the Council deems that its objectives have not been met. C. Regulation No 269/2014 12 Article 3(1)(f) of Regulation No 269/2014, as amended by Regulation 2022/330 (‘Regulation No 269/2014’), establishes a criterion identical to the (f) criterion with a view to funds and economic resources belonging to natural or legal persons, entities or bodies satisfying that criterion being frozen pursuant to Article 2(1) of that regulation. 13 Article 6(1) of Regulation No 269/2014 establishes that, provided that a payment by a natural or legal person, entity or body listed in Annex I to that regulation is due under a contract or agreement concluded by, or under an obligation that arose for, the natural or legal person, entity or body concerned before the date on which that natural or legal person, entity or body was included in that annex, the competent authorities may authorise the release of certain frozen funds or economic resources, provided that they determine that the funds or economic resources will be used by a natural or legal person, entity or body included on that list and that the payment to be made is not in breach of the prohibition on making funds or economic resources available, directly or indirectly, to natural or legal persons, entities or bodies listed in that annex or to persons, entities or bodies associated with them. 14 Article 14(4) of Regulation No 269/2014 provides that the list in Annex I to that regulation is to be reviewed at regular intervals and at least every 12 months. D. Regulation No 833/2014 15 Article 1 of Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 of 31 July 2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 229, p. 1), as amended by Council Regulation (EU) 2022/328 of 25 February 2022 (OJ 2022 L 49, p. 1) (‘Regulation No 833/2014’), provides: ‘For the purposes of this Regulation, the following definitions apply: … (o) “financing or financial assistance” means any action, irrespective of the particular means chosen, whereby the person, entity or body concerned, conditionally or unconditionally, disburses or commits to disburse its own funds or economic resources … …’ 16 In its original version, Article 4(3)(b) of Regulation No 833/2014 was worded as follows: ‘The provision of the following shall be subject to an authorisation from the competent authority concerned: … (b) financing or financial assistance related to technologies referred to in Annex II, including in particular grants, loans and export credit insurance, for any sale, supply, transfer or export of those items, or for any provision of related technical assistance, directly or indirectly, to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Russia or, if such assistance concerns technologies for use in Russia, to any person, entity or body in any other country.’ 17 As Article 3(3) of that regulation stated, in essence, in its original version, Annex II thereto listed certain technologies suited to the oil industry for use in deep water oil exploration and production, Arctic oil exploration and production, or shale oil projects in Russia. E. Regulation No 909/2014 18 Recital 2 of Regulation (EU) No 909/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on improving securities settlement in the European Union and on central securities depositories and amending Directives 98/26/EC and 2014/65/EU and Regulation (EU) No 236/2012 (OJ 2014 L 257, p. 1) states: ‘Due to their key position in the settlement process, the securities settlement systems operated by [central securities depositories] are of a systemic importance for the functioning of securities markets. …’ F. The acts at issue 1. The initial acts at issue 19 On 3 June 2022, in view of the gravity of the situation in Ukraine, the Council adopted the initial acts at issue. 20 Recital 2 of those acts states: ‘The Union remains unwavering in its support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and continues to condemn actions and policies undermining the territorial integrity of Ukraine.’ 21 By Decision 2022/883 and Implementing Regulation 2022/878 respectively, the appellant’s name was added, under number 101, to the list of entities annexed to Decision 2014/145 and to the list in Annex I to Regulation No 269/2014 (‘the lists at issue’), for the following reasons: ‘NSD is a Russian non-bank financial institution and Russia’s central securities depository. It is the largest securities depository in Russia by market value of equity and debt securities held in custody and the only one which has access to the international financial system. It is recognised as a systemically important Russian financial institution by the Government and the Central Bank of Russia. It plays an essential role in the functioning of Russia’s financial system and its connection to the international financial system, thus directly and indirectly enabling the Russian Government in its activities, policies and resources. It is almost fully owned by Moscow Exchange, whose mission is to provide exhaustive access to the Russian financial markets. Moscow Exchange is in turn, through its role and shareholders, under a high degree of control of the Russian Government. NSD is therefore an entity or body supporting, materially or financially, the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine.’ 22 On 3 June 2022, the Council also published in the Official Journal of the European Union a Notice for the attention of the persons, entities and bodies subject to the restrictive measures provided for in Council Decision 2014/145/CFSP, as amended by Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/883, and Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014, as implemented by Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/878 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2022 C 219 I, p. 1). That notice stated, inter alia, that the persons, entities and bodies concerned could submit a request to the Council, together with supporting documentation, asking that the decision to include their names on the lists at issue be reviewed. 23 By letter of 4 August 2022, the appellant asked the Council to provide a statement of reasons and evidence supporting the inclusion of its name on the lists at issue. 24 On 10 August 2022, the Council provided the appellant with file WK 7236/2022/EXT 1, on which it had based its decision. 2. The first maintaining acts at issue 25 By letter of 22 December 2022, the Council informed the appellant that it intended to maintain the restrictive measures taken against it, sent it file WK 17708/2022 INIT and invited it to submit its observations to the Council by 12 January 2023 at the latest. 26 On 13 March 2023, the Council adopted the first maintaining acts at issue, from which it is apparent that the appellant’s name was maintained on the lists at issue, for the same reasons as those set out in paragraph 21 of the present judgment. 27 By letter of 14 March 2023, the Council informed the appellant of the adoption of those acts and invited it to submit its observations to the Council by 1 June 2023 at the latest. 3. The second maintaining acts at issue 28 By letter of 10 July 2023, the Council informed the appellant that it intended to maintain the restrictive measures taken against it, sent it file WK 7807/2023 REV2 and invited it to submit its observations to the Council by 25 July 2023 at the latest. 29 On 13 September 2023, the Council adopted the second maintaining acts at issue, from which it is apparent that the appellant’s name was maintained on the lists at issue, for the same reasons as those set out in paragraph 21 of the present judgment. II. The action before the General Court and the judgment under appeal 30 By application lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 12 August 2022, the appellant brought an action seeking annulment of the acts at issue in so far as they concern it. 31 By decision of the President of the First Chamber of the General Court of 7 November 2023, the European Commission was granted leave to intervene in the proceedings in support of the form of order sought by the Council. 32 By two statements of modification, lodged on 25 April 2023 and 24 November 2023, the appellant, in essence, sought annulment of the acts at issue in so far as they concern it. 33 By the judgment under appeal, the General Court rejected all the pleas in law raised by the appellant in support of its action, alleging, in essence (i) infringement of the obligation to state reasons; (ii) manifest error of assessment; (iii) disproportionate infringement of the appellant’s fundamental rights; and (iv) failure to meet the requisite standard of proof. III. Forms of order sought by the parties to the appeal 34 By its appeal, the appellant claims, in essence, that the Court should: – set aside the judgment under appeal; – annul the acts at issue in so far as they concern it; and – order the Council to pay the costs. 35 The Council, supported by the Commission, claims that the Court should: – dismiss the appeal; and – order the appellant to pay the costs. IV. The appeal 36 In support of its appeal, the appellant raises three grounds of appeal, alleging, in essence (i) that the General Court erred in law in holding that the Council had complied with its obligation to state reasons for the acts at issue; (ii) misinterpretation of the (f) criterion; and (iii) error of law in so far as the General Court held that the restrictive measures taken against the appellant complied with the principle of proportionality. A. The first ground of appeal, alleging infringement of the obligation to state reasons 1. Arguments of the parties 37 By its first ground of appeal, the appellant claims, in essence, that the General Court erred in law in holding that the Council had complied with its obligation to state reasons for the acts at issue. 38 In the first place, the appellant observes that, in paragraph 39 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court recalled its case-law according to which the statement of reasons for an act of the Council imposing a restrictive measure must identify the actual and specific reasons why the Council considered, in the exercise of its discretion, that such a measure had to be adopted. Furthermore, in paragraph 42 of that judgment, on the adequacy of the statement of reasons for the acts at issue, the General Court held that, since it is not necessary for the statement of reasons to specify all the relevant facts and points of law, the appellant’s argument to the effect that those acts fail to identify how and when it supported the Russian Government or to mention any specific transactions in that respect, cannot succeed. According to the appellant, that reasoning is ‘contradictory’, in so far as it amounts to an implied acknowledgement, by the General Court, that the statement of reasons for those acts is incomplete, contrary to the case-law recalled by that court itself in paragraph 39 of that judgment. 39 That reasoning is therefore vitiated by an error of law, since it has the effect of validating acts which fail to state reasons in accordance with the requirements of Article 296 TFEU. 40 In the second place, the appellant submits that the factors, as set out in paragraph 41 of the judgment under appeal, relied on in support of the statement of reasons for the acts at issue, are nothing more than contextual information unrelated to any material or financial support provided to the Russian Government. With that information, the Council confined itself to specifying the identity of the entity subject to the restrictive measures at issue, its company objects and its shareholding structure. However, the lack of factual information relating to material or financial support of the kind referred to prevents any review of whether the statement of reasons for the acts at issue is sufficiently detailed and specific. 41 The Council, supported by the Commission, disputes the appellant’s arguments. 2. Findings of the Court 42 According to settled case-law, the purpose of the obligation to state the reasons on which an act adversely affecting an individual is based, which is a corollary of the principle of respect for the rights of the defence, is, first, to provide the person concerned with sufficient information to make it possible to ascertain whether the act is well founded or whether it is vitiated by a defect which may permit its legality to be contested before the Courts of the European Union and, second, to enable those Courts to review the legality of that act (judgment of 15 November 2012, Council v Bamba, C‑417/11 P, EU:C:2012:718, paragraph 49 and the case-law cited). 43 The statement of reasons for an act of the Council imposing a restrictive measure, such as the restrictive measures at issue in the present case, must identify the actual and specific reasons why the Council considers, in the exercise of its discretion, that that measure must be adopted in respect of the person concerned (judgment of 15 November 2012, Council v Bamba, C‑417/11 P, EU:C:2012:718, paragraph 52). 44 The statement of reasons required by Article 296 TFEU must, however, be appropriate to the act at issue and the context in which it was adopted. The requirements to be satisfied by the statement of reasons depend on the circumstances of each case, in particular the content of the act in question, the nature of the reasons given and the interest which the addressees of the act, or other parties to whom it is of direct and individual concern, may have in obtaining explanations. It is not necessary for the reasoning to go into all the relevant facts and points of law or to provide a detailed answer to the considerations set out by the person concerned when consulted prior to the adoption of that same act, since the question whether the statement of reasons is sufficient must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question (judgments of 15 November 2012, Council v Bamba, C‑417/11 P, EU:C:2012:718, paragraph 53 and the case-law cited, and of 22 April 2021, Council v PKK, C‑46/19 P, EU:C:2021:316, paragraph 48 and the case-law cited). 45 In particular, the reasons given for an act adversely affecting a person are sufficient if that act was adopted in a context which was known to that person and which enables him or her to understand the scope of the act concerning him or her (judgment of 15 November 2012, Council v Bamba, C‑417/11 P, EU:C:2012:718, paragraph 54). 46 In the first place, the General Court found, correctly, in paragraph 40 of the judgment under appeal, that the acts at issue indicated the context in which they had been adopted and the legal bases for their adoption. 47 In particular, it stated, in essence, that it was apparent from the preambles to those acts that the gravity of the situation in Ukraine, together with the continuance of actions undermining or threatening that country’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence, justified including and maintaining the persons concerned, including the appellant, on the lists at issue. 48 The General Court also found, in paragraph 41 of the judgment under appeal, that the reasons for including the appellant’s name on the lists at issue stated, in particular, that the appellant is Russia’s central securities depository, that it has access to the international financial system and that it is recognised as being a systemically important financial institution that plays an essential role in the functioning of Russia’s financial system, thus directly or indirectly enabling the Russian Government in its activities, policies and resources. Those reasons also stated that the appellant is almost wholly owned by Moscow Exchange, which, in turn, is subject to a high degree of control by that government. 49 In view of the context in which the acts at issue were adopted and of the statement of reasons in those acts, the appellant, in its capacity as Russia’s central securities depository, which that company itself acknowledges in its appeal, when it describes itself as an ‘important and central part of the Russian financial system’, could not reasonably have been unaware of the reasons why the Council adopted restrictive measures against it. 50 The General Court was therefore correct to hold, in paragraph 41 of the judgment under appeal, that the wording of the factual circumstances in the acts at issue constitutes a statement of reasons that is sufficiently clear and precise, first, to enable the appellant to understand why its name was included, and then maintained, on the lists at issue, and, second, to allow the General Court to exercise its power to review the legality of those acts. 51 Furthermore, contrary to the appellant’s claim, the General Court did not in any way acknowledge, even implicitly, in paragraph 42 of the judgment under appeal, that the statement of reasons for the acts at issue was in any way inadequate. That court, on the basis of the case-law of the Court of Justice referred to in paragraph 44 of the present judgment, held only, in essence, that the appellant’s argument, that those acts fail to state how or when the appellant supported the Russian Government and do not refer to any specific transaction in that respect, cannot cast doubt on either the adequacy or the consistency of the statement of reasons for those acts. 52 It follows that the appellant’s arguments, as summarised in paragraphs 38 and 39 of the present judgment, are based on a misreading of the judgment under appeal. 53 In the second place, the appellant claims that the factors relied on in support of the statement of reasons for the acts at issue constitute nothing more than contextual information unrelated to any material or financial support provided to the Russian Government, and do not allow any review to be carried out of whether the statement of reasons for those acts is sufficiently detailed and specific. 54 In that regard, it must be borne in mind that the duty to state reasons established in Article 296 TFEU is an essential procedural requirement which must be distinguished from the question whether the reasoning is well founded, which is concerned with the substantive legality of the act at issue. The reasoning on which an act is based consists in a formal statement of the grounds on which that act is based. If those grounds are vitiated by errors, those errors will vitiate the substantive legality of that act, but not the statement of reasons in it, which may be adequate even though it sets out reasons which are incorrect. It follows that objections and arguments intended to establish that an act is not well founded are irrelevant in the context of a ground of appeal alleging an inadequate statement of reasons or a lack of such a statement (judgment of 18 June 2015, Ipatau v Council, C‑535/14 P, EU:C:2015:407, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited). 55 In the present case, on the pretext of an infringement of the obligation to state reasons, the appellant is seeking, in reality, to challenge the merits of the reasons on which the acts at issue are based. Accordingly, its argument, set out in paragraph 40 of the present judgment, must be rejected. 56 In the light of the foregoing, the first ground of appeal must be rejected as unfounded. B. The second ground of appeal, alleging misinterpretation of the (f) criterion 57 The second ground of appeal is divided into two parts, the first alleging that the General Court erred in law in its interpretation of the concept of ‘supporting, materially or financially, … the Government of the Russian Federation’ within the meaning of the (f) criterion; and the second alleging an error of law in so far as the General Court, incorrectly, reduced the burden of proof to be borne by the Council. 1. First part of the second ground of appeal (a) Arguments of the parties 58 By the first part of its second ground of appeal, the appellant criticises the General Court for using a ‘broad, vague, and erroneous’ interpretation of the concept of ‘supporting, materially or financially, … the Government of the Russian Federation’ within the meaning of the (f) criterion. According to the appellant, that concept must be interpreted strictly, as meaning that it covers only forms of support consisting in the actual supply of goods or the transfer of funds for the direct benefit of the Russian Government. In particular, the (f) criterion aims to sanction only the persons, bodies and entities that ‘finance’ that government, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine, but does not include those which ‘assist in facilitating that financing’. 59 In that regard, the appellant submits, in the first place, that the judgment of 7 April 2016, Central Bank of Iran v Council (C‑266/15 P, EU:C:2016:208, paragraph 44), on which the General Court relied, by analogy, in paragraph 57 of the judgment under appeal, for the purposes of interpreting the (f) criterion, is irrelevant. Although the listing criterion at issue in the case that gave rise to that judgment, based on ‘support to the Government of Iran’, has certain similarities with the (f) criterion, it is not for that reason identical, and the General Court therefore could not properly rely on that judgment. 60 In the second place, the appellant claims that the concept of ‘supporting, materially and financially’ within the meaning of the (f) criterion must be interpreted in a similar way to the concept of ‘financial assistance’ in Article 4(3)(b) of Regulation No 833/2014. It relies, to that end, on the judgment of 28 March 2017, Rosneft (C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236, paragraphs 176 to 184), in which, in its view, the Court of Justice excluded the processing of a payment by a bank or other financial institution from the concept of ‘financial assistance’ in question. 61 In that context, the appellant submits that, as the central securities depository, its role consists solely in providing the technical means necessary for the organisation of State bond issuances. That activity cannot be regarded as being covered by the concept of ‘supporting, materially or financially’ within the meaning of the (f) criterion. In addition, the judgment under appeal does not in any way suggest that the appellant has provided direct material or financial support to the Russian Government in the form of revenue transferred to the State. 62 The Council, supported by the Commission, disputes the appellant’s arguments. (b) Findings of the Court 63 The (f) criterion provides for the freezing of all funds and economic resources ‘belonging to or owned, held or controlled by … natural or legal persons, entities or bodies supporting, materially or financially, or benefitting from the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine’ and ‘natural or legal persons, entities or bodies associated with them’. 64 In paragraph 57 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court, referring, by analogy, to the judgment of 7 April 2016, Central Bank of Iran v Council (C‑266/15 P, EU:C:2016:208, paragraph 44), held, in essence, that the concept of ‘supporting, materially or financially, … the Government of the Russian Federation’ within the meaning of the (f) criterion does not require that the persons or entities concerned provide support that is directly or indirectly linked to the annexation of Crimea or to the destabilisation of Ukraine. Indeed, according to the General Court, that support must be understood as any support that is capable, by its quantitative or qualitative importance, of providing the Russian Government with resources or facilities of a material or financial nature allowing it to pursue its actions to destabilise Ukraine. 65 In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, the meaning and scope of terms for which EU law provides no definition and in respect of which it makes no reference to the law of the Member States must be determined by reference to their usual meaning in everyday language, while also taking account of the context in which they occur and the purposes of the rules of which they form part (see judgments of 27 January 1988, Denmark v Commission, 349/85, EU:C:1988:34, paragraph 9, and of 12 February 2026, Stichting Koskea, C‑490/24, EU:C:2026:89, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited). 66 As regards, in the first place, the wording of the (f) criterion, it must be noted that neither Article 2(1)(f) of Decision 2014/145 nor any other provision of that decision contains a definition of the term ‘supporting’ or makes any reference to the law of the Member States to determine its scope. 67 According to its usual meaning in everyday language, the term ‘support’ denotes, in general, the provision of aid or assistance for the action or cause of another, with the aim of reinforcing that action or cause or facilitating its performance. 68 That broad meaning of the term ‘support’ is confirmed by the fact that the wording of the (f) criterion does not establish any requirement as regards the form of the support or the manner in which it is provided, with the exception of the clarification that it must be ‘[material] or [financial]’. Nor does that wording draw a distinction according to whether that support is provided directly or indirectly. 69 It follows that, from a literal perspective, the application of that criterion does not depend on the actual provision of goods or on the existence of a transfer of funds directly benefiting the Russian Government. 70 As regards, in the second place, the context of the (f) criterion, it should be noted that, if that criterion had to be interpreted, in accordance with the appellant’s claim, as referring only to persons, bodies and entities that ‘finance’ the Russian Government, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine, and therefore excluding those that ‘assist in facilitating’ that financing, the scope and effectiveness of the (f) criterion would be called into question, since ‘supporting, materially or financially’ the Russian Government is not confined solely to financing it, but also covers any contribution that is capable, by its quantitative or qualitative importance, of facilitating the financing of that government. Such an interpretation would effectively allow circumvention of the restrictive measures imposed, by setting up an artificial distinction between entities that support that government financially and those which ‘assist in facilitating’ that financing. 71 As regards the appellant’s argument that the concept of ‘supporting, materially and financially’ within the meaning of the (f) criterion must be given an interpretation comparable to the concept of ‘financial assistance’ in Article 4(3)(b) of Regulation No 833/2014, it should be borne in mind that, in accordance with Article 1(o) of that regulation, the concept of financial assistance concerned implies, in essence, that the person, entity or body concerned disburses or commits to disburse its own funds or economic resources. 72 As the Advocate General stated in point 39 of her Opinion, the material scope of Article 4(3)(b) of Regulation No 833/2014, on the one hand, and that of Article 2(1)(f) of Decision 2014/145, on the other, are different. The first of those provisions refers specifically and exclusively to the goods and technologies listed in Annex II to Regulation No 833/2014, in respect of which the provision of financing or financial assistance to any natural or legal person, any entity or any body in Russia, while not explicitly prohibited, requires prior authorisation from the competent authority of the Member State concerned. The second of those provisions, for its part, sets out one of the listing criteria, which gives rise to the freezing of the funds or economic resources belonging to the persons, entities or bodies designated by the Council as satisfying the criterion in question. 73 Accordingly, interpretation of the (f) criterion cannot depend on the concept of ‘financial assistance’ within the meaning of Article 4(3)(b) of Regulation No 833/2014. For the same reason, the interpretation that the Court gave to that concept in the judgment of 28 March 2017, Rosneft (C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236), is irrelevant in the present case. 74 As regards, in the third place, the objectives pursued by the (f) criterion and by the rules of which it is part, it must be noted that, as is apparent from recital 11 of Decision 2022/329, that criterion was introduced the day following the invasion of Ukraine by the armed forces of the Russian Federation, which has been described, as recitals 9 and 10 of that decision state, as ‘unprovoked’ and as a ‘blatant violation of the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine’, both by the Council and by the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. 75 In view of the gravity of that invasion and of the fact that the Council had stated one month previously, as is apparent from recital 5 of that decision, that any further military aggression against Ukraine by the Russian Federation would have massive consequences, including as regards costs in the form of both sectoral and individual restrictive measures, it should be understood that, as the General Court stated, in essence, in paragraph 56 of the judgment under appeal, the Council intended, by adopting the (f) criterion, to exert additional pressure on the Russian Federation and to increase the costs to the latter of its actions to undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, so that it would put an end to its military aggression against that country and, more generally, to its actions and policies destabilising it. 76 In that regard, as the Advocate General stated, in essence, in point 42 of her Opinion, the (f) criterion could not contribute effectively to achieving those objectives if it had to be interpreted as entailing only support in the form of direct financing for the Russian Government or of the direct provision of material resources to that government. 77 In order to achieve those objectives, the (f) criterion should be interpreted as referring to any support that is capable, by its quantitative or qualitative importance, of providing the Russian Government with material or financial resources or facilities allowing it to pursue its actions to destabilise Ukraine, and it is not necessary to establish a direct or indirect link between that support and those actions. That interpretation is such as to ensure that the European Union is able to exert pressure on that government, inasmuch as it enables the European Union to target natural or legal persons, entities and bodies which, although they do not themselves transfer funds or goods directly to that government, nevertheless perform a crucial role in the making available, circulation or safety of the material or financial resources from which that government benefits. 78 As the General Court noted in paragraph 88 of the judgment under appeal, central securities depositories, such as the appellant, are regarded as being systemically important entities that are critical, in particular, for the effective implementation of monetary policy, the credibility of a government’s debt management programme, collateral management, and safe and efficient securities markets. In that latter respect, the appellant itself acknowledges, in its appeal, that it provides technical means necessary for the provision of financial services in relation to the issuing of State bonds and that the majority of Russian financial investment in the European Union is channelled through its services. Furthermore, EU law explicitly enshrines the systemic importance of central securities depositories, in Regulation No 909/2014, in particular in recital 2 thereof. 79 In the light of the considerations set out in paragraphs 66 to 78 of the present judgment, it must be found that the General Court did not err in law when it held, in paragraph 57 of the judgment under appeal, that the concept of ‘supporting, materially or financially, … the Government of the Russian Federation’ within the meaning of the (f) criterion does not require that the persons or entities concerned provide support that is directly or indirectly linked to the annexation of Crimea or to the destabilisation of Ukraine, but that the support in question must be understood as being any support that is capable, by its quantitative or qualitative importance, of providing that government with material or financial resources or facilities allowing it to pursue its actions to destabilise Ukraine. 80 Consequently, the first part of the second ground of appeal must be rejected as unfounded. 2. Second part of the second ground of appeal (a) Arguments of the parties 81 By the second part of its second ground of appeal, the appellant submits that the General Court erred in law by holding, in paragraph 50 of the judgment under appeal, that the Council discharges its burden of proof if it presents to the Courts of the European Union a body of sufficiently specific, precise and consistent evidence to establish that there is a sufficient link between the person or entity subject to a measure freezing the funds of that person or entity and the regime or, in general, the situations being combated. 82 According to the appellant, the use of such a standard of proof is only permissible if it is provided for in a decision of the Council. Since that is not the situation in the present case, the General Court was wrong to reduce the burden of proof to be borne by the Council. 83 In any event, the appellant claims that there is nothing to prevent a change in the case-law referred to in paragraph 50 of the judgment under appeal, consisting in abandoning the use of that standard of proof, in order to strengthen the rule of law in a context characterised by the adoption of rules that it describes as ‘increasingly arbitrary’. 84 The Commission claims that the second part of the second ground of appeal is inadmissible because the appellant has failed to set out, with the requisite clarity and precision, the error of law allegedly made by the General Court. On the substance, both the Council and the Commission submit that the General Court followed the settled case-law of the Court of Justice on the standard of proof applicable in relation to restrictive measures. (b) Findings of the Court (1) Admissibility 85 In accordance with settled case-law, it is apparent from the second subparagraph of Article 256(1) TFEU, the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and Article 168(1)(d) and Article 169(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice that an appeal must indicate precisely the contested elements of the judgment under appeal and the legal arguments specifically advanced in support of the appeal, failing which the appeal or the ground of appeal in question will be dismissed as inadmissible (judgments of 4 October 2024, thyssenkrupp v Commission, C‑581/22 P, EU:C:2024:821, paragraph 57 and the case-law cited, and of 15 January 2026, Anbouba v Council, C‑494/24 P, EU:C:2026:9, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited). 86 In the present case, it should be noted that the appellant identified the precise paragraph of the judgment under appeal that it is seeking to criticise by the second part of its second ground of appeal, and that it set out the errors of law allegedly made by the General Court in that paragraph, with the result that the second part of that ground is admissible. 87 The plea of inadmissibility raised by the Commission must therefore be rejected. (2) Substance 88 In paragraph 50 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court recalled its case-law according to which, in essence, whether or not the factual basis relied on by the Council in a decision adopting or maintaining restrictive measures is sufficiently solid must be assessed by examining the evidence and information not in isolation, but in their context. According to that case-law, the Council discharges its burden of proof if it presents to the Courts of the European Union a body of sufficiently specific, precise and consistent evidence to establish that there is a sufficient link between the person or entity subject to a measure freezing the funds of that person or entity and the regime or, in general, the situations being combated. 89 In that regard, it should be noted, first, that the case-law referred to originated in the case-law of the Court of Justice (see, inter alia, judgments of 21 April 2015, Anbouba v Council, C‑605/13 P, EU:C:2015:248, paragraphs 52 and 54; of 28 July 2016, Tomana and Others v Council and Commission, C‑330/15 P, EU:C:2016:601, paragraph 82; and of 1 August 2025, Timchenko v Council, C‑702/23 P, EU:C:2025:605, paragraph 39). 90 Second, there is no rule of EU law that requires the Council, in its decisions imposing restrictive measures, to specify the standard of proof applicable in that field. 91 The General Court cannot therefore be criticised for relying on the principles set out in paragraph 50 of the judgment under appeal. 92 Furthermore, as regards the (f) criterion, a sufficient link is established between the person or entity subject to a fund-freezing measure and the regime or, in general, the situations being combated where, as stated in paragraph 77 of the present judgment, the entity concerned provides the Russian Government with any support that is capable, by its quantitative or qualitative importance, of providing that government with material or financial resources or facilities allowing it to pursue its actions to destabilise Ukraine, and it is not necessary to establish a direct or indirect link between that support and those actions. 93 That conclusion is not shaken by the appellant’s argument that the case-law referred to in paragraph 50 of the judgment under appeal should be changed to abandon the use of a standard of proof based on a ‘body of evidence’, with a view to strengthening the rule of law. The standard of proof required by the Courts of the European Union in the field of restrictive measures is in line with the fact that those measures are precautionary, temporary and reversible and that their validity is always subject to the continuing existence of the factual and legal circumstances that led to their adoption (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 February 2023, Boshab v Council, C‑708/21 P, EU:C:2023:84, paragraph 59). Furthermore, that standard of proof has no bearing on the fact that the judicial review of the lawfulness of the reasons forming the basis of a decision to include or to maintain a person’s name on the list of persons subject to restrictive measures entails a verification of the factual allegations in the statement of reasons underpinning that decision, with the consequence that the review in question cannot be restricted to an assessment of the cogency in the abstract of the reasons relied on, but must concern whether those reasons, or, at the very least, one of those reasons, deemed to be sufficient in itself to support that decision, are substantiated (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 April 2023, Council v El-Qaddafi, C‑413/21 P, EU:C:2023:306, paragraph 107 and the case-law cited). 94 It follows that the aforementioned standard of proof enables the Courts of the European Union to carry out a full and effective review of the factual basis for the restrictive measures adopted by the Council, although without imposing on the latter a burden of proof that would be incompatible with the constraints due to urgency that surround the introduction of such measures and with the fact that they are precautionary. 95 The second part of the second ground of appeal must therefore be rejected as unfounded. 96 Consequently, the second ground of appeal must be rejected in its entirety as unfounded. C. The third ground of appeal, alleging incorrect assessment of the proportionality of the restrictive measures at issue 97 The third ground of appeal is divided into two parts, the first alleging that the General Court erred in law, in the context of examining the purported disproportionate breach of the appellant’s fundamental rights, by failing to assess the legal situation of the appellant’s customers and the effects on them caused by the restrictive measures at issue; and the second alleging that the General Court erred in law by holding that those measures complied with the principle of proportionality. 1. First part of the third ground of appeal (a) Arguments of the parties 98 By the first part of its third ground of appeal, the appellant claims that the General Court, in the context of examining the purported disproportionate breach of its fundamental rights, failed to take into consideration the situation of its customers and the effects that the restrictive measures at issue had on their economic interests, in particular on their ability to access and manage their investments, and the harm that those customers suffered, even though they are not in any way involved in the armed conflict between the Russian Federation and Ukraine. 99 In that regard, first, the appellant argues that the case-law cited in paragraph 129 of the judgment under appeal, according to which, in essence, the infringement of a subjective right can be relied on only by the person whose right has allegedly been infringed, but not by third parties, is irrelevant in the present case. That case-law was established neither in the context of restrictive measures nor in the context of examining compliance with the principle of proportionality. 100 Examination of compliance with the principle of proportionality necessarily involves considering all the effects of the restrictive measures at issue, which should have led the General Court to assess the alleged infringement of the appellant’s fundamental rights from the perspective of its customers’ right to property. 101 The appellant makes clear, however, that it is seeking annulment of the restrictive measures at issue on account not of a breach of its customers’ right to property but of the economic consequences of those measures, which are completely disproportionate and counterproductive in the light of the objectives pursued by those measures and affect its customers and users. 102 Second, it claims that, in the absence of an effective derogation mechanism in Regulation No 269/2014 making it possible to authorise the release of frozen funds or economic resources, the restrictive measures at issue seriously interfere with its customers’ right to property. It adds that, in practice, implementation of the derogations by the competent national authorities has been accompanied by particularly strict conditions and that those authorities have failed to publish, or have published only at a late stage, the precise procedures applicable to the filing and processing of applications for the release of frozen funds and economic resources, which has made it excessively difficult to have recourse to those derogations. It follows that the appellant’s customers have not been able to obtain the unfreezing of their funds or economic resources. 103 The Council claims that the first part of the third ground of appeal is inadmissible because it constitutes a new argument, in so far as the appellant is invoking, for the first time at the appeal stage, a separate breach of the principle of proportionality as a general principle of EU law, independently of the alleged infringements of fundamental rights that it claimed at first instance. That new argument accordingly changes the subject matter of the proceedings brought before the General Court. In any event, the Council and the Commission claim that the third ground of appeal is unfounded. (b) Findings of the Court (1) Admissibility 104 It must be borne in mind that, under the second sentence of Article 170(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the subject matter of the proceedings before the General Court may not be changed in the appeal. 105 Thus, according to settled case-law, the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice in an appeal is limited to review of the findings of law on the pleas and arguments debated before the General Court. A party cannot therefore put forward for the first time before the Court of Justice a plea in law which it has not raised before the General Court, since that would amount to allowing that party to bring before the Court of Justice, whose jurisdiction in appeals is limited, a case of wider ambit than that which came before the General Court . That said, an appellant is entitled to lodge an appeal relying, before the Court of Justice, on grounds and arguments which arise from the judgment under appeal itself and seek to criticise, in law, its correctness (judgment of 6 October 2021, Sigma Alimentos Exterior v Commission, C‑50/19 P, EU:C:2021:792, paragraphs 38 and 39 and the case-law cited). 106 In the present case, by the first part of its third ground of appeal, the appellant criticises the General Court for failing to take into account, in the context of examining the alleged disproportionate breach of its fundamental rights, either the situation of its customers or the effects that the restrictive measures at issue had on them, and disputes the finding that it was not entitled, in support of its action for annulment, to rely on a right to property that it did not hold. That line of argument originates in the judgment under appeal itself, in particular in the examination of the third plea in law raised in support of that action, alleging disproportionate breach of the appellant’s fundamental rights. 107 Accordingly, by that first part, the appellant is challenging the legal inferences drawn by the General Court from the approach taken by that court itself to a plea debated before it, and therefore, contrary to the Council’s submission, that part does not constitute a new argument and does not change the subject matter of the proceedings that the General Court was called upon to hear. 108 Consequently, the plea of inadmissibility raised by the Council must be rejected. (2) Substance 109 The appellant’s arguments that, when examining the alleged disproportionate breach of its fundamental rights, the General Court failed to take into account the situation of its customers and the effects that the restrictive measures at issue had on their interests cannot succeed. 110 In that regard, it should be noted, as a preliminary point, that, in paragraph 129 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court held, in essence, that the appellant cannot rely, in support of its action for annulment, on a right to property that it does not hold. It is clear from the arguments set out by the appellant under the first part of its third ground of appeal that it is not disputing the restrictive measures at issue on account of a breach of its customers’ right to property, but on account of the economic consequences of those measures, which it considers to be completely disproportionate and counterproductive in the light of the stated objectives of those measures, and to have foreseeable and proven effects on its customers and its users, themselves not subject to any individual restrictive measures. 111 The appellant’s arguments must therefore be understood as referring, in essence, to a breach of the principle of proportionality. In those circumstances, it is not necessary, in the present case, to determine whether the appellant could rely on a breach of a right to property that it does not hold. 112 That said, it should be noted that the General Court in fact took account of the economic consequences caused by the restrictive measures at issue, including on the appellant’s customers, when it examined whether those consequences are proportionate in the light of the objective pursued. 113 In that regard, the General Court, first of all, in paragraph 129 of the judgment under appeal, noted that there were legal remedies available to the appellant’s customers before the national courts, before which those customers could, inter alia, claim a breach of their right to property enshrined in Article 17 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’). 114 Furthermore, in paragraphs 132 and 133 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court held, correctly, that, where a national authority decides on a request to release frozen funds pursuant to the derogations laid down by Decision 2014/145 and Regulation No 269/2014, it is required to observe the Charter, as provided for in Article 51(1) thereof (see, by analogy, judgment of 12 June 2014, Peftiev and Others, C‑314/13, EU:C:2014:1645, paragraph 24). It inferred from the foregoing that if a customer of the appellant that is not included on the lists at issue makes a request for the release of the customer’s funds or economic resources that have been frozen on account of the appellant’s inclusion on those lists, it is for the national authorities to ensure that the interference with the right to property of the customer concerned is in compliance with the conditions laid down in Article 52 of the Charter. 115 Second, the General Court examined the system of derogations aimed at authorising the release of certain frozen funds or economic resources, as provided for by Regulation No 269/2014, to determine whether that system could enable the appellant to return its customers’ securities that were held in the appellant’s frozen accounts with depositories established in the European Union. 116 In that regard, the General Court noted first of all, in paragraph 149 of the judgment under appeal, that, pursuant to the derogation under Article 2(5) of Decision 2014/145, the freezing of the funds and economic resources of a natural or legal person, entity or body does not prevent that person, entity or body from making a payment due under a contract entered into before the date on which that person, entity or body was included on the list in the annex to that decision, provided that the Member State concerned has determined that the payment was not received, directly or indirectly, by a natural or legal person, entity or body included on that list. 117 Next, the General Court noted, in essence, in paragraph 150 of the judgment under appeal, that, in accordance with Article 6(1) of Regulation No 269/2014, provided that a payment by a natural or legal person, entity or body listed in Annex I to that regulation is due under a contract or agreement concluded by, or under an obligation that arose for, the natural or legal person, entity or body concerned before the date on which that natural or legal person, entity or body was included in that annex, the competent national authorities may authorise the release of certain frozen funds or economic resources, provided that they determine that the funds or economic resources will be used by a natural or legal person, entity or body appearing in that annex and that the payment to be made is not in breach of the prohibition on making funds or economic resources available, directly or indirectly, to natural or legal persons, entities or bodies listed in that annex or to natural or legal persons, entities or bodies associated with them. 118 In the context thus defined, the General Court held, in essence, in paragraphs 151 and 152 of the judgment under appeal – without being challenged on that point by the appellant –, that, since funds or economic resources may be released to enable a person, entity or body to make a ‘payment’ under a contract or agreement concluded with a third party before the date on which that person, entity or body was included on the lists at issue, the concept of ‘payment’ within the meaning of Article 6(1) of Regulation No 269/2014 must be interpreted broadly and cannot be confined to payments in the form of the transfer of a sum of money. A restrictive interpretation of that concept would run counter to the very fact that the appellant’s frozen funds or economic resources can be released. The General Court concluded from the foregoing that the derogation provided for in Article 2(5) of Decision 2014/145 and in Article 6(1) of Regulation No 269/2014 authorises national authorities to release those funds or economic resources in order to enable the appellant to make a payment taking the form of the return of its customers’ securities which the appellant held in its frozen accounts with securities depositories established in the European Union. 119 Last, as regards the appellant’s argument that the derogations laid down by Regulation No 269/2014 have not enabled its customers to obtain the release of their funds or economic resources as a result of overly restrictive conditions imposed by the national authorities or because those authorities were slow to act, it must be noted that, as the General Court observed in paragraph 155 of the judgment under appeal, in the context of an action under Article 263 TFEU, the Courts of the European Union have no jurisdiction to rule on the lawfulness of a measure adopted by a national authority (judgment of 17 September 2014, Liivimaa Lihaveis, C‑562/12, EU:C:2014:2229, paragraph 48 and the case-law cited). 120 In view of all the foregoing, the first part of the third ground of appeal must be rejected as unfounded. 2. Second part of the third ground of appeal (a) Arguments of the parties 121 By the second part of its third ground of appeal, the appellant disputes, in essence, paragraphs 134 to 146 of the judgment under appeal, in which the General Court held that the conditions justifying interference with its right to property and its freedom to conduct business, laid down in Article 52(1) of the Charter, were satisfied. 122 In that regard, the appellant submits, in the first place, that, by including it on the lists at issue, the Council intended in reality to freeze the assets of all Russian investors, without listing them individually and identifying them to the required extent. That approach constitutes a misuse of powers, with the effect that the acts at issue are vitiated by a manifest and irremediable breach of the principle of proportionality. 123 In the second place, the appellant claims that the restrictive measures taken against it are permanent rather than temporary, since those measures have remained in force for more than two years after the date on which they were adopted, without any political change having occurred in Russia. It also criticises the General Court for failing, in paragraphs 137 and 139 of the judgment under appeal, to take account of whether those measures were actually effective. 124 In the third and last place, the appellant submits that the mere fact that it is the nominal holder of accounts with depositories established in the European Union cannot be sufficient for it to be classified as a holder of funds and economic resources, within the meaning of Article 2 of Regulation No 269/2014. 125 The Council, supported by the Commission, disputes the appellant’s arguments. (b) Findings of the Court 126 In the first place, as regards the appellant’s argument that its inclusion on the lists at issue is a result of the Council’s wish to freeze the assets of all Russian investors indistinguishably, without listing them individually or identifying them sufficiently, in breach of the principle of proportionality, it must be noted that that argument is invoked for the first time at the appeal stage. According to the case-law cited in paragraph 105 of the present judgment, that argument must be rejected as inadmissible. 127 In the second place, as regards the appellant’s arguments alleging that the restrictive measures at issue are permanent, suffice it to note that, under the third paragraph of Article 6 of Decision 2014/145, that decision is to be kept under constant review and is to be renewed, or amended as appropriate, if the Council deems that its objectives have not been met. Similarly, according to Article 14(4) of Regulation No 269/2014, the list in Annex I to that regulation is to be reviewed at regular intervals and at least every 12 months. 128 It follows that, as the General Court noted in paragraph 136 of the judgment under appeal, those measures are temporary and reversible. 129 That finding is not called into question by the appellant’s argument that the fact that those measures have been maintained for more than two years after the date on which they were adopted, without any political change having occurred in Russia, casts doubt on whether they are temporary and reversible. According to the case-law, the legality of restrictive measures is not dependent on their being found to have immediate effects; all that is required is that they are not manifestly inappropriate in regard to the objective that the competent institution seeks to pursue (judgment of 17 September 2020, Rosneft and Others v Council, C‑732/18 P, EU:C:2020:727, paragraph 97). 130 Pursuant to that case-law, the appellant’s argument criticising the General Court for failing to take into account, in paragraphs 137 and 139 of the judgment under appeal, whether the restrictive measures at issue are actually effective, should be rejected. 131 In that regard, it is sufficient to note, as the General Court did in paragraph 139 of the judgment under appeal, that, since the objective pursued by the Council when it adopted those measures was to reduce the revenue of the Russian State and to put pressure on the Russian Government, in order to diminish the latter’s ability to finance its actions undermining the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, the approach of targeting economic operators which, like the appellant, support that government materially or financially is consistent with that objective and cannot, as a consequence, be regarded as manifestly inappropriate with regard thereto (see, by analogy, judgment of 28 March 2017, Rosneft, C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236, paragraph 147). 132 In the present case, the appellant is not claiming, and nor, therefore, has it demonstrated, that those measures were manifestly inappropriate with regard to that objective. 133 In the third and last place, as regards the appellant’s argument disputing that it can be classified as a holder of funds or of economic resources, within the meaning of Article 2 of Regulation No 269/2014, it must be noted that a criticism which is so vague and, in particular, does not expressly refer to any paragraph of the judgment under appeal, is not such as to enable the Court of Justice to determine whether it is well founded and, therefore, does not satisfy the requirements laid down by the case-law recalled in paragraph 85 of the present judgment. That argument must therefore be rejected as inadmissible. 134 In view of all the foregoing, the second part of the third ground of appeal must be rejected as, in part, unfounded and, in part, inadmissible. 135 Consequently, the third ground of appeal must be rejected in its entirety as, in part, unfounded and, in part, inadmissible. 136 Since none of the grounds of appeal raised by the appellant can be upheld, the appeal must be dismissed in its entirety. V. Costs 137 Pursuant to Article 184(2) of the Rules of Procedure, where the appeal is unfounded, the Court is to make a decision as to costs. 138 Under Article 138(1) of those rules, applicable to appeal proceedings by virtue of Article 184(1) thereof, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. 139 Since the Council has applied for the appellant to be ordered to pay the costs and since the latter has been unsuccessful, the appellant must be ordered to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the Council. 140 In accordance with Article 140(1) of the Rules of Procedure, applicable to appeal proceedings pursuant to Article 184(1) thereof, the Member States and the institutions which have intervened in the proceedings are to bear their own costs. Consequently, the Commission must bear its own costs. On those grounds, the Court (Fourth Chamber) hereby: 1. Dismisses the appeal; 2. Orders NKO AO National Settlement Depository (NSD) to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the Council of the European Union; 3. Orders the European Commission to bear its own costs. Jarukaitis Condinanzi Jääskinen Frendo Kornezov Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 11 June 2026. A. Calot Escobar Registrar I. Jarukaitis President of the Chamber ( *1 ) Language of the case: English.